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Introduction 
Scholars remain intrigued by the "totalitarian" regimes of 
the twentieth century, especially those of Germany and the 
Soviet Union. They have, for the past forty years, repeatedly 
tried to explain how the governments of Hitler and Stalin 
functioned and why they maintained so much public support 
in the face of the atrocities they committed. What is even 
more inexplicable is the fact that both the Nazis and the Bol-
sheviks seized power from governments that promised their 
citizens a great deal of personal freedom. Why did the Ger-
man and Russian people willingly surrender the rights guar-
anteed by these governments and entrust their fortunes to 
regimes that tried completely to control their lives? 
In pursuing answers to this question, historians have nat-
urally turned to the study of Nazi and Leninist propaganda 
techniques. Works by Ernest K. Bramsted, Jay W. Baird, Ro-
bert Herzstein, Ian Kershaw, David Welsh, and W.A. Boelcke 
have dealt with this subject from the German perspective.! 
These books share two important characteristics. First, all 
of them are concerned primarily with the period after the 
Nazis came to power and say little regarding Nazi propaganda 
during the Kampfzeit (time of struggle). Secondly, the National 
Socialist Press, aside from Oron Hale's The Captive Press in the 
Third Reich , has been, until quite recently, largely ignored. The 
publication of books by Dennis Showalter, William Combs, 
and Norbert Frei and Johannes Schmitz, as well as Peter 
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Stein's important bibliography, Die NS Gaupresse 1925-1933, 
are a beginning in the filling of this historiographical gap. 
Once again, however, with the exception of Stein's and Sho-
walter's books, these works are concerned primarily with 
the period after 1933. Much work remains to be done.2 
This study is not only concerned with pre-1933 Nazi pro-
paganda but also, more specifically, with the impact of a 
newspaper in spreading Nazi ideas. It deals with the role of 
Goebbels's Berlin organ, Der Angriff, in his battles with the 
Weimar "system" as well as German Communism. The peri-
od under consideration-often called the "Blood Years" by 
the- Nazis-encompasses events from the establishment of 
the newspaper in July 1927 until the Nazi "seizure of power" 
in January 1933. 
The primary function of Der Angriff was to attack National 
Socialism's political enemies. For Goebbels and the editors of 
the newspaper, the Jews, the creators of both Bolshevism and 
democracy, were the primary enemy. A violent anti-Semitism 
permeated the pages of Der Angrif, and the Jews became the 
scapegoat for all of Germany's, indeed the world's, problems. 
According to Der Angriff, the main force confronting the 
"world Jewish conspiracy" was the National Socialist Ger-
man Workers' Party (NSDAP) and its front-line troops, the Stur-
mabteilung (SA). The SA, composed of at first hundreds and 
later thousands of unemployed working-class youths, became 
a crusader against Jewry and its revolutionary force, Marx-
ism. A section of Der Angriff, "Kampf um Berlin," was dedi-
cated to reporting the violent street clashes between the SA 
and the Rotfrontkaempferbund or RFB (the paramilitary orga-
nization of the German Communist Party or KPD). SA men in-
jured or killed in the struggle for the control of Berlin's streets 
became heroes on the pages of the Berlin newspaper. Horst 
Wessel, murdered by the KPD in 1930, became the archetypical 
Nazi hero. Much of the legend concerning his personality and 
exploits-a major chapter in Nazi mythology-began on the 
pages of Der Angriff. It was the system, created by the "No-
vember Criminals," which the Berlin paper held responsible 
for the deaths of Wessel and other Germans in the struggle 
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against the Jews. Der Angriff played a vital role in this battle 
with the system. 
Oron Hale, in his The Captive Press in the Third Reich, dis-
misses Goebbels's foray into newspaper publishing as totally 
ineffective. He claims that "as an afternoon journal it never 
achieved a large circulation" and that "Goebbels' reputation 
as a militant Gauleiter and master propagandist should not 
be extended to newspaper editing and publishing." My re-
search, however, indicates that, in reality, Der Angriff played a 
much more important role in the rise of National Socialism 
in Berlin than Hale allows.3 
In order to establish the importance of Der Angriff, I will 
have to address various issues and answer a number of ques-
tions. How did the newspaper serve as a forum for Nazi 
ideas? What were these ideas? What was its role in internal 
party struggles? How did it depict the battle in the streets 
between the SA and the RFB? How effective was the Nazi press 
as a campaign tool? At whom was Der Angriff's propaganda 
aimed? Who read the newspaper? How did the Weimar gov-
ernment respond to its attacks? My work deals with all of 
these questions in trying to determine the role of the news-
paper in the emergence of National Socialism in Berlin. 
In addition, my research makes a contribution to two 
other major historiographical debates. The first of these has 
to do with the nature of Nazi ideology. Was it the product of a 
basically anti modernist world view, or was it simply a new 
way of embracing modernity? Though the fact that the Nazis 
were willing to make use of a newspaper in their propaganda 
may seem to suggest that the Nazis accepted the world of the 
twentieth century, a careful examination of the copy con-
tained in Der Angriff forces one to come to a different conclu-
sion. National Socialism contained a vibrant anti modernist 
component. 
Traditionally, historians have argued that, following a 
poor showing in the May 1928 elections, there was a dramatic 
shift in the focus of the NSDAP's propaganda. Before this date, 
the Nazis aimed their propaganda primarily at Germany's 
working classes, hoping to compete with the Communists 
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and Socialists. Supposedly realizing that the majority of 
their meager support came from the countryside, the Nazi 
leadership decided to shift its propaganda focus to appeals to 
the peasantry. A careful examination of Der Angriffs copy 
both before and after May 1928 indicates that the situation 
was, in fact, much more complicated than this, with local 
leaders having extensive control over the propaganda lines 
they pursued. The Nazis did not give up on the proletariat 
after the spring of 1928. 
Further, Der Angrif{ is of interest because it provided 
Goebbels with his first opportunity to develop many of the 
propaganda techniques he would use during the Third Reich. 
Such themes as the "Unknown SA Man" and the "myth of 
resurrection and return" made their first appearance on the 
pages of this newspaper. A study of Der Angrif{ is vital to un-
derstanding subsequent developments in Nazi mythology. 
Finally, this study will attempt a partial explanation re-
garding why many Germans were willing to place their nation 
in the hands of anti-Semitic thugs totally without experience 
in government. By 1930, the economic collapse of Europe had 
placed Germany in such a dire situation that many people 
were willing to turn to anyone who promised to relieve their 
distress. Part of the appeal of the Nazis (as well as the German 
Communist Party) was that they openly professed that they 
would do whatever was necessary to end the economic depres-
sion. Der Angrif{ played a vital role not only in placing the 
Nazis in a positive light but also in attacking the Weimar Re-
public, convincing millions of Germans that democratic gov-
ernment (con trolled by the Jews) was at the root of Germany's 
problems. 
A Fulbright-Hays Grant aided in the completion of the re-
search for this project. A ten-month stay in West Berlin pro-
vided opportunities to visit all of the major archives with 
holdings concerning Der Angrif{. This is particularly impor-
tant when one considers the scarcity of secondary evidence on 
this subject. Aside from Hans-Georg Raehm's pro-Nazi and 
largely propagandistic "Der Angriff," 1927-1930: Der nation-
alsozialistische Typ der Kampfzeit, there is no major secondary 
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work dealing with Der Angriff. Bramsted's book on National 
Socialist propaganda and Helmut Heiber's biography of Goeb-
bels touch upon the subject only in passing. Therefore, the bulk 
of this project is based upon archival sources.4 
A note on organization is also appropriate. The first two 
chapters deal with the period before the creation of Der An-
griff and the institutional history of the paper respectively. 
They are organized, for the most part, chronologically. The 
next four chapters are concerned \¥ith the major propaganda 
themes pursued in the paper. Bec~use of the subject matter, 
they are organized thematically. The final chapter deals with 
Der Angriff and the law. Noticeably absent from this work is a 
chapter dealing specifically with anti-Semitism. This is a 
function of the contention made here that anti-Semitism was 
at the root of all Der Angriff's propaganda. To single out anti-
Semitism as a separate phenomenon would therefore be arti-
ficial and make it appear that it was only one aspect of Goeb-
bels's propaganda. 
Because of the issues raised, this study should contribute 
to the literature on the rise of National Socialism. No major 
secondary work has been published on the history of Gau 
Berlin before 1933. These frenetic years saw numerous politi-
cal parades, speakers haranguing people in the streets, and 
battles-often ending in death-between political factions. 
Joseph Goebbels also began his foray into political propagan-
da. All these incidents can be seen on the pages of Der Angriff. 
1 
The Berlin NSDAP 
before Der Angriff, 
1920-1927 
Chaos characterized the early history of National Socialism 
in Berlin. Promoted by the atmosphere of the capital after the 
revolution of November 1918, the party emerged as one of nu-
merous voelkisch (far right) groups determined to destroy the 
fledgling republic. Because of the fragmented nature of right-
wing politics during this period, the origins of National So-
cialism in Berlin are extremely difficult to trace, but 1920 
appears to be an appropriate point of departure. In that year, 
a chapter of the repugnant Jew-baiter Julius Streicher's Ger-
man Socialist Party or DSP (Deutschsozialistischen Partei) 
was founded in the capital city. The following year this group 
renamed itself National Socialists (Streicher Group).' 
November 1922 saw the establishment of the first Orts-
gruppe Berlin der NSDAP (Local Branch of the Berlin NSDAP) 
at the Restaurant Reichskanzler in Kreuzberg. This group, 
however, was short-lived. The murder of Foreign Minister 
Walther Rathenau by right-wing extremists had led to pas-
sage of the Republikschutzgesetz (Law for the Defense of the 
Republic) under which Prussian Interior Minister Carl Sever-
ing had outlawed numerous political parties aimed at the vi-
olent overthrow of German democracy. Among those receiv-
ing a Verbol (prohibition) in Prussia was the NSDAP. Therefore, 
the newly formed Nazi organization called itself the Gross-
deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Greater-German Workers' Party) 
or GDAP. The title of the new group did not mask its political 
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goals, and Severing banned the party on 10 January 1923. The 
National Socialist movement in Berlin would not reemerge 
until after the ill-fated Beer Hall Putsch and Adolf Hitler's 
release from prison.2 
Although a party organization was not permitted during 
the years 1923-1925, the evolution of the groups that would 
become the paramilitary wing of the NSDAP, the Sturmab-
teilungen (Storm Sections), or SA, continued. The period 1921-
1923 witnessed the genesis of the so-called Voelkische Turn-
erschaften (People's Gymnastic Groups). Mere fronts for right-
wing hooliganism, these clubs were important forerunners of 
the SA and engaged in the burgeoning civil war in the streets of 
Berlin. For example, in April 1924, members of the Turner-
schaft Hutten, on their way to a political rally in the Blueth-
nersaele on Luetzowplatz, brawled with members of the Ger-
man Communist Party (KPD), both sides suffering numerous 
injuries. Even before the April clash with the KPD, the Turn-
erschaften were being absorbed by the newly founded Front-
bann. This group, led in the north by the former SA chief, Ernst 
Roehm, would play an important role in the development of 
the Berlin SA. By March 1925, the Frontbann Berlin-Branden-
burg had two thousand members.3 
About this time, the Frontbann formed an alliance with 
the newly reestablished Ortsgruppe Berlin of the NSDAP. On 
17 February 1925, ten days before Hitler officially reestab-
lished the Nazi Party, Erich Thimm founded the new Nation-
al Socialist group. The following month, Hitler upgraded the 
organization to the Gau Gross-Berlin der NSDAP (Greater-
Berlin Region of the NSDAP), which included the entire pro-
vince of Brandenburg. The Fuehrer also named Dr. Ernst 
Schlange the first Gauleiter (regional leader) of Berlin's 350 
Nazis.4 
For the first month of the party's existence, it maintained 
close ties with the Frontbann, portions of which served as the 
paramilitary arm of the NSDAP. Since most of the Frontbann 
insisted upon maintaining its independence from the Nazis, 
pressure grew within the party to sever ties with the organiza-
tion. The split between the Nazi movement and the Frontbann 
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as well as the founding of the Berlin SA occurred on 22 March 
1926. On this date, the leadership of the Berlin Frontbann met 
in the Wernicke bar on Potsdamerstrasse. Kurt Daluege led the 
faction, which included about one-fifth (450 men) of the Front-
bann, that seceded and offered its allegiance to the Nazis, 
forming the core of the new SA. The remaining 80 percent gave 
its support to Erich Ludendorff's Tannenbergbund, one ofnu-
merous other extreme nationalist groups in Weimar Germany. 
In June, the NSDAP announced that membership in the Front-
bann was not a substitute for belonging to the SA.5 
In spite of the creation of the SA and the upgrading of the 
local organization to Gau status, the movement did not pros-
per. Intra-party strife and political impotence infested the par-
ty organization. The bone of contention in these disagreements 
was one not of party program but of power. The Nazis divided 
into two factions, one supporting Gauleiter Schlange, the oth-
er behind SA leader Daluege. In August 1926, Berlin's 120 dis-
trict leaders met in the Haberlandt Hall to discuss the Gau 
leadership post. The Daluege faction had shrewdly waited un-
til Schlange was on vacation to make its move. The opening of 
the meeting foreshadowed subsequent events. The introduc-
tory remarks made by the temporary Gauleiter, Erich Schmie-
decke, were, as the official Situation Report recorded, "inter-
rupted by noise and interruptions coming from the majority of 
those present." Daluege then took action. Claiming that both 
Schlange and Schmiedecke were corrupt, he insisted that they 
be called before the party's Court of Honor. The leader of the 
Berlin Court of Honor, a man identified only as Hageinan, ar-
gued that Schmiedecke should resign in light of the charges 
brought against him and that a committee should be estab-
lished to run the Gau. The Berlin ss chief, Wolter, claiming au-
thority from Hitler, removed Schmiedecke and made Knodn 
acting Gau Leader. In addition, the regional leaders voted to 
establish a committee to oversee the Gau. This is the first ex-
ample of the rift between the SA and the party leadership that 
would come to characterize Gau Berlin in the 1930s. Given the 
anarchy within the party, it is small wonder that much of the 
Berlin party leadership enthusiastically greeted the appoint-
ment of Joseph Goebbels as Gauleiter in October 1926.6 
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Goebbels earned his reputation as an effective organizer in 
the Ruhr Valley. An excellent speaker, his "leftist" views en-
abled him to appeal to the working class of the heavily indus-
trialized region. He worked his way up the party hierarchy as a 
protege of Gregor Strasser, who, along with his brother OUo, 
ran a voelkisch publishing house, Kampfverlag, in Berlin. The 
Strassers were notorious within the movement for their some-
what unorthodox views-they took the word "socialism" in 
the party's title seriously-and quarreled often with Hitler. 
Goebbels's connection with the Strassers both helped and hin-
dered his appointment as leader of the Berlin Nazis. Though it 
was clear that his anticapitalist views would aid in his mission 
to the largely working-class Berlin populace, Hitler was hesi-
tant to appoint a potential dissident to such an important 
post? 
During the course of 1926, this impediment was removed. 
Goebbels's conversion to blind support of Hitler, which would 
take years, began at this time. Even after breaking with the 
Strassers, he was often critical of his Fuehrer. Political ene-
mies, hoping to discredit Goebbels as an opportunist, proba-
bly misrepresented his actions at the Bamberg leadership 
conference of February 1926. In Bamberg, he allegedly broke 
completely with the Strassers and became an unquestioning 
supporter of Hitler. Goebbels's diaries paint a somewhat dif-
ferent picture. Here one sees hesitancy on his part. Although 
he clearly found Hitler's personality compelling, Goebbels 
frequently disagreed with the Fuehrer's program and was 
less willing to surrender his principles than his opponents 
claimed. Hence, it took several months for him to come 
around to support of Hitler.s 
Goebbels's visit to Munich in April 1926 was probably 
when Hitler finally won him over. The Fuehrer treated him 
well, going out of his way to impress his visitor. Hitler ex-
tended Goebbels every courtesy, dining with him on a num-
ber of occasions and loaning him his car. On 13 April, Goeb-
bels recorded his impressions of a meeting with Hitler: "We 
are moving much closer." He realized that his ideas and the 
Fuehrer's were not very different. Hitler also wanted to so-
cialize "combines, trusts, production of finished articles, 
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transport, etc." The ideological rift between them was be-
coming narrower. "I am reassured all around," he contin-
ued. "Taken all round he is a man. With his sparkling mind 
he can become my leader. I bow to his greatness, his politi-
cal genius!" They parted friends, Goebbels now Hitler's con-
sistent but by no means unquestioning ally.9 
With the eruption of controversy in Berlin in the summer 
of 1926, a search for a new Gauleiter for the capital began. 
The party leadership considered Goebbels for the post. Prob-
ably because he recognized the inherent difficulties of going 
to Berlin, Goebbels was much more interested in a position 
in Munich as the party's general secretary, but he received 
neither position at this time.lO 
At the 1926 party congress in Weimar, the first at which 
the Berlin NSDAP was represented, the Berlin leadership be-
gan to court Goebbels for the Gauleiter post. Hitler offered 
him the job in August; in response, Goebbels "sent a semi-
refusal to Munich regarding Berlin," because "I do not want 
to kneel in muck." The Berlin party membership did not re-
lent. He met with the regional leadership in September. Ap-
parently, the last obstacle to his accepting the position was 
his salary. The Gau, which was on the verge of bankruptcy, 
simply could not afford to pay what Goebbels demanded. Na-
tional headquarters removed this last barrier by agreeing to 
pay his salary. This final impediment removed, Goebbels ac-
cepted the position)! 
This appointment indicates several things about the atti-
tudes of the national leadership of the NSDAP. First, the naming 
of one of the movement's rising stars to the Gauleiter post of 
Berlin-even going so far as to pay his salary-evinces the 
seriousness of the Nazis' intent to build a bridgehead in north-
ern Germany, where they had had little success. The NSDAP 
received a scant 2 percent of Berlin's votes in the most recent 
Reichstag election. Hitler and his cohorts hoped to improve 
upon these results. Also, the fact that Goebbels was known for 
his "leftist" sympathies, which would enable him to appeal to 
antibourgeois elements in Berlin, indicated the seriousness 
with which the Nazis intended to pursue the "urban plan," 
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under which they attempted to compete with the proletarian 
parties (Communists and Socialists) for the support of Ger-
many's workers. Hitler realized that if he were to gain power 
legally he would need support in northern Germany, and 
Goebbels would lead the Fuehrer's struggle in the capital city. 
Berlin had gained a new importance in the movement's plans. 
It is small wonder that the Berlin party, at least officially, wel-
comed the news of Goebbels's appointment.i2 
The new Gauleiter assumed leadership of Berlin's three 
thousand Nazis in November 1926. Among the first things he 
did was visit the district headquarters in the basement of a 
Hinterhaus on Potsdamerstrasse dubbed the Opiumhoehle 
(Opium Den). The situation there discouraged him. Perme-
ated by tobacco smoke, the Opium Den was little more than a 
filthy hangout for unemployed members of the SA. It contained 
few of the amenities necessary for a serious political party, 
such as even rudimentary office equipment. Hence, in his first 
circular to the party membership, Goebbels made acquiring 
new offices his top priority. It would not be until January 1927 
that the Gau moved its headquarters to Lutzowstrasse 44. In 
the meantime, the new Gau leader informed the party that 
loitering in the Potsdamerstrasse offices would not be toler-
ated; it interfered with serious work.n 
As part of the incentive to get him to go to Berlin, the 
Fuehrer granted Goebbels powers that no other Gauleiter, 
with the exception of Hitler himself (Gauleiter of Munich), 
possessed. Not only could he appoint local leaders, a right 
traditionally held by the national organization, but Goebbels 
also controlled the Berlin SA. Instead of reporting to the na-
tional SA leadership, Daluege, as chief of the Berlin SA, was 
responsible directly to the Gau leader. Goebbels realized 
that, given the history of Gau Berlin, claiming these powers 
would prove problematic. He was, however, determined to do 
so. He began this process at a 9 November meeting in the 
Kriegervereinhaus in Spandau, a stronghold of the move-
ment. As leader of the party in the Reich capital, Goebbels 
called for an end to all disagreements within the party-they 
had often led to physical confrontations in the past-and de-
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manded the establishment of unity around his leadership. He 
insisted that those who rejected these conditions should re-
sign their memberships. One-fifth of the approximately one 
thousand people present did so. While Goebbels alienated a 
significant portion of the party membership by his actions, 
those who remained within the Nazi fold agreed to support 
him, thereby solidifying his power.14 
Goebbels also realized that the creation of a strong infra-
structure was necessary for his and the party's success and 
brought order to the previously disorganized Berlin party ap-
paratus. Maintaining that "first the organization had to be 
strengthened from within, then we could take the struggle for 
Berlin to the streets," he purged incompetent party leaders. 
Realizing that the rank and file needed to become more in-
volved in party affairs, he insisted that small assemblies be 
held, at least weekly, on the local level. Here the conversation 
was to revolve less around the daily problems of the member-
ship and turn to propagating the Nazi world view. While this 
caused many apathetic Nazis to resign their memberships, a 
strong core of dedicated members remained around which 
Goebbels could construct the party. Larger assemblies of be-
tween 1,000 and 1,500 members, usually held in the Krieger-
vereinhaus, allowed him to deliver his message to the rank 
and file personally. Weekly meetings, known as Gautage (dis-
trict assemblies), held on Sunday afternoons, brought the 
leadership of the SA and party organizations together to dis-
cuss ideology and propaganda and generally to instill a sense 
of "direction." 15 
The new Gauleiter also got the party's finances in order, 
making a special appeal to the membership, which assured 
him the 1,500 Reichsmarks (RM) per month needed to rent a 
new headquarters. He also established the Nationalsozial-
istischer Freiheitsbund (National Socialist Freedom Union). 
Membership in this exclusive organization came with a spe-
cial monthly contribution. In four months Goebbels had made 
the party solvent. The Gau could afford the new headquarters 
on Luetzowstrasse and had secured 8,000-10,000 RM worth of 
office equipment as well as an automobile. Fiscal success, cou-
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pled with organizational restructuring, made the Berlin NSDAP 
a well-organized, tightly-knit political organization.'6 
These improvements were but a means to an end: political 
power. Goebbels held that "whoever conquers the streets, con-
quers the masses, thereby conquering the state." With this 
conception of the path to political power, the Nazi leader natu-
rally needed a method for winning the streets, which he saw as 
dominated by the "Jewish-Bolshevik" hordes of the KPD and 
Social Democrats (SPD). He would need front-line troops in 
this struggle, men to fight his battles, and the Berlin SA would 
provide them. Therefore, Goebbels also reorganized the storm 
troops on more centralized, hierarchical, lines, assuring his 
control in the offensive against "Red Berlin." 17 
The Gauleiter's view of the struggle for the streets was 
different from the traditional rabble-rousing, nihilistic vio-
lence characteristic of the Berlin SA before his arrival. Violent 
clashes with the Communist or Socialist paramilitary organ-
izations, the Red Front Fighters' League (RFB) and the Reichs-
banner respectively, would no longer be the raison d'etre of 
the SA. In accordance with Hitler's plans to make the NSDAP a 
legitimate political party, it would become more of a propa-
ganda troop. The storm trooper's primary goal was to be-
come representative of the Nazi Party, to make it visible to 
the masses, to serve as "the vanguard of the movement." He 
would not only physically turn back the "Reds" but also 
march in Aufmaersche (parades) and distribute flyers. The SA 
should establish, Goebbels argued, that the NSDAP was will-
ing to fight for Germany's honor, that the Nazis were a party, 
not of words like all the rest, but of deeds, of action. Hence, 
although the barroom brawls with the enemy that the SA men 
so enjoyed were necessary, they should not be ends in them-
selves. In order to mold the SA into what Goebbels wanted it 
to be, discipline had to be imposed; the SA needed to behave 
like a real army.18 
These concepts would serve the Nazi leader well in the 
long run, during the six-year struggle for power in the streets 
of Berlin. They were also important to his immediate concern. 
The biggest problem facing the Berlin NSDAP was the simple 
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fact that it was largely ignored. It was but one of numerous 
right-wing fringe groups within the city; many Berliners had 
not even heard of it. What the Nazis of Berlin needed above all 
else was publicity; they needed to be noticed. Goebbels, hold-
ing that "Berlin needs sensation like a fish needs water," was 
prepared to provide it to gain the attention of the citizens of 
the city. If he caused enough large disturbances, he believed 
that even Berliners, largely anesthetized by all the political 
activity in the Reich capital, would notice. Propaganda, in-
cluding political violence, would be his means of achieving 
this goal.I 9 
An excellent way to promote violent reaction to his par-
ty's ~ctivities was to take the fight to the enemy's territory, to 
take the political offensive. Hence, many Nazi Massenversam-
mlungen (mass rallies) took place in working-class districts of 
Berlin. This not only would serve to foment confrontation 
with the "Reds" but would also take the Nazi message direct-
ly to its target, the proletariat, especially those who had been 
deceived into supporting Marxism.20 
The offensive began soon after Goebbels arrived in the city. 
On 14 November 1926, Berlin's 280 SA men marched "through 
the red stronghold of Neukoelln." Onlookers had assaulted 
many of the Nazis on their way to the assembly point for the 
march, and, so the Nazi account goes, members of the RFB 
lined the parade route along the Kaiser-Friedrich Strasse, 
singing the "Internationale." The RFB, wielding knives, al-
legedly physically assaulted the peaceful marchers as well. In 
spite of being attacked on the Hermannplatz, the SA continued 
to its goal, Hallesches Tor. Thirteen storm troopers were badly 
hurt, but the march was a success. The SA men had paraded 
through a working-class district, establishing that the Com-
munists did not control the streets and gaining much-needed 
publicity.21 
Minor actions such as the parade through Neukoelln con-
tinued, but it was not until 25 January 1927 that Goebbels 
scored his first major propaganda success. On that day, he 
held a mass rally at the Seitz Festsaele in Spandau. Five 
hundred RFB men were in attendance, hoping to disturb the 
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assembly. The Nazis, Goebbels later claimed, were interested 
in an honest debate, so the SA expelled all troublemakers. The 
two-hour meeting was a straightforward attempt to win the 
proletariat from Marxism, he argued, to speak "man to man." 
Violence erupted when, as a member of the RFB took the po-
dium to rebut Goebbels, the Gau leader conveniently received 
word that Communists had assaulted two Nazis who had left 
the meeting early. One of them had been stabbed and sup-
posedly lay dying in the hospital. The Gauleiter announced 
that he would not carryon a discussion with murderers, and 
the Communist approaching the podium shoved him away 
from it. Seeing their leader assaulted, the SA attacked the RFB. 
A brawl ensued, during which the outnumbered Communists 
retreated. The SA remained in control of the hall and had, 
Goebbels held, achieved an important moral victory.zz 
An even more dramatic clash took place about three weeks 
later in the Pharussaele, a popular location for KPD assemblies 
in the proletarian district of Wedding. The posters announcing 
a Nazi meeting to take place there proclaimed that "The bour-
geois state is approaching its end. A new Germany must be 
forged. Workers of the brain and fist, in your hands lies the 
destiny of the German people. On Friday, 11 February, Phar-
ussaele! Theme: the break-up of the bourgeois class state." The 
poster is evidence of a popular Nazi propaganda ploy: empha-
sizing National Socialism's sympathy for the working class 
and hatred of capitalism. It did not work, however. The RFB 
placed stickers outside of the Pharussaele stating: "Red Wed-
ding for the Red proletariat. Whoever dares to put his foot into 
the Pharus-Saele will be beaten to a pulp."23 
Goebbels, the featured speaker for the evening, arrived in 
Wedding at about 8:00 P.M. to discover Communists roaming 
the streets waiting to harass Nazis on their way to the rally. 
Upon reaching the door of the hall, the Gauleiter's story goes, 
the leader of the ss (Schutzstaffel or bodyguard) guard in-
formed him that the police had closed the doors at 7:15 and 
that a full two-thirds of the two thousand spectators present 
were Communists. Goebbels saw an opportunity to reach the 
proletarian masses and expose the lies their Marxist leaders 
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had spread about the NSDAP, so he decided to give his speech 
before the hostile audience. As he approached the podium, 
cries of" Bluthund" (bloodhound) and" Arbeitermoerder" (mur-
derer of workers) filled the hall. The crowd would not be qui-
eted. Fifteen SA and ss men surrounded the stage as Goebbels 
tried to speak. Each time he began, a Communist in the rear of 
the hall shouted, "Point of orderl" The assembly leader, Da-
luege, informed the heckler that, since this was a Nazi meet-
ing, he had no right to bring up a point of order. Goebbels dis-
patched his guards to quiet down the troublemaker, whom the 
storm troopers carried to the stage.24 
At this point, someone threw a beer glass at the podium. 
A pitched battle resulted. Glasses, beer bottles, table legs, 
and chairs served as weapons. The Nazis were able to drive 
out their opponents, making Goebbels's claims that the as-
sembly was two-thirds Communist appear doubtful. Daluege 
then called the meeting to order, and Goebbels gave one of 
the most important speeches he would make during the 
"time of struggle." He had ten of the most seriously injured 
storm troopers brought up on the stage. There, surrounded 
by bleeding "aristocrats of the Third Reich," he ended his 
speech with exhortations to the "unknown SA man," who 
fought not for self-aggrandizement but for the glorification of 
Germany. The Gau leader had developed a powerful new pro-
paganda motif to which he would often turn during the next 
six years. By the time the meeting ended, the police had 
cleared the streets outside the hall, thereby avoiding further 
violence.25 
That was not the end of the matter. The Berlin Nazis re-
ceived a further windfall from the battle in the Pharussaele: 
publicity. The major Berlin papers carried stories about the 
incident, which Goebbels quoted at length in his own ac-
count. The Berliner Morgenpost counted fourteen injured in 
the brawl, four of whom had to be hospitalized. The news-
paper insisted, in a more credible estimate than that of the 
Nazis, that one hundred Communists were present. The Welt 
am Abend claimed that Daluege said that there would be no 
open discussion as promised and that three hundred men at-
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tacked the justifiably angry Communists who protested this 
development.26 
The confrontation received front-page coverage in the 
Communist daily, Rote Fahne. The Communist paper claimed, 
like the Welt am Abend, that the Nazis denied the Communists 
present the opportunity to voice their opinions. Then, this ac-
count continues, the Nazis attacked the workers present with-
out provocation. The workers, caught off guard because of 
their peaceful intentions, were the unsuspecting and unde-
serving victims of Nazi thugs wielding table legs and chairsP 
Probably neither the account of the Communists nor that 
of the Nazis was entirely accurate. Exactly what occurred in 
the Pharussaele will never be known. Much more important, 
however, from the point of view of the historian, were the 
results. The NSDAP gained valuable publicity; people talked 
about the party. A political movement consisting of a few 
thousand adherents had become a force in the capital city. 
Berliners simply could no longer ignore the Nazis. 
The newly won political notoriety of the Berlin Nazi Party 
led to an increase in the number of violent clashes between the 
SA and RFB. Among the most interesting of these episodes oc-
curred in March in the Lichterfelde-Ost train station. Mem-
bers of the SA were returning from a ceremony in the town of 
Trebbin. RFB men were on the same train, also returning from a 
rally, theirs in Leuna. According to Nazi accounts, when the 
train halted in Lichterfelde, in the southern reaches of Berlin, 
the RFB fired upon the detrained Nazis as the train rolled out of 
the station. In response, a storm trooper jumped upon the 
train and pulled the emergency brake. A fight ensued in which 
the ss troops awaiting the arrival of their comrades became 
involved. Between sixty and one hundred shots were fired. At 
least two storm troopers were hit, one in the leg and the other 
in the pelvis.28 
The police intervened and, Goebbels recounted, escorted 
the defeated RFB from the station. Fifteen Communists were 
hurt. The Nazis assembled outside the station and marched 
north to the Kurfuerstendamm, the cultural center of Berlin. 
Once there, they assaulted Jewish passersby on the street, 
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and were even so bold as to enter the Romanische Cafe, a 
salon at the center of Berlin's intellectual life, in pursuit of 
Jews.29 
This incident earned the Nazis much publicity; the story 
even occupied the first two pages of Rote Fahne. It recounts, 
in a version somewhat different from Goebbels's, how four to 
five hundred Nazis fired upon "20-25 Communist workers" 
without provocation. The SA and SS, not the RFB, had guns. In 
the bloody battle that ensued, the Nazis inflicted wounds 
upon twenty Communists, six of whom were badly hurt, 
while suffering a mere two injuries themselves. Rote Fahne 
as much as admitted that the "fascists" won this battle 
when it said that "when, in the future, bands of fascists at-
tack workers, events must not proceed as in Lichterfelde," 
but the Nazis must feel the "fist" of the proletariat.3D 
Goebbels, while realizing that political violence could 
help gain a reputation as a dynamic movement for the NSDAP, 
also knew that it could get the party into serious trouble. 
Therefore, at the beginning of 1927, he issued orders forbid-
ding the SA to carry weapons, hopefully avoiding another pro-
hibition as in 1923. This order did not prevent the storm troop-
ers from arming themselves, however, and, in the long run, the 
much-feared prohibition came. When it did, the possession of 
weapons was not an issue.31 
Events reached their climax after Hitler gave a speech ex-
clusively to party members-he was forbidden to give public 
speeches in Prussia-in a Berlin beer hall called the "Clou" on 
1 May 1927. Because of a negative reaction to the speech in the 
"Jewish" press, Goebbels called a public assembly to rebut 
newspaper accounts of the Fuehrer's address. This meeting in 
the Kriegervereinhaus on 4 May would have a dramatic im-
pact upon the fortunes of National Socialism in Berlin.32 
According to Goebbels, the assembly was full and the po-
lice had to deny many people admittance. He began his speech 
with an attack upon the "Jewish" press of Berlin, which had 
published a fabricated interview with Hitler, misrepresenting 
his ideas. During the address, a drunk in the right-center of the 
hall interrupted the Gauleiter. The audience allegedly became 
angry with the man, and in order to avoid chaos, Goebbels 
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directed the SA to expel him. After "boxing him on the ears," 
the storm troopers did so. The speaker thought nothing of the 
incident-it was not unusual for someone to be forcibly re-
moved from a Nazi rally-and continued his presentation.33 
Then a police officer stood on a chair, attempting to 
make an announcement. Goebbels, the Gauleiter claimed in 
his memoirs, quieted down the crowd so that it could hear 
the officer, who informed those present that they would be 
searched for weapons. The Nazi leader ordered them to sub-
mit. It took around two hours to search the audience of two 
to three thousand. To this point, nothing had occurred out of 
the ordinary, and Goebbels had no reason to anticipate sub-
sequent events.34 
The following morning Goebbels was distressed to dis-
cover that the Berlin press, because of events on the previous 
evening, was mounting a campaign to have his party prohib-
ited. It seems that the "provocateur" was a Lutheran minis-
ter. The papers, seizing upon the opportunity to discredit the 
Nazis, recounted a "serious assault" with a beer mug, not a 
"boxing on the ears." The "Jewish" press, Goebbels claimed, 
called the two storm troopers involved "murderers" and said 
that the victim had to be taken to the hospita1.35 
From the point of view of the Nazis, things only got 
worse. Around seven in the evening, a policeman arrived at 
party headquarters to inform them that the president of the 
Berlin Police Force, Karl Zoergiebel, had issued a prohibi-
tion against the NSDAP. The grounds given for the ban cited 
"around 30" incidents since October 1926 in which the Nazis 
had attacked bystanders and "members of opposing organi-
zations." The National Socialists, under the terms of the pro-
hibition, might not hold "assemblies of any kind," including 
those in private. "Parades and demonstrations" were also ex-
pressly banned.36 
The immediate response of the Nazis was to send a storm 
trooper to Zoergiebel's office. He returned the notification of 
the ban to the office, shouting, "We National Socialists refuse 
to recognize the prohibition." Goebbels, however, realizing 
the gravity of the situation, composed a letter to the Prussian 
Minister of the Interior, Albert Grzenski, protesting the ban. 
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It was illegal for two reasons, the Gauleiter contended. First, 
the Gau Gross-Berlin included all of the Mark Brandenburg. 
Authorities of the city of Berlin could not prohibit an organiza-
tion that was, for the most part, outside of their jurisdiction. 
Second, the prohibition was politically motivated. Clearly, the 
police wanted to muzzle a group so critical of the system. The 
KPD had clearly committed much worse indiscretions, Goeb-
bels continued, and the police had not prohibited the Commu-
nists. The Gauleiter concluded his letter by declaring that the 
movement would never be vanquished)? 
This last statement proved prophetic. The NSDAP did not 
dissolve but went underground. Numerous Nazi groups reor-
ganized under different guises. Some became "stamp collect-
ing clubs," others "hiking" or "sports clubs." Yet others be-
came" singing" or "bowling" groups. Some even went so far as 
to dub themselves "Bible-study" groups. All this served to add 
credence to the slogan of these dark days for the NSDAP, "Trotz 
Verbot nicht tot!" ("Not dead in spite of prohibition!").38 
The ban, however, hurt the Nazis severely. The police 
kept a close eye upon the forbidden party, and it could no 
longer operate in the open. Although the ban was not ex-
tended outside of the Reich capital, and meetings could be 
held in Potsdam, it proved impossible to carry out propagan-
da activities. (Goebbels was partially correct in claiming that 
Berlin authorities could not prohibit an organization with 
members outside of their jurisdiction, but while Berlin au-
thorities could not extend the Verbat outside the city, they 
could prosecute it within Berlin.) The SA could no longer 
march into Communist strongholds. Ta complicate matters 
further, soon after the ban on the party, authorities placed a 
Redeverbat (prohibition on public speaking) upon Goebbels, 
thereby completing the silencing of the Nazis. The Gauleiter 
realized that, without an effective propaganda apparatus, the 
party might well fade into oblivion, as had happened during 
previous bans. Goebbels needed to find another means of 
propagating his hateful message. Further, he wanted to con-
tinue to garner the publicity that his often violent antics had 
gained for the NSDAP. The Gauleiter decided to start a weekly 
newspaper.39 
2 _____ _ 
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The establishment of a newspaper as a means of spreading 
Nazi propaganda in Berlin, although not a novel idea, gained a 
new urgency in the spring of 1927. Julius Lippert, Chef der 
Geschaeftstelle (chief of party headquarters) and later editor-
in-chief of Der Angriff(The Attack), recounted a meeting of the 
Gau leadership soon after the police outlawed the party. At the 
gathering held in the Gauleiter's apartment, Goebbels devel-
oped the idea of publishing a weekly newspaper. This would 
not violate the terms of the prohibition. In addition to permit-
ting the Berlin Nazis to continue their propaganda activities, 
the office of a weekly publication would serve as a structure 
that would keep the outlawed party intact. This last function 
was probably most attractive to the Gau leadership, for the 
prohibition was a serious threat to the NSDAP'S existence} 
Goebbels also decided, after much discussion, upon the 
name of the new weekly. Realizing that the title of his news-
paper would be very important in attracting readers, he held 
that it should both "agitate" and present the paper's pro-
gram. The name decided upon, The Attack, indicated that the 
purpose of the publication was to "take the offensive." It was, 
contended Lippert, a "meaningful [and] powerful" title for a 
Kampfzeitschrift ("fighting periodical").2 
The type of organ that the Berlin Gau leadership hoped to 
create, a Kampfblatt or Kampfzeitung ("fighting newspaper"), 
evolved from the long tradition of the German political press. 
The revolutions of 1848 saw the development of newspapers 
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affiliated with political parties. The second half of the nine-
teenth century witnessed the creation of the most influential 
political newspapers, the Catholic Center Party's Germania 
and the SPD's Vorwaerts. The raison d'etre of these political 
organs was not the spread of information as much as the 
spread of the party program,3 
As was the case in so many other areas, the revolution of 
1918 led to a radicalization of the German political press. The 
Communist Party's Rote Fahne took polemical attacks upon 
its opponents to new extremes, and its political enemies an-
swered in kind. In the milieu of the first years of the Weimar 
Republic, the political press gained increasing influence, lead-
ing to a rise in the number of politically affiliated newspapers.4 
The political right also improved and expanded its press, 
and the Nazis were among the first voelkisch groups to develop 
a press apparatus. In December 1920, Hitler bought the insol-
vent Voelkischer Beobachter, making it the first Nazi news-
paper. Its primary functions were to communicate the official 
party line to the membership and serve as a source of informa-
tion concerning meetings and other party activities. Local 
Nazi leaders, emulating their Fuehrer, founded their own pa-
pers. The most pressing reason for founding these organs was 
to enhance the local propaganda apparatus; to have yet one 
more tool in the battle with the system. A newspaper also 
served as an organizational tool around which the party could 
be built.s 
The political press reflected the ever more prevalent vio-
lence characteristic of the Weimar years. The "fighting press" 
was characterized by sensationalism, an unrelenting parti-
sanship, emphasis upon violent clashes with the "enemy," an 
almost complete disregard for hard news, and a concentration 
upon polemic. A fighting newspaper was not a source of infor-
mation; it related a savage nihilism that would appeal to the 
dispossessed of Weimar Germany. The Nazis and Communists 
proved the most effective political factions at producing these 
newspapers. Goebbels hoped Der Angrif[ would be such a 
journal.6 
Before he could begin publishing his newspaper Goebbels 
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had to overcome several obstacles, the most important of 
which was political in nature. Goebbels's relationship with the 
Strassers, which had been somewhat cool since his change in 
allegiance during the summer of 1926, became more strained. 
In May 1927, in order to avoid alienating Hitler, who was feud-
ing with the Strassers, Goebbels resigned his editorship of the 
Kampfverlag's NS-Briefe, a position he had held since the peri-
odical's inception in 1925. When rumors of a split between the 
Gauleiter and Hitler began to circulate in the "bourgeois" 
press, Goebbels blamed the Strassers. In order to discredit 
such rumors, he began to attack the brothers viciously, insist-
ing that the Reichsleitung discipline them or accept his resig-
nation from the Gau leadership post? 
The rift between Goebbels and the Strasser camp wid-
ened. The Berlin Gauleiter attacked Gregor Strasser in retalia-
tion for an article that appeared in the Kampfverlag's seven 
'newspapers in April 1927. Entitled "Consequences of Race 
Mixture," Goebbels alleged that it was an attack upon him 
personally because of its references to a clubfoot. Although 
signed by an Elberfeld Nazi, Erich Koch, Goebbels insisted 
that Gregor Strasser had written it as part of a systematic 
press campaign against the Berlin leadership. On 10 June, six-
teen leaders of the Berlin branch of the party met at the behest 
of their leader. He demanded that they renew their pledge of 
loyalty to him and went on to harangue the absent Strassers 
for the newspaper article. Although Koch swore that he had 
indeed written the article himself and did not have Goebbels 
in mind when composing it, the disagreement escalated.8 
The Strassers pursued a vigorous counterattack against 
Goebbels, centering it upon his proposed newspaper. The 
Kampfverlag already published a newspaper in Berlin, the of-
ficial Gau organ, the Berliner Arbeiter Zeitung or BAZ. Gregor 
Strasser saw Der Angriff as a serious threat to the BAZ, insisting 
that Hitler stop publication of the new paper. The Fuehrer 
compromised, decreeing that Der Angriffbe "neutral," mean-
ing that it would not be the official party organ. Although rec-
ognized by the party, it was to be the Gauleiter's personal 
press outlet, not a tool of the party as such. Strasser's protesta-
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tions that, given his position, Goebbels could never be consid-
ered editor of a "neutral" paper fell on deaf ears.9 
The Fuehrer's solution to the disagreement concerning the 
newspapers set the tone for the way in which he settled the 
Goebbels-Strasser dispute. The Gau leader was Hitler's per-
sonal representative in Berlin, so he had to side with him in the 
long term. On the other hand, the Nazi "left" had an extensive 
following in the movement, and breaking with the Strassers 
would be counterproductive. In addition, a continuation of the 
status quo would be to Hitler's advantage because it would 
preclude an alliance of the two factions in a region where his 
power was tentative. Hitler's solution was to publish an article 
in the Voelkischer Beobachter stating that reports of his falling-
out with Goebbels published in the Berliner Tageblatt, the Vos-
sische Zeitung, and the Welt am Abend were false. Jews, deter-
mined to weaken Nazism, had fomented these stories. Indeed, 
Goebbels maintained Hitler's "fullest loyalty." The Fuehrer 
permitted publication of Der Angriff on schedule and had pub-
licly announced his support for the Gauleiter, giving Goebbels 
a major victory. In the long run, however, the disagreement re-
mained unresolved and the fight between Goebbels and the 
Strassers would continue until 1930. Der Angriff would play an 
important role in this ongoing dispute.1O 
While carrying out a public argument with the Strassers, 
Goebbels also began to prepare for the coming publication of 
Der Angriff. Among the first things he did was secure the 
funds necessary to finance the enterprise. He borrowed 2,000 
RM from a still unknown source and found a printer willing 
to extend credit. Lippert played an important role in con-
vincing Hans Schulze, a local printer and member of the 
NSDAP, to undertake such an economically dubious enter-
prise. The greatest obstacle to the founding of a newspaper-
acquiring the necessary capital-was overcome'!! 
A vigorous propaganda campaign designed to publicize 
the upcoming first edition of Der Angriffbegan in June 1927. 
Goebbels issued a series of three posters anticipating its pub-
lication. The first, clearly designed to pique the curiosity of the 
reader, asked simply "THE ATTACK?" The second announced 
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that "The Attack begins on 4 July;" and the third informed the 
reader that Der Angriff would be "the German Monday paper." 
The newspaper, this last poster announced, would be pub-
lished by Goebbels and have as its motto, "Fuer die Unter-
drueckten! Gegen die Ausbeuter!" (For the Oppressed! Against 
the Exploiters!).'2 
Perhaps the most important requisite for founding a news-
paper was the assembly of a competent staff. Goebbels would 
himself serve as Herausgeber (publisher) and oversee the over-
all operation of Der Angriff, especially when it came to deter-
mining its ideological line. He had experience in publishing a 
periodical (NS-Briefe); finding others qualified in the field of 
journalism, however, would prove problematic. There were 
not many Berlin Nazis with experience in this area. Since 
Goebbels hoped to maintain the organization of the now ille-
gal Gau offices, many party administrators simply assumed 
new positions on the staff of Der Angriff; this only served to 
intensify the problem. This largely unqualified press organi-
zation faced the formidable task of founding a new paper. 
Goebbels's difficulties were far from over.13 
Goebbels chose as Hauptschriftleiter (editor-in-chief), the 
man who would oversee the daily operation of the newspaper, 
Julius Lippert, one of the few men available with experience 
in journalism. In addition to having served as chief of the 
Berlin party's information office and giving speeches re-
lating Nazi views on economic matters, Lippert had pub-
lished several articles in the voelkisch press. Born in Basel in 
1895, he had a doctorate from the University of Berlin. He 
had joined the party officially only three months before the 
publication of the first issue of the paper, but probably had 
been sympathetic to the NSDAP for some time. After the "sei-
zure of power," he went on to become Staatskommissar (may-
or) of Berlin.14 
As editor-in-chief, Lippert was in charge of the daily op-
eration of Der Angriff, a task for which Goebbels had neither 
the patience nor the inclination. The Gauleiter simply did not 
wish to endure the tedium inherent in a regular job; he had 
other responsibilities. Lippert was a convenient tool who 
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would see to the more mundane aspects of journalism with-
out posing a serious threat to the publisher's authority. Lip-
pert often acted as an intermediary between Goebbels and 
Der Angriff's staff. For example, he carried out the Gauleiter's 
orders to discipline employees of the paper. The editor-in-
chief also served as a convenient scapegoat when Goebbels 
was displeased with the paper's copy. He simply blamed any 
deficiencies upon Lippert's "bourgeois" world view, often ha-
ranguing the editor-in-chief on this score, insisting that Der 
Angriff must become more vO,elkisch and "socialist." In spite 
of this conflict, Lippert evidently did an adequate job, also 
serving as editor for foreign politics from 1930 to 1933. The 
Gauleiter decided to offer Lippert the position of editor-in-
chief when Der Angriffbecame a daily in 1930.15 
Dagobert Duerr assisted Lippert in overseeing the paper's 
staff. Born in 1897 in Mecklenburg, Duerr joined the NSDAP in 
1925 and became chief of the Berlin party office (Gauge-
schaeftsfuehrer) in January 1927. Like so many other leaders 
of the now illegal Berlin Nazi party, Duerr went to work for 
Der Angriff in July 1927. What his official title was is some-
what uncertain; the sources list several, and it is possible 
that he went by all of them at various times. The official par-
ty archive lists him as Chef vom Dienst (head of the news-
paper's office) for the years 1927-1931, but he called himself 
Stellvertretender Hauptschriftleiter (deputy editor-in-chief) in 
his personnel records. In 1932, he became editor for domestic 
politics, which meant that he, like Lippert, wrote much of the 
newspaper. The practice of one man filling multiple posts 
was probably a device designed to save money, which was 
always in short supply. After the Nazis assumed power, Duerr 
became press chief of Berlin. 16 
Although Goebbels, Lippert, and Duerr dominated the 
operation of Der Angriff throughout the "years of struggle," 
several other people played significant roles in the paper's 
operation, the most intriguing of these being Hans Schweit-
zer, who drew the political cartoons for the paper. Born in 
1901 in Berlin, he became a member of the party in 1926. 
Even before he joined the staff of Der Angriff, he was famous 
An Institutional History of Der Angri[[ 27 
in Berlin as an illustrator of political posters and postcards. 
As Goebbels put it, "Schweitzer is a fabulous illustrator. He 
has the great gift of being able to make a vital point with a 
few lines. Only a master can do that." Schweitzer became the 
Gauleiter's closest companion during the Weimar years; they 
regularly spent the evenings together, attending the movies 
or the theater. Goebbels, who considered himself a writer, 
probably enjoyed the companionship of someone with an ar-
tistic temperament. In 1928 they jointly published the infa-
mous Das Buch I sidor, a vicious polemic against the vice 
president of the Berlin police, Bernhard Weiss. Schweitzer 
published his caricatures under the pseudonym "Mjoelnir," 
the name of the hammer possessed by the god Donner in 
Wagner's "Ring Cycle." Mjoelnir's caricatures were brilliant, 
and, as Goebbels pointed out, it was often easier to express 
Nazi ideas in a political cartoon than with the written word. 
A cartoon would express concepts in a quickly understood 
manner that was impossible to attain in an article. During 
the Third Reich, Schweitzer rose to the rank of colonel in the 
ss and became a Reich senator of cultureP 
Schweitzer's style was indicative of the overall tone of Der 
Angrif{. He emphasized simplicity and the brutality of life on 
the streets of the German capital. This is in sharp contrast to 
the style of other Nazi cartoonists, such as "Fips" (Philip 
Ruprecht), who worked for Juiluis Streicher's infamous news-
paper, Der Stuermer. Whereas Fips emphasized miscegena-
tion-a typical cartoon in Der Stuermer would show a hook-
nosed Jew deflowering a defenseless Aryan girl-the theme of 
Mjoelnir's cartoons was usually either economics or political 
violence. This variation is reflective not only of the differing 
tastes of their respective publishers but also of the audiences 
at whom the two newspapers were aimed. Der Stuermer mir-
rors the obsession with sexuality so typical of the uneducated 
farmers who read the paper. Goebbels, on the other hand, con-
sidered Der Angrif{ a working-class newspaper. Schweitzer's 
cartoons reflected this fact. Indeed, Mjoelnir's style had more 
in common with that of the Communist cartoonists working 
for Rote Fahne than it had with Fips's. This is evidence of the 
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fact that regional party leaders had a great deal of latitude in 
devising their own propaganda motifs, which were deter-
mined, to a large extent, by local conditions. One thing that 
the work of Fips and Mjoelnir had in common, however, was a 
vicious anti-Semitism. It can be said that anti-Semitism was 
characteristic of all Nazi propaganda. Der Angriff was no ex-
ception to this trend.l 8 
Eberhard Assmann, erstwhile chief of the Gau's economic 
department, became managing editor of Der Angriff. Born in 
1903, he joined the party in 1925. His job was to oversee the 
actual printing and publication of Der Angriff. In November 
1930, Ludwig Weissauer, who also served as editor for eco-
nomics, replaced him. Goebbels expelled Weissauer in 1931 
because of his role in a failed SA rebellion.l9 
Weissauer's replacement, Hans Hinkel, was born in Worms 
in 1901. After studying at the Universities of Bonn and Mu-
nich, he joined the NSDAP in October 1921. In 1924, Hinkel 
became editor-in-chief of the Oberbayrischen Thgeszeitung, a 
Nazi newspaper. In 1928, he went to work for the Kampf-
verlag, which caused him to move to Berlin. While in the Ger-
man capital, he became a correspondent for the Voelkischer 
Beobachter and, after the Stennes Putsch, managing editor of 
Der Angriff. Because of his extensive experience in journal-
ism, Hinkel became an important member of the staff, writ-
ing much of the newspaper's copy. He was also secretary of 
the Kampfbund fuer deutsche Kultur, the Nazi organization 
which attempted to eliminate "Jewish" (modernist) culture, 
a position that took up much of his time. Therefore, although 
he was among the most capable members of Der Angriff's 
staff, Hinkel's authority at the newspaper never reached its 
potential. After the Nazis came to power, Hinkel worked his 
way up the party apparatus, becoming a Staatskommissar in 
the Prussian Ministry of Sciences, Art and Popular Educa-
tion, as well as member of the Prussian Theater Committee.20 
Another member of Der Angriff's staff is of interest be-
cause she was a woman in a man's world. Melitta Wiede-
mann must have been a person of extraordinary talent to 
have risen to a position of responsibility in the patriarchal 
An Institutional History of Der Angrif[ 29 
hierarchy of National Socialism. She served as secretary in 
the offices of Der Angrif{ and in 1929 assumed an editor's 
position on the newspaper, overseeing women's issues until 
1931. At first, Goebbels had a rather high opinion of her abil-
ities, calling her "the only real man" on the editorial staff. In 
the long run, however, she was in an impossible position. 
Other members of the staff were jealous of her abilities, and 
she became a victim of Nazi misogyny. In the end, Goebbels 
changed his mind about her, confessing that he did "not trust 
Wiedemann," because "a woman will always misuse power." 
The Gauleiter's chauvinism was probably the real reason for 
her expulsion from the party after the Stennes Putsch; at the 
time of the SA rebellion she was out of the country and hence 
clearly not directly involved.21 
There were others,like Wiedemann, We is sauer, and Hin-
kel, who joined the editorial staff of Der Angrif{ at some time 
after the inception of the newspaper. Willi Krause, a Berliner 
born in 1907, had joined the NSDAP in August 1930. He had 
served as an editor for Scherl-Verlag, bringing with him valu-
able experience to the position of editor for local politics, a 
post he assumed in the fall of 1930. Later he was editor for cul-
tural politics. Like the other editors of the newspaper, he wrote 
much of the copy himself, making film reviews his specialty. 
After serving Der Angrif{for the remainder of the Kampfzeit, he 
became a film critic for the Propaganda Ministry.22 
Karoly Kampmann was a latecomer to the newspaper's 
editorial staff. Having joined the party in 1930, he worked his 
way up the hierarchy of the SA, becoming Gaupropagandalei-
ter of Berlin in August 1931. In January 1933, Kampmann re-
placed Lippert as editor-in-chief of Der Angriff, Although 
Goebbels never explicitly stated why he fired Lippert, the 
Gauleiter's diaries make it clear that the two had had anoth-
er clash concerning the ideological line of the organ, and 
Goebbels decided to remove his second in command. His re-
placement, who went on to work as press chief for the Reich 
labor leader, had little direct effect upon Der Angrif{ during 
the years 1927-1933.23 
While the editorial staff composed most of the articles in 
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the newspaper, there were other journalists who regularly 
wrote for Der Angrif{ as well as other organs of the far right. 
Known as Mitarbeiter (associates), these people were freelance 
writers paid by the line of copy. Although there is little evi-
dence concerning the role of these journalists in the publica-
tion of Goebbels's newspaper, it is clear that they wrote most 
of the relatively few signed articles in Der Angrif{. Among the 
most interesting of these writers was Johann von Leers. Born 
in Mecklenburg in 1902, von Leers had a doctorate. Like many 
unemployed intellectuals during the Weimar Republic, he 
became active in voelkisch politics, joining first the Free Corps 
Viking and, in 1929, the Nazi Party. After supporting himself 
as a freelance writer through articles published in the NSDAP 
press, von Leers joined the ss and became an important au-
thor in the Reich Propaganda Ministry, publishing such books 
as Kraefte hinter Roosevelt and 14 Jahre Judenrepublik. Like so 
many other employees of Der Angriff, von Leers used his posi-
tion as a stepping-stone to higher positions in the Third 
Reich.24 
The leaders at the offices of Der Angrif{ shared several 
traits. They were well-educated, all having college degrees, 
several of them doctorates. They were young, middle-class 
people who had no place in the Weimar system and felt alien-
ated by a society coming increasingly under the influence of 
working-class institutions. All but one was male, and most 
had become Nazis relatively recently. These characteristics 
imply that ideological purity was not as important as compe-
tence to Goebbels; he hired people who could complete the 
tasks assigned to them. That they be orthodox Nazis was not 
his primary concern. As Gauleiter and publisher he, not the 
editorial staff, would oversee the ideological purity of the 
paper. 
Even before the appearance of the first issue, Der Angrif{ 
began fulfilling one of its two major goals: its offices provided 
an opportunity to maintain the illegal party organization. 
Goebbels gave most of the former leaders of Gau Gross-Berlin 
positions in Angriff-Verlag. Dozens of storm troopers, who 
might otherwise have drifted away from the defunct party, vol-
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unteered to work for the weekly, both in the writing and pub-
lishing of the newspaper as well as distribution. The news-
paper distribution firm Stilke oversaw sales of the paper. SA 
men sold the newspaper on street corners as did newspaper 
stands owned by Nazis on Potsdamer Platz and Alexander-
platz. Der Angrif( was also available at certain bookstores and 
newspaper stands outside of Berlin.25 
Although the almost complete lack of journalistic experi-
ence surely diminished the quality of Der Angriff, in addition 
to causing severe difficulties in getting it out on time, the party 
leadership considered the paper a success. A hard core of party 
members thought of the weekly as their own and worked hard 
at the offices of the paper. These same people who created Der 
Angriff, and persevered through the lean years of Nazism in 
the capital city, were rewarded when the NSDAP became a dy-
namic political force after 1930 and assumed power in Janu-
ary 1933. Der Angrif(helped to hold the party together in diffi-
cult times.26 
The first issue of Der Angrif( appeared on 4 July 1927. It 
was a disappointment to its publisher, who considered it a 
Kaeseblatt (paper for wrapping cheese-a popular slang term 
for an unimportant, uninteresting journal). Although Goeb-
bels considered the weekly uninspiring, he had to continue its 
publication since it was his only means of communicating 
with the membership. The quality of the paper improved over 
time, as the staff members became increasingly competent at 
their jobs; but this was a protracted process, and the news-
paper would never consistently meet Goebbels's standardsP 
The 4 July edition of Der Angrif( was laid out as it would be, 
for the most part, for the remainder of the Weimar era. In 
addition to the title of the paper, the masthead contained its 
motto: in the upper left-hand corner "For the Oppressed," and 
in the right "Against the Exploiters." To the left, under the 
title, were the words: "Publisher: Dr. Goebbels." Directly un-
der the title was "The German Monday Paper in Berlin." The 
price of the first issue, which would remain constant until the 
paper became a daily in 1930, was twenty pfennigs. Noticea-
bly absent from the masthead, which would remain almost 
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unchanged during the Kampfzeit, was the official party sym-
bol, the swastika. This was because Der Angriff, being techni-
cally the private property of the Gauleiter, was not the official 
Gau organ. That distinction belonged to the Strassers' BAZ. 
Although recognized by the party as an NSDAP paper, Der An-
griff, like many other party journals, could not use the swas-
tika. Hitler probably refused permission in order to mollify 
the Strassers, who had fought against the publication of the 
newspaper. Even after Der Angrif{ became the official news-
paper of Gau Berlin in 1930, the editorial staff never used the 
party symbol on the masthead.28 
The lead story in the first issue dealt with the possibility of 
a Communist putsch, and the political cartoon, also on the 
first page, intimated that Foreign Minister Gustav Strese-
mann's policy of fulfillment of the Treaty of Versailles was tan-
tamount to surrendering Germany to the Jews. The second 
page presented major news stories from a Nazi perspective. 
The following page contained the "Political Diary." Written, 
like the lead story, by Goebbels himself, the "Political Diary" 
was a record of major political events during the week, as in-
terpreted by Berlin's leading Nazi. The second edition of Der 
Angrif{ printed announcements of local party meetings. Enti-
tled "Plakatsaeule" ("Poster Column"), this listing became a 
permanent fixture on page three. "Kampf urn Berlin" (" Strug-
gle for Berlin"), appearing on page four, related the activities 
of the local NSDAP, especially violent clashes with other politi-
cal groupS.29 
The short-lived anti-Semitic section, "Der Philosemit," 
appeared on the next page. It dealt primarily with the per-
ceived dangers of Jewish influence in German culture and 
politics. At the bottom of the page, squared-in for emphasis, 
was the statement, "The Jewish people will never relinquish 
its goal of eliminating all that is German from the world." 
The editors of the newspaper, possibly because they realized 
that a column dedicated solely to anti-Semitism in a news-
paper saturated with anti-Jewish polemic was redundant, 
and that the space could be used more productively, elim-
inated this section in August 1927. Pages six and eight carried 
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advertisements. As a Nazi newspaper, Der Angriff could not 
accept advertisements from Jewish firms. Most advertisers 
throughout the "years of struggle" were small and medium-
sized companies attempting to sell such things as SA uni-
forms and cigarettes. Sandwiched between the advertise-
ment pages was the page concerned with local news, "From 
the Reich Capital."30 
Eventually another column appeared that concentrated 
upon Berlin news. "From the Asphalt Desert" referred to the 
streets of the German capital. The column dealt with events 
at the grass-roots level, always keeping the NSDAP's program 
in mind. The first story to appear on this page denied claims 
that storm troopers had purposely run over a Jew's dog, 
"SalIn." Another column, "Wie sie sich amuesieren" ("How 
They Amuse Themselves") reviewed theater, film, and radio 
from a Nazi perspective. Der Angriff found Berlin's cultural 
life lacking in opportunities for the working man, who had 
"neither money nor time" for the frivolous products of mod-
ern culture. Catering to the tastes of Jews and democrats, 
these productions were unfit for German consumption. The 
sixteenth of January saw the first appearance of a section 
presenting the Berlin NSDAP'S perspective on economic mat-
ters, "Arbeit und Geld" ("Work and Money")}l 
In January 1929, Der Angrifffirst appeared in an edition 
consisting of twelve pages, allowing the weekly's staff to devel-
op sections with new subjects. Now the newspaper contained 
a supplement that alternated its theme between women's 
issues-"Heim und Welt" ("Home and World")-and the SA, 
"Der unbekannte SA Mann" ("The Unknown SA Man"). In addi-
tion, Der Angriffbegan to publish book reviews and a new col-
umn presenting a Nazi view of German history, "What Histo-
ry Teaches." This section published highly didactic accounts 
of historical events designed to show how outside forces-
Jews, Marxists and demoqats-had conspired to deprive Ger-
many of its rightful place among nations.32 
On 3 October 1929, Der Angriff began appearing twice 
weekly, Mondays and Thursdays. Although the staff returned 
the newspaper to an eight-page format, the semiweekly pub-
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Ii cation schedule permitted the editors to expand the issues 
dealt with yet again. Two new columns were added, one for the 
Hitler Youth and another for students ("Students in Brown 
Shirts"). In May 1930, Der Angriff expanded to ten pages, mak-
ing it possible to publish more advertisements as well as 
propaganda.33 
Beginning 1 November 1930, after a protracted negotia-
tion process, Der Angriff began daily publication. The edi-
torial staff began discussing the possibility of publishing Der 
Angriff on a daily basis as early as May 1929. Serious obsta-
cles, however, confronted Goebbels's plans. The Gauleiter 
first broached the subject with Hitler on the second anniver-
sary of the first issue of the paper. The proposal that he made 
to the Fuehrer involved Hitler becoming publisher of the dai-
ly while Goebbels would serve as editor-in chief himself. He 
hoped to begin publication on the first of January. Goebbels's 
diary entry does not record his leader's reaction, but, in light 
of subsequent developments, it is likely that Hitler chose to 
defer a decision on the issue,34 
The first important discussion of the possibility of mak-
ing Der Angriff a daily occurred when Goebbels met with 
Hitler, Max Amann, head of Eher Verlag, the Nazi publishing 
company based in Munich, and Rudolf Hess, the Fuehrer's 
secretary. Amann approved of Goebbels's plan but insisted 
that, in order to make the paper solvent, 40,000 RM had to be 
raised and eight thousand subscribers found before Goebbels 
could begin publication. When the National Socialist Wom-
en's Organization (NS-Frauenschaft) agreed to raise the mon-
ey and recruit five thousand subscribers, it appeared that all 
obstacles had been overcome and Goebbels could begin work 
on the new format in November 1929. One problem, however, 
still remained.35 
When Goebbels met with Amann and the Eher Verlag's 
printer, Adolf Mueller, on 21 November 1929, Amann's posi-
tion had changed. He insisted that the new Berlin daily be a 
special edition of the Voelkischer Beobachter. Goebbels was 
appalled; he assigned this change of heart to Amann's un-
adulterated greed coupled with jealousy on the part of the 
editor of Voelkischer Beobachter, Alfred Rosenberg. The chief 
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of Eher Verlag saw that a daily, if properly produced, could 
make a tremendous amount of money in a city of four million 
people. To make matters worse, Mueller would provide the 
printing presses for the new edition of the Voelkischer Beo-
bachler, which would leave the publishers of Der Angriff with-
out financial benefit from the new paper. Goebbels insisted 
that a paper with a style aimed primarily at the people of 
southern Germany would have little success in "Red Berlin." 
In the end, since the plan had Hitler's support, the party 
leadership adopted Amann's proposal. Publication of the Ber-
lin edition of the Voelkischer Beobachter began on 1 March 
1930. The paper, which was nothing more than the Munich 
edition with a one-page supplement containing Berlin news, 
was, as Goebbels anticipated, a failure, and Amann stopped 
publication little more than a year later.36 
In spite of this serious defeat, the Berlin Nazi leader re-
mained determined to publish his own daily and improve the 
Gau's propaganda apparatus. Goebbels continued to raise 
money for this project. Events began to turn in Goebbels's 
favor at the end of January 1930, when the Strassers' Kampf-
verlag began publication of a daily in Berlin without the ap-
proval of central party authorities. Issuance of a newspaper 
in direct competition to the official party organ was a serious 
action, which eventually contributed to the expulsion of Otto 
Strasser from the party, as well as the dissolution of the 
Kampfverlag. In the meantime, since the Strassers had a tre-
mendous influence throughout northern Germany, Hitler 
was in desperate need of allies in Berlin.37 
During this period of intra-party turmoil, Goebbels be-
came increasingly disillusioned as Hitler hesitated to expel 
the Strassers from the party. Although the Gau leader would 
not allow the possibility of getting his own daily to fade, he 
did not actively pursue it during these difficult times; for this 
Hitler would be grateful. Goebbels's loyalty, coupled with the 
"electoral breakthrough" of September 1930, eventually bore 
fruit. On 26 September, the Berlin Gauleiter met with Amann 
to reach an agreement that would permit Der Angriffto begin 
publication six days per week.38 
The two men formed a corporation, 60 percent owned by 
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Eher Verlag and the remainder by Angriff Verlag. The new 
daily would appear each afternoon at four beginning on 1 No-
vember and consist of ten pages. Both Amann and Goebbels 
benefited from the deal. The chief of Eher Verlag, since he 
owned the majority of the stock in the new corporation, 
would have financial control of the paper. Goebbels, on the 
other hand, received ideological command of the daily and 
would determine what was printed in the newspaper. He had 
created another valuable propaganda weapon. In addition, 
now that Kampfverlag was defunct, Der Angriff gained new 
prestige by becoming the official organ of Gau Berlin. After a 
protracted struggle, during which he had to overcome diffi-
culties presented by both the central party leaders and the 
renegade Strassers, he had obtained his daily paper. Der An-
griff would begin publication six days per week on 1 Novem-
ber 1930.39 
The new daily newspaper, dubbed by Goebbels "The Ger-
man Evening Newspaper in Berlin," presented its publisher 
with new opportunities. Now the Berlin NSDAP would have a 
chance to bring its ideas into the homes of party members 
Monday through Saturday. Some columns began to appear 
more regularly in the paper, for example a daily extract from 
a novel. The first serial that the daily published was Goeb-
bels's novel, Michael, Ein Deutsches Schicksal in Tagebuch-
blaettern. Written in 1921, shortly after Goebbels received his 
doctorate from the University of Heidelberg and first pub-
lished by the Eher Verlag in 1929, Michael is the story of a 
young university student who achieves voelkisch conscious-
ness and, upon becoming dismayed about Germany's place in 
the post-Versailles world, commits suicide. In addition to the 
daily serial, the new format also included a sports section on 
page eight. Goebbels reduced the price of the paper to ten 
pfennigs. Later, Der Angriff expanded, once again, to twelve 
pages.40 
The penchant to expand the size of newspaper, as well as 
include new columns during the years 1927-1933, is indicative 
of Goebbels's attitude toward both the role of the newspaper 
in Nazi propaganda and propaganda in general. The evolution 
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of the pages of Der Angrif{ evince an increasing determination 
to present a Nazi view on everything. Der Angrif{ tried to 
nazify people's views not only on traditionally political mat-
ters-foreign policy, economics and domestic issues-but also 
within areas not traditionally thought of as being in the realm 
of politics: the role of women and the raising of children, 
books, music, and even sports. The Nazi world view had posi-
tions on all of these matters, and a newspaper was an effective 
means of propagating them. In short, Der Angrif{ was part of 
an attempt by the NSDAP to lay the foundation of a future total-
itarian society; one in which the Fuehrer and his minions 
would have the last say on all matters, public and private, and 
no one would have the information necessary to oppose them. 
Der Angriff, and papers like it, would provide a valuable train-
ing ground for the future leaders of the Third Reich's propa-
ganda apparatus, and this trend toward the creation of an all-
encompassing world view would continue, indeed accelerate, 
during Hitler's years in power. 
Although much information is available concerning Der 
Angrif{ as a propaganda tool, the same is not the case with 
the administrative history of the newspaper. There are no ex-
tant minutes of meetings of the organ's staff, and the only 
records available concerning discussions among the editors 
of the paper are Goebbels's brief diary entries. In spite of this 
lack of sources, there are some things which can be inferred 
about the way that the Gau leader ran his paper. 
It is clear that until 1930 Goebbels was intimately in-
volved in the operation of the newspaper. He wrote much of 
the copy himself, including the lead story and the "political 
diary," often preparing the former well in advance of pub-
lication in order to permit himself lengthy vacations. The 
publisher also played an active role in editing copy and lay-
ing out Der Angrif{. Over time, he reduced his commitments 
in these areas, leaving them to those more temperamentally 
suited to regular work.41 
Goebbels also attended conferences of the editorial staff. 
Whether the editors ever assembled without their boss is un-
certain, but probable, since the publisher sometimes went 
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several weeks without meeting with the staff. He did, how-
ever, usually meet with the editors two or three times per 
week to discuss management of the paper, taking particular 
care to emphasize ideological matters. The meager evidence 
available suggests that these gatherings were often unpleas-
ant for everyone, especially Lippert, who was the focus of 
Goebbels's wrath. After informing the staff that he could only 
sacrifice seven or eight minutes of his time, Goebbels held 
the meetings in Lippert's office. Goebbels sat in the editor-in-
chief's chair, forcing Lippert to stand as Goebbels berated 
him for incompetence, philosemitism, or being "bourgeois." 
Lippert was not the only victim of Goebbels's harangues, and 
no one, not even his good friend Schweitzer, was immune to 
his outbursts. After one of these eruptions, the business at 
hand completed, the Gauleiter would get up from his chair 
and walk out of the office.42 
The permanent staff of Der Angriff did most of the day-to-
day work of writing, editing, and laying out the newspaper. 
The editors of the various columns were the backbone of the 
staff, even writing most of the copy. At the outset, an almost 
complete lack of skilled journalists marred the quality of the 
paper. Eventually, as the employees gained valuable experi-
ence, the quality of the copy and the layout of the paper im-
proved. As the paper expanded, appearing more often and ad-
ding new sections, the number of personnel employed by the 
newspaper increased. This was particularly true after Der An-
griff became a daily in 1930.43 
The financial condition of the newspaper was an almost 
constant concern to Goebbels and the staff, even after the par-
ty presented him with the funds to repay his original 2 ,000 RM 
loan. The number of readers remained low, and although 
Goebbels insisted that all party members subscribe, circula-
tion was only about 4,500 in October 1927. In spite of the poor 
reception the paper received, Goebbels had to maintain the 
paper for two reasons. First, continuing publication of Der An-
griff was a matter of prestige. The Gauleiter simply could not 
permit this newspaper to fail. Second, and perhaps more im-
portant, it was the only means he had, at least until the lifting 
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of the ban on his speaking in public at the end of October 1927, 
of communicating with the membership. Although Goebbels 
required all party members to subscribe to Der Angriff, most 
did not. This eliminated what would have been a major source 
of funds. While the newspaper was a financial burden, it was 
yet another weapon against the hated system.44 
Even as Der Angrif{ expanded and gained new readers, it 
remained insolvent. Goebbels's diaries record an almost un-
ceasing series of financial crises at the office of the news-
paper. After the ban against the Berlin NSDAP was lifted in 
1928, the paper's solvency became intimately connected with 
that of the Gau organization. When the Gau was short of 
funds, Der Angrif{ suffered. Whenever it appeared that the 
Gau would have to declare bankruptcy or cease publication 
of the newspaper, a generous benefactor would provide the 
money necessary to avoid catastrophe. For example, in Octo-
ber 1928, the Gau received a gift of 25,000 RM from a person 
identified only as a "young man" named Haller. Another con-
tributor gave Goebbels 10,000 RM in December 1929. It is 
clear, however, that Gau Berlin obtained most of the money 
necessary to operate the party organization and newspaper 
from the party rank and file.45 
This constant struggle to maintain solvency helps to ex-
plain why Goebbels was willing to surrender some of his con-
trol of the newspaper to Amann when Der Angrif{ became a 
daily in 1930. Eher Verlag was committing its financial re-
sources to the paper and as majority shareholder in Der An-
griff, it had a financial responsibility to the Berlin organ. A 
promised salary of 12,000 RM for running the newspaper 
served as further incentive for Goebbels to make a dea1.46 
These measures, to the chagrin of the Berlin Nazi leader, 
did not ensure solvency. Even after the daily reached a circula-
tion of eighty thousand in March 1931, making it the second 
largest Nazi organ after the Voelkischer Beobachter, financial 
problems plagued Der Angrif{. By May 1931, the Gau was 
18,000 RM in the red and Goebbels had been refused a loan of 
20,000 RM for his newspaper. Even though Der Angrif{ showed 
a profit of 60,000 RM for 1932, the surplus went to retire the 
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debts of the Gau and the newspaper. Throughout the Weimar 
period, the staff of Der Angrifffound itself consistently on the 
verge of bankruptcy, and Goebbels never devised a means of 
assuring the solvency of his newspaper.47 
Determining who read Der Angriffis difficult, because the 
staff never assembled the statistics necessary to do so. The 
paper never had a "letters to the editor" section. Therefore, it 
is not possible to canvas letters written to the organ in order 
to come to some conclusions, no matter how tenuous, con-
cerning readership. Some hypotheses can be offered, how-
ever, based upon trends revealed in the Nazi press as a whole 
complemented by membership, election, and distribution 
statistics. 
Historian Larry Wilcox has established a correlation be-
tween party membership and newspaper readership. The vast 
majority of readers of the Nazi press were committed National 
Socialists. In general, the press was not a means by which 
people were converted to the Nazi world view. As is usually the 
case today, people bought publications which related view-
points they already possessed. A person first became a mem-
ber of the NSDAP and then subscribed to the local party organ. 
This is established by the fact that, in general, large increases 
in the number of subscribers to the Nazi press followed rises in 
party membership. The number of subscribers never matched 
the massive electoral support the Nazis received after Sep-
tember 1930. Mere support for the Nazi program was not the 
determining factor in readership numbers; party membership 
was.48 
The meager evidence available implies that the reader-
ship of Der Angriff fit these overall trends. Unfortunately, be-
cause a fire in 1934 destroyed many of Der Angriff's records, 
little information is available concerning circulation of the 
paper before 1930. There is some evidence, however, from 
which some overall trends can be inferred. Distribution re-
mained low before September 1930, and the number of new 
subscribers recorded in Goebbels's diaries was quite small. 
In November 1928, for example, the Gauleiter was pleased 
with an increase of two hundred subscribers. In January 
1929, he recorded an increase of three hundred. Whether this 
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included the rise from November is not clear. Goebbels was 
pleased with these seemingly minor increases in circulation. 
This indicates that until 1930 Der Angriffhad a small circula-
tion and played a minor role in the political life of Berlin.49 
As was the case in so many other areas of concern to the 
Nazi Party, the Reichstag election of 14 September 1930 was a 
turning point for the fortunes of Der Angriff. Nazi support in 
the capital city increased tenfold from the previous Reichstag 
election. In the May 1928 election, the Nazis received a mere 
39,000 votes (1.6 percent of the votes cast); in September 
1930, they received 396,000 (14.6 percent). Within the Reich 
as a whole, the NSDAP witnessed an increase of 2.6 to 18.3 
percent. Hitler's party had become a major political force in 
the Weimar Republic.50 
The "electoral breakthrough" brought an increase in par-
ty membership and with it a rise in the readership of the 
National Socialist press. Der Angriff was no exception to ihis 
trend. The paper became a daily in order to appeal to these 
new voters and party members. Circulation increased dra-
matically and approached 60,000 by the end of 1930, and in 
March 1931 it reached 80,000. Just before the 31 July 1932 
Reichstag election when the Nazis received their best results 
(28.6 percent in Berlin and 37.4 percent in the Reich as a 
whole), the number of readers of Der Angriff reached its maxi-
mum at 110,600. Following the July 1932 elections, circula-
tion of the Berlin paper began to decrease, anticipating the 
setback the Nazis would experience in the November 1932 
elections. This provides further evidence that newspaper read-
ership reflected party membership. After the July elections 
fewer people joined the NSDAP, and newspaper sales reflected 
this fact.51 
The literature concerning the class membership of sup-
porters of the NSDAP is voluminous, but determining the class 
to which the majority of readers of Der Angriffbelonged with 
any certainty is a difficult task. The extant evidence is totally 
circumstantial. While it is clear that the editors of Der Angriff 
aimed their propaganda primarily at the working classes, it 
is impossible to prove that the readership of the paper was 
largely proletarian. Jeremy Brown has proved that the Berlin 
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NSDAP concentrated its activities in working-class districts of 
the city. Establishing that Der Angriff was aimed at the prole-
tariat does not prove that most of its readers were workers. 
Additional circumstantial evidence, however, does make the 
contention that many workers read the paper appear more 
tenable. Historian Michael Kater has established that the 
Nazis made little headway within the urban proletariat be-
fore 1930. After the September 1930 elections an increasing 
number of workers joined the party. It was natural that a 
paper which had an editorial policy primarily aimed at the 
urban working class had an almost insignificant circulation 
before 1930. Few members of the middle classes would read a 
paper so clearly published to appeal to proletarians. There-
fore, at least some of the immense increase in circulation of 
the paper can be assigned to a rise in the number of working-
class readers. It is equally clear that an accompanying in-
crease in the number of members from other social classes 
contributed to increases in circulation, and it would be irre-
sponsible to assign the entire rise in readership after 1930 to 
newly-won proletarian readers.52 
Whatever its source, the circulation of Der Angriff after 
1930 made it a significant actor in Berlin politics. Each day 
Goebbels and his cohorts presented their agenda to as many 
as 110,000 readers from all walks of life. The editorial staff of 
the paper would try to make the most of this opportunity. Der 
Angriffwas conceived in difficult times for the Berlin NSDAP. 
During the period 1927-1930, conditions improved only mar-
ginally. Even after the electoral breakthrough of September 
1930, the newspaper remained a serious financial burden 
upon the party. On several occasions, Der Angriff was on the 
verge of bankruptcy, only to be saved by a generous donation. 
The editorial staff, however, could point to some successes. 
Der Angriffhad helped to keep the party together during the 
difficult months of the prohibition. In addition, the paper 
had grown from its relatively modest origins to become the 
second largest Nazi-operated newspaper. This was quite an 
accomplishment. 
3 
The Party, the Fuehrer 
Myth, and the 
Presidential Election 
From the publication ofits first issue in July 1927, Der Angriff 
played an important role in Nazi intra-party politics. Goeb-
bels had founded his newspaper, in part, to enable him to 
undermine the Strassers' Berliner Arbeiter Zeitung. The Gau-
leiter simply could not tolerate its existence; a paper beyond 
his control was an affront to his position as leader of Berlin's 
Nazis. Since Hitler had decreed that the National Socialist 
press could not publish personal attacks upon party mem-
bers, Goebbels's assault upon the BAZ and its publishers could 
not be made on the pages of Der Angriff. He had to find other 
means.! 
Goebbels started a newspaper war. He began by refusing 
to give the BAZ information concerning Gau meetings. Hence, 
any Nazi seeking a schedule of Berlin party functions would 
have to turn to the district leader's own organ. In addition, 
Goebbels used the SA to intimidate sellers of the BAZ. Storm 
troopers in civilian clothes assaulted Strasser supporters, 
causing several of them to move out of the city. In spite of the 
Kampfverlag's protestations to the Fuehrer, Hitler refused to 
discipline Goebbels, making it obvious that the Berlin Gau-
leiter was acting in accord with Hitler's wishes. Clearly, the 
Fuehrer was determined to destroy the Nazi "left" at the first 
available opportunity.2 
Goebbels's campaign against the BAZ worked; circulation 
of the Kampfverlag organ decreased dramatically throughout 
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northern Germany. Not only did Der Angrif( offer the only 
source of information about party functions, but it had a more 
dynamic style. The BAZ attempted to appeal to the capital's 
working-classes in a "rational," somewhat intellectual, man-
ner. Der Angrif( took a different, more emotional, approach. 
Nazi readers found Schweitzer's depiction of the ideal Nation-
al Socialist-a muscular worker with an unbuttoned shirt and 
a hammer in his hand-more compelling than the somewhat 
dry reading found in the BAZ. Goebbels's newspaper soon be-
came the de facto organ of the Gau Gross-Berlin. The BAZ, al-
though it was the official district newspaper, simply could not 
compete with the Gau leader's organization) 
The summer of 1928 saw further developments that would 
have a dramatic impact upon the Goebbels-Strasser feud. The 
Nazis did poorly in national elections, which discredited the 
"urban plan," under which the NSDAP had tried to appeal to 
Germany's proletariat, in the eyes of many leading Nazis. With 
the development of a new electoral strategy, which would at-
tempt to appeal to the peasantry, the Nazi left lost much of its 
influence in the movement. The Kampfverlag, however, re-
fused to accept its decline peacefully. While the rest of the lead-
ership contended that attempts to appeal to the proletariat 
had failed and might not prove fruitful in the future, Otto 
Strasser argued that the party's refusal to adopt truly socialist 
principles had caused the electoral failure of 1928. He called 
for the establishment of a National Socialist trade union, a 
move that was anathema to orthodox Nazis. Gregor Strasser, 
on the other hand, realized that new campaign strategies had 
to be adopted, and the years 1928-1930 saw him drift gradually 
to the right. He began to distance himself from his erstwhile 
colleagues on the left and, in 1928, accepted the powerful post 
of organization leader, overseeing the party bureaucracy.4 
With the influence of the Strasser group reaching its nadir, 
Hitler found himself in a position where he could increase 
pressure upon the Kampfverlag. He did nothing, for example, 
when Goebbels declared Der Angrif( the Berlin NSDAP'S "dis-
trict organ." In addition, when Otto Strasser refused to surren-
der in the face of almost constant harassment by the Berlin SA, 
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the Fuehrer traveled to Berlin to meet with his intransigent 
subordinate. Surprising the younger Strasser by bursting into 
his flat unannounced, Hitler demanded that the Kampfverlag 
submit to Goebbels's authority. Strasser told Hitler that he 
would not back down in the face of threats from the Gauleiter's 
hooligans. Further, he threatened that he had a revolver in his 
desk drawer and would not hesitate to use it on his visitor. 
Hitler, realizing that there was nothing that he could do to cow 
Strasser, stormed out of the room. The Fuehrer, however, did 
not give up. In 1929, while Otto Strasser was in Munich, Hitler 
offered to purchase Kampfverlag, but Strasser refused to sell 
it.s 
Two things occurred in the spring and summer of 1930 that 
forced Hitler's hand. First, in March 1930, Kampfverlag began 
publishing a daily in Berlin, Der Nationalsozialist, in defiance 
of Hitler's wishes. Amann, speaking for Hitler, agreed with 
Goebbels that Otto Strasser's new paper, a competitor for both 
Der Angrif{ and the Berlin edition of the Voelkischer Beobachter, 
must be eliminated. The Berlin Gau leader and the chief of 
Eher Verlag got their chance to do so because of a tactical mis-
take on Otto Strasser's part in April. The Saechsischer Beo-
bachter, a Kampfverlag paper, supported a strike by Saxon 
metalworkers, violating the party's officially neutral position 
on the issue. Hitler had had enough, and he gave Goebbels carte 
blanche in his assault on Strasser and his newspaper appar-
atus.6 
Hitler ordered Goebbels to begin "ruthlessly [to] clean up 
the party of all those [Strasserite] elements in Berlin," an 
assignment the Berlin Nazi leader accepted happily. While 
the Berlin SA intensified its harassment of Nazi leftists, the 
Fuehrer did his part to assist the storm troopers. In May, he 
told the national party court to dismiss a case Strasser had 
brought against the business manager of Gau Berlin in re-
sponse to assaults upon sellers of the BAZ. On 30 and 31 May 
Hitler met with Otto Strasser in the Hotel Sanssouci, where 
the Fuehrer was staying. According to Strasser's account of 
the discussions, Hitler harangued him for several hours, in-
sisting that Strasser submit to his authority and sell the 
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Kampfverlag to the party. Otto Strasser, who had become de 
facto chief of Kampfverlag since Gregor's defection, refused 
to meet either demand. As a result Berlin's assault upon the 
ideological heresy intensified, and Goebbels began purging 
Strasser's supporters.7 
On 30 June 1930 Gregor Strasser announced his resigna-
tion from all his positions with the Kampfverlag, and the 
NSDAP officially severed all ties with the press organization. 
In order to keep his position as organization leader, Gregor 
Strasser agreed never to have further contact, either person-
ally or politically, with his brother. Further, Hitler sent a let-
ter to Goebbels granting his district leader the right to hold 
an all-Gau meeting at which Goebbels could deal with the 
dissidents. The assembly took place on 2 July. Otto Strasser 
was invited, but the SA guard at the door refused to admit 
him. Goebbels expelled several Strasser supporters at the as-
sembly, causing Otto to issue an ultimatum to the Fuehrer. 
He demanded that Hitler rescind the Gauleiter's expulsions 
and, when he received no answer from the Nazi leader, re-
signed from the NSDAP on 4 July 1930, selling Kampfverlag to 
the party. Otto Strasser and his supporters exited the party 
under the slogan "The Socialists have left the NSDAP," deliv-
ering a serious blow to radicalism within the party.s 
Otto Strasser founded his own political party, the Kampf-
gemeinschaft revolutionaerer Nationalsozialisten (Struggling 
Community of Revolutionary National Socialists), also known 
as the "Black Front." The goal of the movement was to estab-
lish a type of voelkisch socialism through the creation of na-
tionalist trade unions and other working-class organizations. 
In short, the Kampfgemeinschaft, completely ignoring the 
peasantry, pursued the same policies as the NSDAP had before 
the electoral debacle of 1928. They would prove even less effec-
tive than earlier Nazi attempts to attract the proletariat. Otto 
Strasser led 5,000 people out of the NSDAP in July 1930, none of 
whom was an important Nazi leader. In September 1930, 
Strasser could claim only 260 supporters in the German capi-
tal, once a center of the Nazi left. Although the number of 
members would not peak until April 1931, the Kampfgemein-
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schaft never posed a serious threat to the NSDAP. Also, the offi-
cial organ of Strasser's group, Der Nationalsozialist, having 
only four thousand readers, was never a serious competitor for 
Der Angriff.9 
Now that Otto Strasser had left the party, Goebbels could 
openly attack him. Rote Fahne reported that the Gauleiter 
had ordered the SA to "beat them [the Strasserites] down!" 
Although violence against members of the organization was 
rampant, the Communist daily had no sympathy for the ex-
Nazis.1O 
Goebbels could now begin an offensive against Strasser 
in his newspaper as well, publishing a story entitled "The 
Eternal Critic" in the 6 July 1930 edition of Der Angriff. Al-
though the Gauleiter did not mention Otto Strasser and his 
supporters by name, it is clear that they were the subject of 
the article. These "Jammergestalten" ("pitiable figures") had 
refused to work for the benefit of Germany and wished to turn 
the NSDAP into a debating society. Their primary goal was the 
criticism of Hitler and the other leaders of the movement, not 
the creation of a National Socialist Germany. In response, the 
party should look to the "old guard" for direction. These men 
had been members of the Nazi Party since its creation, and 
only they knew what the party stood for-action. This did 
not imply, Goebbels continued, that the leadership did not 
have an "open ear" for suggestions from the membership. In-
deed, the party benefited from honest criticism aimed at im-
proving its fortunes. Attacks, however, aimed at the destruc-
tion of National Socialism could not be tolerated. Those 
"eternal critics" who wished to usurp the legitimate powers 
of the old guard had to be expelled; the party leadership had 
done the NSDAP a valuable service by doing so.1' 
The "Political Diary" of the same issue contained another 
essay, also written by Goebbels, concerning the Strasser con-
troversy. Here, the paper's publisher insisted that Strasser· 
and his minions had striven to discredit the "25 Point Pro-
gram" of the party in order to implement their own. This 
destructive agenda had to be derailed. The party had done 
that. Once again, Goebbels insisted that, to these men, "dis-
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cuss ion was an end in itself," and all men of action must re-
ject this notion. The party had to impose discipline and had 
rightfully done soP 
These two articles shared common themes that the Berlin 
Gau leader hoped would convince his readers that the break 
had been Otto Strasser's fault. The Strasser camp, not the 
Hitlerites, as the dissidents claimed, had betrayed the ideals of 
National Socialism. They had denounced the party program 
and violated the trust of the Fuehrer. The people who had re-
mained in the party, whose ideological roots went back to the 
creation of the NSDAP, were the true National Socialists. Goeb-
bels also stressed a prominent theme of Nazi propaganda: the 
Nazis were the party of action. Hitler and his supporters did 
something. They assaulted the system. Otto Strasser had 
bought into that Bolshevik-dominated system with his call for 
more socialism. In short, the supporters of Hitler represented 
the true goals of National Socialism, not the Black Front. 
The tenor of the Gau Leader's attacks says something 
about the real roots of the dispute. In the end, Hitler did not 
run Otto Strasser and the Nazi left out of the party as the 
result of a debate over a new propaganda strategy. While the 
period after the 1928 election did see the Nazis increase their 
appeals to the peasantry, they never did give up on the prole-
tariat.B What the Fuehrer found objectionable in the actions 
of the Strasser camp, and Goebbels echoed this, was its refus-
al to submit to the party leadership, to accept the infallibility 
of Hitler's decisions. The debate over propaganda strategy 
was simply a pretext for a final reckoning with the left. In 
short, Otto Strasser had been tricked into starting a fight 
that he could not win. 
Goebbels's newspaper had emerged from the Hitler-Stras-
ser dispute with an improved position in party circles. The 
Kampfverlag was defunct. The BAZ was no longer a serious 
competitor for Der Angriffbecause it could not claim to repre-
sent the positions of the party's national leadership. Der An-
griff had remained true to the goals of the party and was not 
tainted by ideological heresy as was the BAZ. In addition, 
Goebbels's paper became the new official organ of Gau Berlin, 
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thereby gaining new prestige. Because its publisher had fought 
on the front lines of this party dispute, Hitler decided to permit 
Goebbels to begin daily publication in November 1930.'4 
Even more important than the paper's role in intra-party 
feuds was its part in communicating with party members 
and potential Nazis. In order to win and maintain suppor-
ters, Der Angriffhad to define exactly what National Social-
ism was and what it stood for. The most interesting perspec-
tive from which to examine this issue is an analysis of the 
role of the newspaper during the period of the prohibition of 
the Berlin NSDAP, May 1927 to April 1928. During this eleven-
month span, party meetings were forbidden and Gau Berlin 
was in serious danger of dissolution, and Der Angriff was the 
only means by which Goebbels could communicate with the 
membership. Therefore, the way in which the paper pre-
sented the party to its readers was of the utmost importance. 
Among the most important things the staff of Der Angriff 
did during the prohibition was to assure party members that 
the NSDAP was still active in the capital. If the rank and file 
believed that Nazism was dead in Berlin, the party would 
lose members and eventually dissolve. Hence, Der Angriff 
tried to maintain the morale of the now illegal party by as-
suring its readers that National Socialism would not surren-
der, as the hated Weimar system wanted. In one of Goebbels's 
front-page articles, published in August 1927, the Gau leader 
promised his readers that "We will not surrender!" He went 
on to assure them that the NSDAP had pledged itself to "love 
an enslaved people" and fight for its freedom. "So we are 
[still] committed," he wrote. Although a "strike of the pen 
marked us out of existence," the Berlin Nazis would never 
capitulate. They would continue to fight for the liberation of 
the Fatherland. "Schlag zu! Schlag zu! [Attack! Attack!]" he 
continued. "We will not surrender!" 15 
In keeping with this theme, Der Angriffmade a concerted 
effort to show that, in spite of the prohibition, the NSDAP was 
still strong. The August 1927 party congress in Nuremberg 
presented an excellent chance to make this case. The paper 
emphasized the large crowds, estimated at 100,000, present 
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for the party rally. It contended that Berlin's Nazi Party was 
strongly represented, in spite of its underground status. Seats 
on the "special train" to Nuremberg were "sold out," evinc-
ing that the ban could not "exterminate the spirit" of the 
movement. Since the article did not give an estimate of the 
number of those attending, it is probable that it was rela-
tively small. Der Angriffhad made it clear, however, that the 
Berlin NSDAP was not defunct.16 
The staff of Der Angriff made an effort to use the hardships 
that the prohibition had imposed upon party members as a 
propaganda tool. The paper's copy recorded the "persecution" 
and the" sentences under Jewish law" to which the system had 
subjugated Berlin's Nazis. As was the case with early Chris-
tianity, this persecution would only serve to strengthen the 
movement and increase its size. In the end, they warned, the 
Weimar authorities would 10se.'7 
This was a popular theme in the caricatures of cartoonist 
Hans Schweitzer. For example, an August 1927 cartoon showed 
a chained arm holding a Nazi flag. In the background was the 
Brandenburg Gate. The caption said, in large letters, "BERLIN! 
TROTZ VERBOT-NICHT TOT! [Not dead-despite prohibition!]" 
A March 1928 cartoon showed the vice president of the Berlin 
Police, Bernhard Weiss, throwing seeds into a field. Above the 
seeds was written the words "Persecution," "Prohibitions," 
"Prison Terms," and "Maltreatment." Growing in the field, the 
result of the misdeeds sown by Weiss, were SA men. The cap-
tion read, "Whoever sows the wind, will reap a whirlwind-!" 
The prohibition would, in the long run, only strengthen the 
party.'8 
Der Angriff also tried to make it clear that the Berlin par-
ty leadership was fighting the prohibition which had brought 
such hardship upon the rank and file. In August 1927, per-
haps in part to boost its lagging sales, an article in Der Angriff 
reminded readers that the paper had been founded specifi-
cally to fight the Verbal. It was "the best weapon" against the 
system that the movement had. "They [Berlin's authorities] 
have forbidden us the spoken word. Now we fight with the 
pen and printing press." The message was clear: all Nazis 
Party, Fuehrer Myth, and Presidential Election 51 
who wished to maintain contact with the now illegal move-
ment should become subscribers to Der Angrif{. The paper 
also recorded how Goebbels had taken the Berlin Police force 
to court in order to have the ban lifted. The court decided 
that since, in its view, the Berlin party organization was to-
tally independent of any national political party, the prohibi-
tion was legal. Der Angrif{ assured its readers that National 
Socialism would not be subject to "Jewish law" and the fight 
would continue. The party would never give Up.'9 
The persistence of the Berlin Nazi Party paid off. On 31 
March 1928, faced with the fact that he could not effectively 
enforce the prohibition, the president of the Berlin Police, 
Karl Zoergiebel, lifted the ban. On 13 April, Goebbels offi-
cially reestablished Gau Berlin in an "overfilled hall." In the 
"Political Diary" of the following week, he recorded that "It 
is almost like a dream!" An "electric" atmosphere permeated 
the room. The doors "sprung open," and a company of "sol-
diers in brown marched" down the aisle "in unison." The 
Nazi flag was legally exhibited for the first time in almost a 
year. It had returned as all true believers knew it would. 
Goebbels concluded the piece with a jubilant verse: 
As we march 
God stands at our side. 
He wants, and so should it be, 
That right will be victorious.20 
Now that the prohibition had ended, the party had to surren-
der one of its most effective propaganda themes and would 
have to devise others. 
During the summer of 1928 the Berlin organ turned to a 
new propaganda campaign. During July, Der Angrif{ published 
three articles, all written by Goebbels, outlining the basic ten-
ets of National Socialism. Goebbels undoubtedly hoped that 
these pieces could help win converts to the movement. 
The first of these articles, an obvious attempt to appeal to 
members of other voelkisch groups, related the Nazi definition 
of nationalism. Being a "nationalist," Goebbels contended, 
had nothing to do with being loyal to a "form of government" 
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or "symbol of the state." It was a matter of dedication to the 
Volk. It was racist. The problem with "bourgeois patriotism" 
was that it did not recognize this fact. On the other hand, sup-
porters of the "reactionary right" had in mind not the inter-
ests of the Volk but those of a former ruling class, those of the 
Kaiser. Hence, this was not, the article continued, nationalism 
at all. By implication, Goebbels was stating that the Nazis 
were the only true nationalists in Germany because they, of all 
political factions, had the interests of the nation, the Volk, at 
heart.21 
The following week Goebbels attempted to present a Nazi 
definition of socialism. Socialism was, he argued, the belief 
that society should pursue the advantage of all. He consid-
ered only Volksgenossen (racial comrades) to be legitimate 
members of German society. Therefore, Jews could never be 
true socialists. They were advocates of Marxism only because 
it aggravated the class divisions within the Volk that kept the 
Jews in power. In an obvious attempt to court proletarian 
support, Goebbels continued by stating that capitalism was 
equally bankrupt because it supported the bourgeoisie at the 
expense of the working class. This also contributed to un-
healthy class divisions. True socialism was a middle way be-
tween capitalism and Marxism that would place the interests 
of Germany above class antagonisms. The NSDAP, a strong ad-
vocate of putting an end to class conflict, was the only truly 
socialist party.22 
Two weeks later the Gau leader published an article deal-
ing with what was the most important tenet of National So-
cialism, anti-Semitism. In this article, a clear attempt to ap-
peal to the traditional right, Goebbels made sweeping gener-
alizations, blaming the Jews for all Germany's ills. Of course, 
he made no effort to present evidence justifying his absurd 
claims. Nazis hated the Jew because he had "injured the social 
necessities of the general population" through the promotion 
of cleavages in German society. He had also contaminated the 
German race. Because of this, "we can thank him for the fact 
that we are today the pariahs of the entire world." In addi-
tion, the Jew was "not creative." He did not work but lived off 
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the labor of others. Goebbels concluded by linking national-
ism and socialism with hatred of Jews. True socialism would 
cast the Jews out of Germany in order to eliminate all class 
hatred, which was the product of an insidious Jewish con-
spiracy. A true nationalist concerns himself with the racial 
purity of the German Volk and opposes Jewish efforts to pol-
lute Germany's blood. For these two reasons, Goebbels ar-
gued, any National Socialist must be an anti-Semite. He 
concluded by dismissing humane concerns for Germany's 
Jewish population. The crimes of the Jews made them less 
than human and not subject to Christian charity. They de-
served only persecution, and the NSDAP was willing to pro-
vide it.23 
To the average German, however, the party's ideology was 
not its most important asset; its Fuehrer was. Hitler possessed 
a charismatic personality unequaled by the leader of any other 
political faction. His personality would make the National 
Socialist Party a viable force in German politics. During the 
time of struggle, Nazi propaganda began creating a "Fuehrer 
myth" surrounding the personality of Hitler, claiming that he 
was the solution to all of Germany's problems.24 
Der Angrif{ made a valuable contribution to the creation of 
the Hitler myth. Drawings of the Fuehrer, and sometimes ex-
pensive photographs, were a regular feature of the paper. For 
example, the 23 April 1928 issue contained a drawing of Hitler, 
a determined look on his face, with the upraised arms of his 
followers in the background. The caption read, "Freedom is 
not yet lost." Hitler always appeared with a serious counte-
nance, the problems of Germany his constant concern.25 
The 1927 party rally presented the editors of Der Angrif{ 
with an opportunity to enhance the image of the Fuehrer. In 
the issue dealing with the rally, the paper published a piece 
written by Houston Stewart Chamberlain entitled "The Pic-
ture of the Leader." Hitler, Chamberlain wrote, was a man of 
integrity who "looked his audience in the eye" when he made 
a promise. He was not a liar. He was also a great leader who 
would save Germany from its despair because he knew about 
economics, foreign policy, and the "problems of the people." 
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"The Fuehrer speaks!" (All illustrations are from Dey Angrif{.) 
In short, he was the solution to all of Germany's problems. 
The next issue published a drawing of Hitler speaking to the 
100,000 Nazis present at the rally. As Hitler spoke, assuming 
a dramatic pose, the audience was enthralled. He was a lead-
er of the masses who could communicate with them.26 
A visit to Berlin by the Fuehrer was a major propaganda 
event. One such occasion, recorded in dramatic fashion on 
the pages of Der Angriff, was in July 1928. The evening began 
with a parade of the SA through Friedrichshain, passers-by 
soon joining the storm troopers. When they arrived at the 
hall at 7:30 P.M., the paper's account continued, it was al-
ready full. At 8:00 P.M. a film about the 1927 Nuremberg rally 
was shown. As it concluded, there was "suddenly an outcry of 
the thousands of spectators: Hitler-Hitler!" After a brief 
introduction by Goebbels, the evening's events came to a cli-
max with the Fuehrer's speech. It was a typical Hitler perfor-
mance, beginning with a critique of Weimar Germany's for-
eign policy, which had brought Germany so much disgrace. 
He then turned to an attack upon bourgeois elements who 
acquiesced in the emasculation of Germany. In response to 
threats from other European powers, Hitler proposed an alli-
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ance with Fascist Italy. The speech concluded with a call to 
stand behind the party in its struggle to return Germany to 
its rightful place in European affairs. The evening ended with 
yet another parade through the streets of the German capital. 
The article concluded with the statement: "A great day in the 
history of the movement in Berlin was over."27 
Although the Hitler visit had ended, the beneficial propa-
ganda it brought had not. The 6 August edition of Der Angrif{ 
published a story recording that Hitler's Berlin speech had 
been covered in the Italian press. The paper, Journal of Italy, 
gave the speech a positive review, recording that throughout 
the three-hour speech, "one did not hear anyone breathe." Al-
though Hitler's call for a German-Italian alliance was not 
mentioned, the Italians did applaud his insistence upon an 
end to all diplomatic ties with Bolshevik Russia. The purpose 
of this article was clear. Der Angrif{ wished to convey the fact 
that the movement received attention outside of Germany, 
that it was becoming an important actor in European politi-
cal affairs. This was the case because of the Fuehrer.28 
The Berlin organ also made a concerted effort to counter 
frequent attacks made upon Hitler's character. On 22 Janu-
ary 1928, for example, the newspaper Reichsbanner published 
a story about a man, Mr. Julian, who claimed that Hitler was 
a Jew. Der Angrif{ dismissed the charge out of hand. After all, 
Obersdorf, where Reichsbanner was published, was popu-
lated primarily by Poles, not members of the Volk. Der Angrif{ 
dismissed the paper as a "comical" propaganda organ of the 
SPD. In a manner typical of the Berlin Nazi paper, it attacked 
the character of the person making charges against Hitler, 
rather than presenting evidence to refute them.29 
The 1932 presidential campaign provided Der Angrif{ 
with its greatest opportunity to build the Hitler myth. Dur-
ing the spring of that year, there were two presidential elec-
tions that pitted Hitler against the popular incumbent, Field 
Marshal Otto von Hindenburg, as well as the Communist 
leader, Ernst Thaelmann. The Nazi Fuehrer, because of his 
status as the leader of what was, by now, the second-largest 
party in Germany, received much attention. Der Angrif{ de-
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cided to seize this opportunity to enhance Hitler's image as 
well as attack opponents of National Socialism. 
The election was the result of Chancellor Heinrich Brue-
ning's failed attempt to have the aging president's term ex-
tended. It was to end in the spring of 1932. While it was gen-
erally agreed that Hindenburg would easily win reelection 
should a contest be held, Bruening and his supporters feared 
that the eighty-four-year-old field marshal would not survive 
the rigors of a campaign. The chancellor developed a plan un-
der which a two-thirds vote of the Reichstag would override 
the constitution and extend Hindenburg's term. Since the KPD 
would certainly oppose the proposal, Bruening needed to 
secure the support of the right in order to get the measure 
through the Reichstag. Alfred Hugenberg, leader of the Na-
tionalists, refused to support the bill outright. Hitler, on the 
other hand, made certain demands that Bruening would have 
to meet in order to secure Nazi support. Bruening had to lift 
all bans and prohibitions placed upon the NSDAP throughout 
the Reich as well as dissolve the Reichstag and call for new 
elections. In addition, Hindenburg would have to dismiss 
Bruening (Hitler hoped to secure the chancellorship for him-
self). The chancellor, of course, could not accept this last de-
mand. Talks between Bruening and the NSDAP collapsed, and 
an election became imminent.3° 
At first it appeared that Hindenburg would not stand for 
reelection. There were several reasons for his hesitation. First, 
he feared that he was too old to endure the stress of a cam-
paign. Bruening circumvented this problem by agreeing to do 
all of the president's campaigning for him. Hindenburg would 
make but one radio address. The incumbent also resented the 
fact that he would have to rely upon the support of the SPD-a 
party which, as a traditional conservative, he detested-in or-
der to assure victory. He seriously considered forgoing run-
ning in order to avoid such a distasteful proposition. Bruen-
ing, however, pointed out that the only viable alternative to a 
Hindenburg presidency was a Hitler administration, which 
the field marshal found more distasteful than courting Social-
ist support. Finally, the chancellor devised a plan under which 
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a Hindenburg reelection would be a prelude to a restoration of 
the monarchy, a possibility the reactionary Hindenburg sim-
ply could not ignore. Because of Bruening's convincing argu-
ments, Hindenburg announced his candidacy on 16 February 
1932.31 
The incumbent was not the only popular politician who 
hesitated to run for the presidency. Hindenburg seemed un-
beatable, and Hitler feared losing a major election, which 
could break the NSDAP's momentum. On the other hand, if the 
Fuehrer, leader of Germany's second-largest party, refused to 
stand, it would look as if he had backed away from a chal-
lenge, a conclusion he wanted to avoid at all costs. Hitler was 
in a quandary, and Goebbels was instrumental in helping 
him reach a decision.32 
As early as the middle of January 1932, the Berlin Gau 
leader had begun to urge Hitler to announce his candidacy. In 
addition to contending that the Fuehrer could not bypass 
such an important contest, Goebbels honestly believed that 
Hitler could win. He went so far as to use Der Angrif{ to per-
suade his leader to make the desired decision. The 30 Janu-
ary 1932 edition of the paper had as its headline "Sponta-
neous Ovation in Sportpalast for Adolf Hitler." The accom-
panying story told of a crowd of ten thousand Nazis chanting 
"Hitler for president!" The loyal supporters of the NSDAP had 
made their feelings clear, and Hitler could not deny the will 
of the masses, agreeing to run on 2 February. Goebbels, how-
ever, decided upon a strategy aimed at maintaining a feeling 
of suspense about Hitler's decision; the question remained, 
would Hitler run? On 22 February Goebbels ended the ten-
sion by announcing the Fuehrer's candidacy before a packed 
house in Berlin's Sportpalast. Goebbels hoped that the ap-
proaching campaign, which he would oversee, would be "a 
masterpiece in the way of propaganda." Under his auspices, 
it would be extremely well organized. The staffs of the dozens 
of Nazi newspapers throughout Germany worked together in 
order to increase the effectiveness of the Nazi press appara-
tus. People all over the Reich read the same copy on the same 
day. Goebbels strived to make maximum use of his limited 
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resources. The presidential campaign would be the most co-
ordinated in the NSDAP's history)3 
The Nazis, of course, were not the only party that cam-
paigned during the two presidential contests. Hindenburg and 
the parties behind him also had an effective propaganda appa-
ratus. The theme of the incumbent's campaign was one that 
concentrated upon Hindenburg's character and his ability to 
provide stability in troubled times. In contrast, if Hitler were 
elected president, his administration would bring "hate, parti-
sanship, inexperience, government by party 'hacks,' self-de-
struction and further deterioration of the German people" and 
even civil war. Further, a vote for Ernst Thaelmann, candidate 
of the KPD, was the same as a vote for Hitler since the Commu-
nist candidate had no chance of winning. Hindenburg's propa-
ganda largely ignored the other candidate, Theodor Duester-
berg, representing the right-wing "Harzburg Front"; none of 
the three leading candidates considered him a threat.34 
Ironically, Thaelmann's campaign had a similar theme to 
that of Hindenburg: "Whoever votes for Hindenburg, votes 
for Hitler, whoever votes for Hitler votes for war!" The Com-
munists insisted that there was no substantial difference be-
tween Hitler and Hindenburg. They were both fascist repre-
sentatives of the capitalist elite that was responsible for the 
plight of Germany's proletariat. The only real alternative to 
the miserable status quo was Thaelmann)5 
On 20 February 1932, Goebbels distributed a letter that 
outlined Nazi campaign strategy for the 13 March election. It 
emphasized that party propaganda would concentrate upon 
attacking the status quo rather than present a positive pro-
gram for ending Germany's problems. Goebbels took this 
path for a variety of reasons. First, Hindenburg was tremen-
dously popular within all strata of the German population, 
especially among the right-wing groups to whom the Nazis 
hoped to appeal. Attacking him personally could be counter-
productive. In addition, the economic situation was so des-
perate in Germany that the NSDAP was hoping to benefit from 
the dissatisfaction rampant within all classes. Finally, nega-
tive campaigning eliminated the necessity of presenting con-
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crete solutions to Germany's problems, something Goebbels 
and other Nazi leaders wished to avoid.36 
Der Angriff reflected Goebbels's attitudes toward the cam-
paign, concentrating its attacks upon the Weimar system. 
These assaults can be put into two categories: attacks upon 
Hitler's opponents and charges against the Bruening govern-
ment. The third pillar of Goebbels's election strategy was the 
promotion of Hitler's personality. This would, however, re-
main a secondary consideration in the 13 March campaign. 
An important part of any political crusade, especially for 
the National Socialists, was to discredit one's opponents. 
Hindenburg, however, presented a special problem in this re-
gard. He was the hero of Tannenberg, a symbol of their coun-
try's past to all Germans. That Hitler, a mere corporal in the 
war, should run against the great field marshal could cause 
the Nazis to lose support among voelkisch elements. Goebbels 
recognized this problem, recording in his diary that "the 
honorable personality of the president of the Reich is shame-
lessly being dragged into the fight. Now we must be clever!" 
Hitler also recognized this problem when he stated that "one 
should never deprive the volk of its gods." Goebbels sought to 
resolve this problem by attacking the supporters of Hinden-
burg rather than the president himself.37 
This strategy can be seen in the pages of Der Angriff even 
before the campaign officially began. The 23 January issue 
contained an editorial written by Goebbels protesting Zoer-
giebel's recent banning of Der Angriff. The police president 
had done so under the auspices of a presidential decree signed, 
naturally, by Hindenburg. "Does he [Hindenburg] want to suf-
fer having his name used in such a manner again?" No, the 
paper concluded, because his affinity for "truth and justice" 
would forbid it.38 
The practice of not attacking the president directly, but 
rather concentrating the Nazi assault upon his supporters, 
continued into the presidential campaign. On 15 February, a 
front-page cartoon depicted Hindenburg riding on the back 
of Thaelmann, implying that he had KPD support. The car-
toon was entitled "His 'Train to Victory.''' The 23 February 
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number of Der Angriff featured Jewish caricatures holding 
Hindenburg posters, emphasizing the Nazi claim that the 
"Jewish world conspiracy" stood behind the forces support-
ing the president and the Weimar system. Indeed, because he 
had heeded the advice of his "Jewish" backers, Hindenburg 
bore responsibility for the 6 million Germans who lost their 
jobs because of the depression,39 
Goebbels's newspaper also dubbed the field marshal "the 
candidate of the Social Democrats," a title that the staunchly 
conservative President undoubtedly found insulting. Through-
out the campaign, Der Angriff emphasized the fact that the SPD, 
the party of the November Criminals and the system, stood be-
hind the incumbent. A vote for Hindenburg was a vote for the 
status quo and all of the evils inherent in the system. Der An-
griff pursued this policy, all the time emphasizing that "the 
personality of Reichspresident Hindenburg is unassailable for 
us also." 40 
Thaelmann, the candidate of the hated KPD, was the victim 
of even more vicious insults than Hindenburg. Der Angriff in-
sisted that he was "not the leader of the German proletar-
iat ... He is the caretaker of the Russian leadership and can 
only do anything on its orders .... Thaelmann can never be a 
leader, because he is not allowed to have any of his own opin-
ions."41 He was, in short, an agent of a foreign power deter-
mined to bring revolution and class warfare to Germany. 
Duesterberg, having no chance of winning, received the 
least amount of attention in Der Angriff. The paper portrayed 
him as the candidate of the Reaktion, a mere pawn of big 
business. He would not fight for the common man as would 
Hitler.42 
Slightly over 37 million (3,425,750 in Berlin) Germans 
went to the polls on Sunday, 13 March 1932. Hindenburg, as 
almost everyone expected, received a plurality of the votes 
cast, 18,650,000 (1,307,661 in the capital). Hitler was second 
with 11,400,000 (666,053 in Berlin, placing him third in the 
city). The Communist candidate, Thaelmann, got 5,000,000 
votes (685,411 in the capital city) and Duesterberg a mere 
2,500,000 (232,224 in Berlin). The only surprise was that Hin-
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denburg failed to get the requisite majority of the votes cast 
needed under the Weimar constitution to secure reelection. 
There would have to be a runoff election, which Chancellor 
Bruening scheduled for 10 April 1932.43 
Goebbels, as always, strived to turn defeat into victory. Der 
Angrif{ dealt with the setback optimistically. The headline on 
14 March read, "Majority of the People Against Hindenburg-
NSDAP Support Doubles!" Since the incumbent was the candi-
date of the status quo, the fact that he had failed to receive a 
majority of the votes cast was a scathing indictment of the 
system. Repeating a popular campaign theme, Der Angrif{ 
maintained that, since the Communists had lost votes since 
the last Reichstag election, Marxists were voting for Hinden-
burg. The paper also emphasized the fact that the number of 
votes Hitler received was double the Nazi support in the Sep-
tember 1930 election. A story on 15 March reminded readers 
that all parties except the NSDAP had lost votes since 1930.44 
Though it was clear that Hindenburg would have little 
trouble securing reelection-a plurality of the votes cast was 
all that was needed to win the runoff election-Goebbels had 
to get the Nazi propaganda machine ready for another cam-
paign. He outlined his press strategy in a circular that ap-
peared on 23 March 1932. After ordering that all Nazi papers 
distribute special election editions on 29 March, he turned to 
the theme of the second contest: the character of the Fuehrer. 
All Nazi organs were to have a "unified theme" on specified 
days beginning 29 March. On that day, the motif upon which 
the entire Nazi press apparatus was to concentrate was "Hit-
ler as a man." The subject of the following day would be 
"Hitler as comrade." On 31 March the National Socialist press 
would concentrate its efforts upon depicting "Hitler as politi-
cal fighter." The first day of April would see Nazi newspapers 
present "Hitler as statesman." 45 While appeals to the person-
ality cult surrounding Hitler were not absent during the first 
campaign, Goebbels and Der Angrif{ would adopt them as 
their central theme during the second contest, doing much to 
contribute to the creation of the Hitler myth. 
Emphasizing Hitler's personality, however, was not the 
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only Nazi strategy in the second campaign. Der Angrif{ also 
emphasized the inevitability of a Nazi victory. The number of 
Nazi supporters, it alleged, increased daily. There was, as a 
result of NSDAP election victories, "Desperation within the 
Communist 'Masses.''' Many erstwhile Communist voters, 
the paper alleged, who would refuse to support the doomed 
candidacy of Ernst Thaelmann, had been forced by economic 
circumstances to accept the "ideas of our Fuehrer and ... 
become nationalists." Typical of this tactic was the publica-
tion of a letter from a former Communist explaining his con-
version to Nazism: "There is no other way for me."46 
The 31 March edition of Der Angrif{ carried reports of yet 
more conversions to National Socialism. Since Duesterberg 
had withdrawn his candidacy in light of his poor showing, 
the Stahlhelm, the Nationalist paramilitary group, had given 
its support to Hitler. This made the Nazi leader the "Nation-
al Unity Candidate" of all those who rejected the system. If 
all right-wing groups, the paper insisted, fell in line behind 
Hitler as the Stahlhelm had, the Fuehrer would win the elec-
tion, and Germany would be saved.47 
The primary source of the popularity of National Social-
ism was, of course, Adolf Hitler. His magnetic personality was 
the movement's primary asset, and Goebbels made the most 
of it during the second contest. On 31 March, an article ap-
peared in Der Angrif{ entitled "Hitler, the Political Fighter." 
Written by Goebbels, it was a brief biography ofthe Nazi lead-
er. At the end of the First World War the Fuehrer had vowed to 
avenge the crimes of November 1918 and had struggled against 
the system created by the November Criminals ever since. 
Hitler had become "a symbol of Germany's rebirth for the 
wide masses." Eleven and one-half million Nazi voters in the 
March election was proof; there was simply no stopping Hit-
ler's momentum.48 
On 3 April Hitler began his famous aerial campaign tour 
of Germany. Der Angrif{ reported that, in the course of this 
campaign, entitled "Hitler over Germany," the Nazi leader 
would speak to 1 million Germans, visiting twenty-one cities 
in six days. A reporter for the paper, having been in the 
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Fuehrer's plane, wrote that, as Germany faded beneath them, 
they realized that Hitler and his entourage had embarked 
upon a historic mission, and German politics had never wit-
nessed anything comparable.49 
Hitler's "Flight over Germany" began a new emphasis in 
Der Angriff's approach to the campaign. In this second contest, 
the paper concentrated not only upon the speakers at Hitler 
rallies but also upon the crowds. It tried to transform the mass 
hysteria of a Nazi meeting into print. Therefore, the organ pub-
lished articles such as "80,000 in Dresden," "60,000 in Pots-
dam," and" 20 ,000 in the Sportpalast." These pieces contained 
reports of tens of thousands raising their arms in the Hitler 
salute upon seeing their hope for the future. Women cried. 
Hitler kissed babies.5o 
Der Angrif{ and other Nazi papers portrayed Hitler as a 
man of the people. The article, "Adolf Hitler, the man" pre-
sented him as a leader whose primary motivation was the 
love of his people. He was "not only a politician, but a com-
mon man ... to whom millions have given their last hope." 
The story featured a picture of Hitler shaking hands with a 
little girl; the caption read "Hitler the Friend of Children." 
The Fuehrer was also fearless in his determination to carry 
out his mission, having flown "through snow and hailstorm 
in [a] flight to Frankfurt" in order to give a speech.51 
The Nazis presented no coherent political platform. Hitler 
was their program. A full-page advertisement in the 4 April 
edition, for example, appealed to women. Only Hitler could 
provide food for their babies, and under his leadership, moth-
ers would no longer have to work to feed their children. The 5 
April issue contained a piece called "Adolf Hitler: My Pro-
gram." As president, Hitler would end the "Germany of Par-
ties" and replace it with the "Germany of the People." He 
promised to eliminate unemployment and inflation and would 
do so by annihilating the system which was the root of these 
illS.52 
Hitler, of course, lost the second election as well. On lO 
April he received 13.4 million votes (863,621 in Berlin, mov-
ing him up to second) while Hindenburg got 19.4 million 
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(1,328,941 in the capital city). Thaelmann received 3.7 million 
votes overall, 573,099 of them in Berlin. While Hindenburg 
had gained 700,000 votes over March's results, Hitler had in-
creased his support by 2,000,000, a tremendous showing for 
the Nazi leader and his party. Der Angrif[ cited this as further 
evidence of the inevitability of a Nazi victory.53 
In spite of the fact that Hitler had lost the presidential 
election of 1932, the campaign did much to contribute to his 
coming to power in January of the following year. First, and 
most obviously, the campaign gave Goebbels an opportunity 
to present a positive image of his Fuehrer. Hitler was, so Der 
Angrif[ claimed, a lover of children, a struggler for the im-
provement of Germany's future, the man who would abro-
gate the Versailles Treaty and a leader who would bring down 
the hated system. In short, he was the solution to all of Ger-
many's problems. The campaign contributed much to the 
creation of the Hitler myth. 
In addition, Hitler's bid for president helped to under-
mine the stability of Weimar democracy by causing a rift be-
tween Hindenburg and Bruening. There were two results of 
the election that the incumbent resented.' First, the aging 
field marshal took umbrage at the fact that he had had to 
look to left-wing and centrist support to secure reelection. As 
Hindenburg himself asked: "Who elected me then? The So-
cialists elected me, the Catholics elected me and the Berlin 
Daily News elected me. My people did not elect me." In addi-
tion, Hindenburg objected to the fact that Bruening had 
failed to secure his reelection on the first ballot as he had 
promised. Hindenburg's disappointment at the course of the 
presidential contest was a major factor in the fall of the 
Bruening government in May 1932. The resulting instability 
and the incompetence of Bruening's successor, Franz von Pa-
pen, contributed greatly to Nazism's success. For this rea-
son, although Hitler lost the presidential contest of 1932, the 
Nazis benefited the most from the election. The campaign 
strategy pursued in Der Angrif[ played an important role in 
bringing this about.54 
4 _____ _ 
The SA and 
political Violence 
Among the most dynamic and revolutionary organizations 
within the NSDAP was its paramilitary wing, the SA. This was 
the case on both the national and Gau levels. Propaganda 
work and political violence carried out by Nazi storm troop-
ers played an important role in the rise of National Socialism 
in Berlin, and the pages of Der Angriff mirrored this fact. The 
paper regularly contained entire columns dedicated to SA ac-
tivities and political violence. The prominence of political vi-
olence on the pages of Der Angriff was the result of the con-
frontational atmosphere in Berlin. The city was the political 
center of Germany, and frequent street clashes between vari-
ous paramilitary groups were part of political life. Many oth-
er Nazi sheets, Der Stuermer for example, did not place such a 
strong emphasis upon physical clashes with the enemy. There 
were simply not as many Communists in Nuremberg to fight. 
Thus, Der Angriff's attitudes stressing political violence serve 
as an example of how regional party leaders adapted their 
propaganda to local conditions. The ways in which Goeb-
bels's newspaper portrayed the milieu of SA men also say 
much about the Nazi world view and how political propagan-
da reflected it. l 
Although no one has done a quantitative analysis of the 
Berlin SA, there is enough information available to come to 
some tentative conclusions concerning its composition. Nazi 
sources record the number of SA men in the Berlin-Branden-
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burg district. In 1926, there were only 450 storm troopers in 
Berlin. By the time of the prohibition in May 1927, there were 
800 SA men in the German capital. At the beginning of 1930, 
largely as a result of the unemployment caused by the world-
wide depression, there were 3,000 storm troopers in the Ber-
lin-Brandenburg SA, organized into 37 storms. In March 1931 
there were 5,000 storm troopers comprising 100 Stuerrne. The 
number of storm troopers in the Berlin-Brandenburg district 
of the SA continued to grow throughout the Weimar years, 
reaching 32,000 on the eve of the seizure of power.2 
There are no sources available concerning the class and 
age composition of the Berlin-Brandenburg SA. There is, how-
ever, no reason to believe that they differ from nationwide sta-
tistics. According to Michael Kater, 72.6 percent of storm 
troopers in his sample were either workers or artisans. This is 
significantly higher than the percentage of party members 
who were from these same groups (32.1 percent). SA men were 
also young, 77.6 percent being under the age of thirty and 94.2 
percent younger than forty-five. It is therefore safe to conclude 
that the Berlin SA was comprised primarily of young men from 
a working-class background.3 
The motivations these men had for joining the SA were, to 
a large extent, the products of socioeconomic conditions. The 
number of storm troopers increased dramatically after the 
economic collapse of 1929-1930. There were a variety of rea-
sons for this correlation. First, it is clear that the vast major-
ity of storm troopers-estimates run as high as 70 percent-
were jobless and most of the rest were underemployed. They 
turned to the SA as an alternative to employment. The organi-
zation saw to it that they had a place to stay and something 
to eat. Hostels (SA Beirne) were established that provided un-
married, out-of-work storm troopers with the necessities of 
life. Also, vagrancy led to boredom and the SA provided disil-
lusioned young men with a sense of purpose, a feeling of be-
longing to an organization in which they were appreciated. 
Disillusionment led to political violence. The prospect of vio-
lent confrontations with other paramilitary groups attracted 
many frustrated young men seeking an outlet. They were po-
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litical soldiers fighting to destroy the republic that was re-
sponsible for their plight. Many would give their lives in pur-
suit of this nihilistic goa1.4 
The pages of Der Angriff reflected these harsh realities. The 
storm troopers depicted in Schweitzer's political cartoons 
were always young and muscular, identical in appearance-
except for the Nazi armband-to the archetypical worker. 
They, like other members of Berlin's proletariat, had been dis-
heartened by the defeat of 1918 and the actions of the inept 
democratic government. After losing their jobs, they felt un-
wanted but had found an organization that needed them, one 
that would feed them and give them a mission in life: saving 
Germany from the machinations of the Jews and democrats.S 
Der Angriff presented SA men not only in a symbolic fash-
ion but also as actual people. An article published in January 
1931, for example, eulogized the martyred storm trooper, 
Ernst Schwartz. Schwartz was, the piece pointed out, "the 
son of a pastor, a soldier at the front, a painter, [and an] SA 
man." The article contained excerpts from some of his letters, 
relating how he had suffered in order to secure Germany's 
future. He had fought long and hard for his ideas, having 
been wounded in the First World War. After the war he suf-
fered further as the "only" Nazi artist "in Berlin at that 
time." One of his major goals was to assure that the NSDAP 
supported the maintenance of "German art." Now this de-
vout and committed man, a minister's son, was the victim of 
the Communists, who had brutally murdered him. The exam-
ple of Schwartz, the editors of Der Angriffhoped, would con-
tribute to the myth that storm troopers were ordinary men, 
making extraordinary sacrifices for the benefit of Germany.6 
Among the indignities storm troopers had to accept was 
the possibility of being the "victims" of political violence. The 
world of the SA man was often a dangerous one, and a storm 
trooper had to be prepared to fight for his life at a moment's 
notice. He was the National Socialist "minute man." His op-
ponents were most often the members of the other paramili-
tary organizations, the Communists' RFB and the SPD's Reichs-
banner. Brawls among these groups-often leading to loss of 
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life-were an integral part of the political landscape in Berlin, 
and Der Angriff's copy reflected this. In December 1930 and 
January 1931, for example, the paper published a series of arti-
cles providing boxing lessons to its readers.1 
All stories concerned with politically motivated assaults 
insisted that the enemies of the storm troopers were to blame. 
The SA men were always, according to Der Angriff, the victims 
in any violent clash. The primary goal of Berlin's storm troop-
ers was to carry out peacefully the tasks that the Gau lead-
ership assigned them, whether distributing propaganda or 
marching through a working-class neighborhood. The Marx-
ist parties, on the other hand, "practiced bloody terror and 
cowardly attacks."8 
Standing behind these" cowardly attacks" were, of course, 
the Jews. The Jews benefited the most from these clashes be-
tween workers because they promoted division within the 
working-class community, which assured the continued domi-
nation of German society by the Jews. Indeed, members of the 
RFB and Reichsbanner were not really workers at all since they 
did the bidding of the Jews. Totally lacking in honor, these 
Marxist terrorists ambushed unsuspecting storm troopers in 
alleys, never attacking unless they had superior numbers. They 
were, according to Der Angriff, mere thugs, void of "human 
feelings." The paper attempted to dehumanize the enemy.9 
Pubs and beer halls were often the sites of violent clashes. 
One of the first beer hall brawls reported in Der Angrif[ oc-
curred in the Schlossbrauerei Schoeneberg in September 
1927. The hall was crowded; nine hundred people were pre-
sent, about one hundred of them Communists. During the 
course of the discussion, so the police report recounts, two 
Communists tried to receive permission to speak. When they 
could not produce Nazi party cards, permission was refused. 
A bloody brawl ensued. The Communists, singing the "Inter-
nationale," threw beer glasses and stools at Goebbels and the 
guest speaker, a man identified only as Haake. The fight 
spread outside, but the RFB men ran away when the police 
appeared on the scene. Nine people were arrested, eight Com-
munists and one Nazi. lO 
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Der Angriff reported the story briefly and, for the most 
part, accurately. There was, however, one important differ-
ence between the police and newspaper reports. Der Angriff 
insisted that the storm troopers present had forced the RFB 
men to retreat. The Communists were "driven out of the hall 
with bloody heads and [they] fled over roofs and into cel-
lars." No mention of intervention by the police was made. 
Rather, the brave SA men present came to the rescue of their 
leaders, driving off the enemy and emerging, as always, vic-
torious.1I 
Der Angriff's account of this beer hall battle in Schoene-
berg evidences several propaganda techniques of the paper. 
First, and most important, the editors tried to base their copy, 
however loosely, upon the truth. A complete fabrication of 
events would be detected by those who were present and 
would serve to discredit the newspaper, which would be 
counterproductive, causing people not to take Der Angriff's 
copy seriously. In contrast, a carefully edited account of actu-
al events could place the NSDAP in a positive light. In the 
Schoeneberg case, the KPD had initiated events, with the RFB 
men being the first to throw beer glasses and stools. The 
NSDAP could, to a certain extent, legitimately claim to have 
been the victims of red aggression. A foundation, however 
tenuous, in actual events contributed to the newspaper's 
credibility. 
On the other hand, Der Angriff never published the truth 
when it would be disadvantageous to do so. The newspaper 
contended, for example, that the Nazis had driven the Com-
munists from the Schlossbrauerei. The editors of the paper 
did this for two reasons. First, their version of events made it 
appear as if the NSDAP had emerged unscathed and victorious 
from an unprovoked attack. Second, it would have been un-
wise to admit that the police had frightened away the RFB, 
which would have implied that the NSDAP needed the police 
to fight its battles. It would suggest that Goebbels and his 
followers were helpless in the face of the "red horde," some-
thing Der Angriff could never admit. In addition, the paper 
consistently claimed that the Berlin Police Force was a tool of 
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the system, the handmaid of the Jews and the parties of the 
left. It could not admit that the police would protect the 
Nazis. Lying, or neglecting to relate completely the course of 
events, was a popular ploy that contributed greatly to the 
propaganda mission of Der Angriff. Berlin's storm troopers 
surely appreciated this propaganda technique.l2 
The ultimate sacrifice any SA man could make was to die 
for his ignoble cause. This happened frequently. By the sum-
mer of 1932, about 350 storm troopers had been killed through-
out the Reich, seventeen of them in Berlin between 1926 and 
August 1932. These "martyrs," having made the ultimate sac-
rifice for the movement, became Christ figures in Nazi mythol-
ogy, the "holy sacrifice" Germany had made at the altar of the 
Elders of Zion. The NSDAP lauded them in song and poetry. The 
poem "Two Hundred Are Dead," published in Der Angriff in 
January 1931, is an excellent example of Nazi martyrology. 
They fought by day and in dark night, 
They have buried two hundred comrades, 
Have mourned but never taken flight, 
And have struggled and only said one thing is right: 
Two hundred are dead, but hundreds of thousands stand, 
Because Germany must not fall or be ruined they demand 
They have fought for the new, the approaching state, 
They stand together despite terror, death and hate, 
They keep the flame and will not let it flee 
And hold it tightly until Germany is great and free. 
Two hundred are dead, so the rippling flags wave 
Because Germany must not fall or be lost to the brave.13 
The first storm trooper killed in Berlin after Der Angriff be-
gan publication in 1927 was Walter Fischer, a member of 
Sturm 13. Communists shot him on the evening of 14 Decem-
ber 1929 in Wilmersdorf. The nineteen-year-old Fischer, ac-
cording to the Nazi version of the story, was on his way to a 
pub after an SA meeting. Along with several of his comrades, 
he wanted to end the day with a beer at Sturm 13's tavern, 
"Unger." Rumors claiming that armed RFB men from the pub 
"Lauenburger" were roaming the streets around Wegener-
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strasse spread among the tavern's patrons, though Fischer 
and his comrades were unaware of the danger. To make mat-
ters worse, the SA men in this district had no weapons with 
which to defend themselves; the police had confiscated them 
earlier that day. Because the Communists had destroyed 
many of the surrounding streetlights, the neighborhood was 
dark. Shots rang out. Fischer was hit in the shoulder. He was 
taken to the hospital, where he died later that night.'4 
Presented with its first SA martyr, Der Angrif{ was deter-
mined to benefit from his death. The 19 December issue of the 
paper contained a front-page story, written by Lippert, which 
paid tribute to the fallen storm trooper. Fischer was, Lippert 
charged, the victim of a hypocritical system that espoused 
"humanitarianism" and "pacifism." But Weimar authorities 
only paid lip service to these views because they permitted 
young men to be gunned down in the street. And the system 
would do nothing. This problem, the article continued, was 
not confined to the city of Berlin. Every day, throughout Ger-
many, fifty storm troopers were attacked; and the government 
did nothing. Rather, the police merely blamed the violence 
upon the victims, calling them "political rowdies" unworthy 
of protection. Therefore, the SA had to defend itself.'s 
Lippert then turned to an attack upon the Weimar con-
stitution, which defended Communist murderers of unsus-
pecting SA men. A document that would protect assassins 
was not worthy of Germany and should be abrogated for the 
benefit of the entire nation. If this were not done, Germany 
could be certain that men such as those who ambushed 
Fischer would come to rule the country. The constitution 
protected no one but the guilty, those who murdered inno-
cent men like Fischer.'6 
Fischer was the first storm trooper martyred during the 
period 1927-1933 but by no means the most important in 
Nazi propaganda. Horst Wessel, who died in February 1930 
after a five-week battle for life, became the most prominent 
figure in the martyrology of the SA. The death of Wessel, the 
leader of Storm 5, became the subject of poems, books, and 
even a movie, "Hans Westmar." "The Horst Wessel Song" 
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("Die Fahne hoch") became the official ballad of the NSDAP. 
Der Angrif{ played no small role in creating what historian 
Jay Baird has called "the myth of resurrection and return" 
surrounding Wessel's deathP 
Wessel's background was useful in creating this myth. 
The son of a Lutheran pastor, he would be just twenty-two 
years old when he died. The year 1926 saw him begin to study 
law at the University of Berlin. The pretentious intellectual 
atmosphere at the university repelled him, and he joined the 
SA in December of the same year. Wessel soon became famous 
for his impassioned speeches calling for the liberation of Ger-
many, making him popular with the other storm troopers. 
His speaking ability, coupled with intense popularity, led to 
his appointment as leader of Storm 5 in 1929. Wessel soon got 
a reputation in Berlin's proletarian districts as a good orga-
nizer and propagandist for the NSDAP, which contributed to 
the decision to murder him in January 1930.18 
The events surrounding Wessel's death are somewhat un-
clear. Because of effective KPD propaganda surrounding his 
murder-Rote Fahne insisted that Wessel was shot because 
he was a pimp-it is traditionally argued that Wessel was 
killed in a disagreement over a woman. In September 1929, 
he moved in with his girlfriend, the prostitute Erna Jaenicke, 
who lived in Friedrichshain. The Communist Ali Hoehler sup-
posedly shot Wessel on 14 January 1930 in a dispute concern-
ing Jaenicke's services.19 
Baird has determined, however, that Jaenicke's affections 
had nothing to do with Wessel's murder. Rather, the storm 
leader was having some difficulties with his landlady, Frau 
Salm, because he and Jaenicke were living together. Further, 
Salm did not like the noise made during the SA meetings fre-
quently held in Wessel's apartment. She turned to the local 
RFB section, headquartered in the tavern "Der Baer," for aid. 
Hoehler, because of Wessel's reputation among Berlin's prole-
tariat, was willing to deal with the storm leader. On 14 Janu-
ary, Hoehler and several comrades burst into the apartment, 
shouted "You know what this is for," and shot Wessel. As 
Baird points out, treatment was delayed because of a refusal 
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to secure the services of a nearby Jewish doctor. Wessel was 
taken to the Friedrichshain Hospital, where he died on 23 
February 1930.20 
Der Angrif{ began to create a legend concerning Wessel 
even before the Sturmfuehrer's demise. An article appearing 
on 19 January lauded the dying storm trooper. He was at-
tacked, the paper argued, because he was "the most active 
storm leader of Berlin;" so the Communists, who could not 
match Wessel's dedication and enthusiasm, shot him. Wessel 
had assumed control of SA Troop 34, headquartered in the 
heart of "red Friedrichshain," and had turned it into a Sturm. 
He was able to succeed in the heart of Communist territory 
because he, unlike the KPD, understood the "soul of the prole-
tariat." The leader of Storm 5 saw every German as his 
"brother and comrade." Der Angrif{, countering Communist 
propaganda, insisted that for these "purely political" rea-
sons, Communists had assaulted Wessel. Further, not only 
was the KPD guilty of the attack on Wessel, but so was the 
system. Hoehler had recently been arrested for assault but 
had conveniently been broken out of jail. The implication 
was that, as usually was the case, the system had managed to 
protect the guilty rather than the innocent. To make matters 
worse, Dey Angrif{ recorded, Hoehler would never suffer for 
his crime, for the KPD leadership had spirited him away to his 
comrades in the Soviet Union.21 
Another article in Der Angriff, written by Goebbels, began 
by depicting the "deathwatch" over Wessel. Concerned com-
rades and candles and flowers surrounded the wounded storm 
trooper. "On the wall hangs a picture of [Wessel's] father in 
[his] vestments." The room was blanketed in silence, on-
lookers weeping quietly. Horst Wessel was "fighting ... his 
hardest battle: that against death." In spite of his condition-
he could neither eat nor drink-Wessel looked forward to vis-
its from his comrades. "This young man has lost two liters of 
blood." He was conscious throughout the ordeal, and, in spite 
of the pain, had not so much as whimpered. Wessel kept his 
spirits up as always. The storm leader suddenly began to 
speak. "We must endure!" he said. "We are still needed," he 
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fjeUige Opfer 
mellll es 1I0dJ eine C5etedJlIglell IIlbl - - Oie lletgellunll mub lommen! 
"Holy Offerings. If there is to be justice-retribution must come." 
continued. "I am happy!" Wessel, in spite of his pain, kept the 
movement foremost in his thoughts. The Gauleiter gave Wes-
sel his hand but could no longer contain his grief and had to 
leave. Goebbels "would never forget" this moment. The mur-
derers must be punished, he insisted.22 
Der Angriff also began to use Christian motifs in the cre-
ation of the Horst Wessel myth. A cartoon appearing in the 23 
January edition depicted the "Holy sacrifices" of the Berlin 
NSDAP. On the ground were the bodies of several martyred 
storm troopers, Walther Fischer and Wessel (who was not yet 
dead) among them. Standing over the bodies was an RFB man 
holding a pistol. Behind him, standing in front of the mast-
head of the Rote Fahne, was "the Jewish murderer," the RFB 
man his willing "tooL" The caption read: "If there is to be 
justice-retribution must come."23 
After Wessel's death, Der Angriff grafted another Chris-
tian theme onto the Wessel myth: the concept of victory in 
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death. The storm trooper was not really dead at all because 
his memory would live on in the hearts and minds of the 
comrades he left behind. He provided inspiration that would 
cause others to take up his cause. The RFB, which was respon-
sible for his murder, would have to look upon the SA with new 
respect and fear because the death of Horst Wessel would 
provide new strength and determination for Marxism's ene-
mies. In short, Wessel had not died in vain; he had helped to 
assure that the movement, Germany, would live.24 
The theme of heroic death remained an important one 
for Der Angriff throughout the rest of the "years of struggle." 
Among those added to the pantheon of Nazi martyrs during 
this period was storm trooper Ernst Schwartz. Schwartz 
was attending an SA meeting in the tavern "Bergschloss" in 
Frohnau on the evening of 19 January 1932. While walking 
home through Reinickendorf with his comrades from Storm 
4, Schwartz became involved in a pitched street battle with 
Communists who attacked the storm troopers outside the 
collection of wooden hovels known as "Felseneck." During 
the course of the fight, shots were fired from one of the nearby 
shacks. The Communists brandished knives. Schwartz was 
killed, stabbed in the heart. A Communist also died during the 
skirmish. Two others, both Nazis, were severely wounded in 
the course of the battle.25 
Goebbels and the staff of Der Angriffhad yet another op-
portunity to reap benefit from the death of a storm trooper. 
The paper held that Schwartz must not die in vain. His noble 
demise must inspire others to make the ultimate sacrifice for 
their country and the movement. They must be willing to go 
"from graveside to [a] new struggle." His comrades must 
avenge his death, thereby seeking the salvation of Germany. 
This would give meaning to Schwartz's life of struggle and 
his noble death.26 
Der Angriff contended that, when the RFB murdered SA 
men, it was carrying out a conscious plan. The paper used the 
murder of Schwartz to bring this point home. The Commu-
nists held that the working-class neighborhoods were their 
turf and became determined to end Nazi penetration of these 
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areas. In this case, the plan began with a series of circulars 
posted in the Felseneck district. These Flugblaetter called for 
establishment of a "unified front against fascism," insisting 
that the Nazis should not be permitted to enter the area. To 
complement the distribution of propaganda, the local Com-
munists began to attack small groups of Nazis, on one occa-
sion assaulting a distributor of Der Angrif{ in the hallway of 
an apartment buildingP 
Having contributed to this atmosphere of hate, it was just 
a matter of time until the KPD's efforts came to fruition. On 
the night of the murder, Communist troops patrolled the 
streets of Reineckendorf, looking for trouble. Local police, 
aware of the tense situation in the area, were also on alert. As 
Schwartz and his men approached, they were ambushed by 
inhabitants of the surrounding shacks. The Communists had 
obviously been waiting for the members of Troop III of Storm 
4, murder in their hearts. Schwartz, somewhat streetwise, 
tried to get his men out of the situation, but Communists cut 
off all paths of retreat. Three hundred shots were fired at the 
storm troopers. While policemen watched, the leader of Troop 
III was stabbed by a "red murderer." Such events were clearly 
the result of a conspiracy aimed at the murder of a local SA 
leader. These street clashes were not the products of coinci-
dence, but part of a conscious policy on the part of the KPD to 
drive the NSDAP out of the working-class neighborhoods. The 
Reds, however, would ultimately fai1.28 
Storm troopers were not the only victims of red cam-
paigns to take over the streets. On 24 January 1932, a gang of 
Communists murdered the Hitler Youth Herbert Norkus in 
Moabit. Like Horst Wessel, Norkus would become one of the 
most important figures in National Socialist propaganda, 
and, once again, Der Angrif{ played an important role in se-
curing his place in Nazi mythology.29 
On 24 January 1932, the fifteen-year-old Norkus was plac-
ing flyers in mailboxes in Moabit, accompanied by a comrade, 
Johannes Kirsch. As they left the fourth house on Gotzkowski-
strasse, they saw thirty-five to forty Communists. The Hitler 
Youths, keeping on the watch for danger, continued to distri-
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bute flyers. As they approached one of the houses, they discov-
ered that the Communists were behind them. One of the "reds" 
told them to "stand still." When Kirsch tried to place a flyer in 
the door of the house, one of the RFB men hit him in the back. 
Kirsch managed to escape harm by hiding behind a trash can. 
Norkus, however, was not as fortunate.3o 
Norkus tried to flee down Gotzkowskistrasse, turning 
onto Zwinglistrasse. After he unsuccessfully attempted to 
gain sanctuary in a nearby building, his enemies caught him. 
Although they knocked him down, he managed to escape 
once again, trying to seek refuge in the Kirschner school. His 
failure to do so enabled the Communists to fall upon him 
again, this time stabbing him. Norkus, somehow succeeding 
in escaping yet again, managed to get help from the propri-
etor of a cleaning establishment. He was taken to the hospi-
tal, where he died.31 
The following day, Der Angriff carried news of "the assas-
sination of the Hitler Youth." On Sunday morning, the paper 
recorded, Norkus and his comrades were peacefully distrib-
uting leaflets announcing a Hitler Youth function. While they 
were doing so, a "terror troop" of the RFB, acting on a tip 
from its network of "bicyclists and other couriers," made 
plans to attack the unsuspecting adolescents. The Commu-
nists waited for Norkus and Kirsch in a "dark corner." They 
fell upon the greatly outnumbered Hitler Youths, and in the 
course of events "knives flashed," and Norkus received "nu-
merous stab wounds." Once again, the Nazis were the victims 
of a planned Communist assault. A more detailed story in the 
same edition numbered Norkus's attackers at forty and his 
stab wounds at six.32 
Another piece in Der Angriff discussed the "men behind 
the cowardly assassination": "International Workers' Aid, 
Red Aid and [the] Leadership of the KPD." The killers of Nor-
kus were not the only people guilty of his death. Also bearing 
responsibility for the deed was the leadership of the KPD, 
which had organized a systematic terror campaign against 
Berlin's Nazis. The leaders of the Berlin government, the 
hated system, were also held accountable for.Norkus's mur-
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der. They had refused to put an end to the red terror. The 
police, who were so adept at solving nonpolitical murders, 
almost never captured the culprits who murdered a Nazi. 
The reason was simple: they did not want to pursue these 
cases tenaciously. This, in the eyes of Der Angriff, was further 
evidence of the bankruptcy of the Weimar government.33 
Norkus had become yet another martyr for the Nazi 
cause. He had, Der Angriff claimed, answered the call of the 
chief of the Hitler Youth to help propagate the ideas of his 
Fuehrer, to win Germany's youth for the coming Third Reich. 
Norkus knew that he might very well have to sacrifice his life 
for the movement, but, even though he was not yet a man, he 
understood that his mission was more important than his 
own existence. Norkus, who had grown up in the shadow of 
red oppression, went willingly into enemy territory and fell 
there, contending that "Germany should live, even if we must 
die." 34 
Yet Norkus had not really died. In a front-page story in Der 
Angriff, Goebbels recorded the Hitler Youth's resurrection: 
There in the bleak, gray twilight, yellowed, tortured eyes stare into 
the emptiness. His tender head has been trampled into a bloody pulp. 
Long, deep wounds extend down the slender body, and a deadly lacer-
ation tears through his lungs and heart. ... Yet it is as if life stirs 
anew out of pale death. Look now, the slender, elegant body begins to 
move. Slowly, slowly he rises as if conjured up by magic, until he 
stands tall in all his youthful glory right before my trembling eyes. 
And without moving his lips, a frail child's voice is heard as if speak-
ing from all eternity: "They killed me. They plunged the murderers's 
daggers into my breast and mangled my head .... This happened 
only because I-still a child-wanted to serve my country .... I am 
Germany . .. one of you millions .... What is mortal in me will per-
ish. But my spirit, which is immortal, will remain with you. And 
it ... will show you the way. Until the Reich comes."35 
Norkus was not dead. He lived as long as other Germans pur-
sued his vision. The dead Hitler Youth would serve as an in-
spiration to millions. 
There are several themes that run throughout Der An-
griff's propaganda concerning political violence. They say 
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much about the way in which the leadership of the Berlin 
NSDAP viewed the movement and how most effectively to 
spread its message. Studying these motifs will aid in the un-
derstanding of National Socialism and, more specifically, its 
propaganda. 
First, Der Angrif{ always depicted Nazis involved in politi-
cal violence as victims. Nazis never initiated a confrontation 
and were always the prey of Marxists and Jews. In each case 
discussed above, the Nazis attacked were, in the view of Der 
Angriff, engaged in peaceful activity, such as distributing pro-
paganda leaflets or merely walking home to their families 
after an evening at the local storm pub. In short, the goal of 
National Socialism was not violence, but merely the salva-
tion of Germany. Others, who objected to this goal, felt com-
pelled to destroy Nazism violently because they could not de-
feat it through peaceful methods. The Marxists, no better 
than animals, did this consciously. 
Der Angrif{ also had much to say about Nazi victims of po-
litical violence. They were ordinary people who found them-
selves in extraordinary circumstances and rose to the occa-
sion. Horst Wessel, for example, had not intended to martyr 
himself for his cause. In the end, however, he was willing to do 
so if it came to that. Germany, not his own welfare, was his 
primary interest. Even on his deathbed, Wessel's foremost con-
cern was the success of the movement. Those who remembered 
him, Der Angrif{ contended, would do him a great service by 
continuing his mission. 
The paper consistently used Christian themes in portray-
ing Nazi martyrs. They had died not to destroy Germany but 
to save it. They were "holy sacrifices." A storm trooper, like 
Christ, died so that others might live. Herbert Norkus, Goeb-
bels implied, had risen from the dead so that others would 
continue his mission. As long as their ideas lived, these men 
would not truly be dead. 
These themes were powerful propaganda weapons. They 
depicted Nazism as a dynamic movement. People were will-
ing to make the ultimate sacrifice for its ideas. To espouse 
Nazism was, therefore, by implication to adopt a noble cause. 
80 Goebbels and Der Angrlff 
No one would willingly fight and die for anything less. Der 
Angrif{ hoped to attract and keep supporters by stressing 
these themes, and stories concerning martyrs to the Nazi 
cause provided a valuable foundation upon which these mo-
tifs could be constructed. 
Der Angrif{'s involvement with Nazi paramilitary politics 
went beyond merely recording the exploits of SA men. The 
paper often found itself entangled in the internal politics of 
the paramilitary group. One such occasion was the revolt of 
the eastern SA in April 1931. This rebellion is of interest not 
only because Der Angrif{ played an important role, but also 
because of the part its editor, Goebbels, played in the revolt.36 
The Gauleiter's actions are of interest because he was the 
Nazi leader at the center of the conflagration, Berlin. Fur-
ther, he almost lost his position as leader of the Gau and its 
newspaper because he seemingly could not control the SA in 
his region. Also, Walther Stennes, the leader of the rebels, 
claimed that Goebbels was intimately involved in the April 
action. Finally, the Berlin Police, which had an informant in 
the Stennes camp, claimed that the Gauleiter fled to Munich 
and told Hitler about the SA leader's plans, thereby betraying 
Stennes and helping to crush the revolt.37 
Fortunately, the recent appearance of previously unpub-
lished entries from the Gauleiter's diaries make it possible to 
trace his actions. Goebbels's personal account, coupled with 
other evidence, makes it clear that the situation was much 
more complicated than the police believed. Although the April 
1931 rebellion is of primary concern here, a brief recounting of 
the August-September 1930 revol t is necessary for understand-
ing the issues facing the Berlin party leader. 
The catalyst for the August uprising was a disagreement 
between Hitler and the Supreme Commander of the SA (Osaf), 
Franz Pfeffer. The issue was the position of SA representatives 
on the NSDAP Reichstag list for the upcoming election. At a 
leadership conference held on 2-3 August 1930, Pfeffer de-
manded that storm troopers receive three secure places. Hitler 
refused because of a growing disagreement between the party 
and the paramilitary leadership. Pfeffer saw the SA as a mili-
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tary organization that would play an active role in the violent 
overthrow of the Weimar government. In contrast, Hitler, who 
had committed himself to a "legal" seizure of power, saw the 
SA'S function as primarily political. Its members were to carry 
out propaganda work and serve as guards at party rallies, al-
though occasional clashes with the Communists aided in cre-
ating an image of the NSDAP as a bulwark of law and order. Be-
cause of his views on the role of the SA, Hitler wanted the organ-
ization subordinate to the party, a position Pfeffer would not 
accept. On 12 August Pfeffer resigned, effective 1 September.38 
Because of repeated clashes with the RFB, the Osaf's posi-
tion had gained preeminence in Berlin. Hence, the reaction to 
Pfeffer's resignation was strongest in the capital. The Berlin SA 
went on strike, refusing to distribute propaganda or defend 
rallies until Hitler reinstated Pfeffer. The leader of the mutiny 
was the supreme commander of the SA for eastern Germany 
(Osaf-ost), Walther Stennes. The Osaf-ost had been a right-
wing revolutionary since leading troops in the aborted putsch 
by the "Black Reichswehr" (troops assembled by right-wing 
groups in violation of the Versailles Treaty) in 1923. By 1927, 
his reputation within voelkisch paramilitary circles had led 
to his appointment as Osaf-ost. Because of his background, 
Stennes was a strong supporter of Pfeffer and would not watch 
his superior ousted without a fight.39 
Under Stennes's leadership the strike spread. At the end 
of August, Goebbels received word that the strikers would 
present the party with an ultimatum concerning the Reichs-
tag list. He faced an all-out rebellion of the forces under the 
Osaf-ost. The demands of the strikers increased, Stennes in-
sisting that the party do more to help unemployed members 
of the SA. Hitler and the other party "big shots" (Bonzen) had, 
Stennes alleged, abandoned their socialist goals in order to 
gain the support of big business, thereby selling out hungry 
storm troopers and their families.4o 
When Hitler refused to meet Stennes's demands, SA Storm 
31 seized the Berlin party headquarters and the offices of Der 
Angriff, injuring two ss guards. Hitler's response was effec-
tive and quick. He personally assumed the position vacated 
82 Goebbels and Der Angr1[f 
by Pfeffer and went to Berlin, where he used his immense 
popularity to quell the rebellion. The Fuehrer visited SA pubs 
on 1 September, assuring those assembled that he was con-
cerned with their welfare. All present swore an oath of loyalty 
to Hitler, who ordered that twenty pfennigs be added to par-
ty dues to help the beleaguered SA. Goebbels then spoke, 
echoing Hitler's promises. While Goebbels hoped that the ep-
isode was closed, it was clear that the fundamental issue, the 
proper role of the SA, remained unresolved. Also, the strong 
"social-revolutionary component" within the SA had come to 
the fore.41 
The revolt also presented the Berlin Gauleiter with a seri-
ous problem. He enjoyed the privilege of being leader of both 
the party and SA within his region. In other Gaue, the leader 
of the SA reported directly to the Osaf for the area. In Berlin 
he was responsible to the Gauleiter, who could lose this pow-
er if the SA were to revolt again. Another rebellion would 
prove that Goebbels was unworthy of the authority given him 
by his leader. He therefore had to be sure to maintain the 
dominance of the party over the paramilitary group. On the 
other hand, Stennes was very popular with the rank and file 
of the Berlin SA, and Goebbels could not afford to alienate 
him; this could cause another mutiny.42 
Realizing his predicament, Goebbels began to court Sten-
nes's favor, meeting frequently with the SA leader. One such oc-
casion was 20 September 1930, when an SA gathering brought 
them together. They spoke until two in the morning. In his 
diary, the Gauleiter recorded that he felt Stennes was a man 
with whom he could work. Another important meeting oc-
curred in the Gauleiter's home on 11 January 1931, during 
which Goebbels and Stennes discussed the problems existing 
between the SA and SS, which was becoming elitist and in-
creasingly independent of the SA. Stennes opposed this trend, 
and Goebbels echoed his concern. "Stennes appears to want 
peace with me," Goebbels recorded in his diary. They were 
"becoming much closer" and the SA leader could serve as 
"something of a counterweight against Munich."43 
At the same time that the Gauleiter tried to win the trust of 
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the SA, he complained about the trouble it gave him. Know-
ing that the issues raised in August were unresolved, he re-
corded in his diary that "I also do not believe that Stennes 
will give [us] peace in the long run." The following month, 
Goebbels lamented that Hitler was trying to increase the 
powers of the national SA leadership, thereby undermining 
Stennes's strength. He feared problems would arise from the 
"many utopian romantics" who stood behind the Osaf-ost. In 
the end, he was sure that the issues raised in the late summer 
of 1930 remained unresolved.44 
While Goebbels tried to seize control of the political situ-
ation, the SA felt itself increasingly alienated from the party 
leadership. Ernst Roehm, whom Hitler named Osaf in Janu-
ary 1931, reorganized the SA in the eastern districts, thereby 
taking control of the SA in Silesia from Stennes. Hitler also 
issued a decree on 20 February which made the SA subordi-
nate to the party organization at the Gau level. Both of these 
moves were designed to decrease the power of the Osaf-ost 
and his supporters.45 
Stennes's reaction was swift but cautious. On the last day 
of February 1931, he composed a letter to Roehm in which he 
voiced his concerns about recent developments, protesting 
the party's abrogation of the traditional rights of local ,SA 
leaders. Instead of undermining the authority of the organi-
zation's leadership, the party should deal with matters of im-
mediate importance, especially the economic plight of unem-
ployed SA men.46 
In the meantime, the situation became more uncomfort-
able for Goebbels. On 15 March he spoke with Hermann Goer-
ing who scolded him for being too close to Stennes. Unnamed 
party leaders had made accusations questioning Goebbels's 
loyalty. Goebbels and Goering argued about the new party 
program, the Gauleiter maintaining that it had renounced so-
cialism. "Armer Sozialismus!" he lamented. Later that same 
day, Goebbels told Willi Hess, an assistant to the Gauleiter of 
Duesseldorf, that the Fuehrer was oblivious to the views of the 
masses. "Next time [I see him] I'll talk turkey with him [bei 
ihm Fraktur redenJ" about this.47 
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Goebbels soon got his chance to do so, but not under con-
ditions he liked. On the evening of 30 March, he met with 
Bruno Wetzel, the leader of the Berlin SA and a strong sup-
porter of Stennes. According to one account, the Gauleiter 
promised Wetzel that he would "fight on Stennes's side" in 
any effort to establish an independent revolutionary move-
ment in northern Germany. Then, so this police account goes, 
Goebbels, realizing that another SA mutiny was afoot, fled to 
Munich to tell Hitler about it. The Gauleiter hoped that this 
action would help him maintain his post after the rebellion 
was over.48 
Wilhelm J ahn, an SA squad leader, gave a somewhat differ-
ent version of the gathering. Goebbels, holding that the Berlin 
SA was right to resent the policies of Munich, vowed never to 
take action against Wetzel and always to fight by his side. The 
Berlin Gauleiter emphasized, however, that the time had not 
yet come for a reckoning with Munich. Goebbels made only 
cryptic references to the meeting in his diary, merely stating 
that the situation in the SA was a cause for concern and that 
trouble was likely. He had, however, made no concrete agree-
ment and, once again, kept his options open.49 
The Gauleiter's actions support the Jahn account. He did 
not run away to Munich; Hitler called him to a conference in 
Weimar. On his way, he stopped in Dresden, where he gave two 
speeches before proceeding. Had Goebbels known about the 
impending revolt and had he wanted to inform Hitler, he 
would probably have gone directly to the Fuehrer. If, on the 
other hand, he planned to participate in the rebellion, he 
would not have gone to meet with the party boss at all. Fur-
ther, a successful SA revolt would only decrease the Gauleiter's 
power because it would clearly make Stennes the number one 
man in Berlin. Goebbels was unlikely to support such an out-
come.1t is most likely, therefore, that, while he suspected that 
another SA revolt was likely, he did not know when. Support-
ing this interpretation is the fact that, after the mutiny began, 
Stennes sent a delegation to Weimar to win the support of 
Goebbels, who had, by then, gone to Munich with Hitler. This 
would have been unlikely had Goebbels known about the re-
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bellion in advance. On the other hand, this also makes it clear 
that, because of his actions in Berlin, Stennes expected Goeb-
bels to support him. Goebbels had considered one day turning 
against Hitler. This is evinced by a diary entry made shortly 
after he learned of the rebellion: "For me there is no longer any 
question, I will remain loyal to Hitler." The Gauleiter knew 
that his contacts with the SA would cause him serious diffi-
culties, confessing that "there remains nothing for me to do 
but conceal the facts." 50 
Goebbels learned about what happened from Roehm. 
Hitler had removed Stennes, who refused to accept his dis-
missal and rebelled during the night of 31 March-l April. 
Once again, the SA stormed the Berlin party headquarters 
and the offices of Der Angriff, With the aid of the managing 
editor, Weissauer, pro-Stennes editions of the newspaper ap-
peared on the first two days of April. Upon learning that he 
would not support them, the insurgents deposed Goebbels 
and named Wetzel the new Gauleiter. Hitler gave Daluege, 
who by now was the leader of the Berlin SS, responsibility for 
crushing the rebellion.51 
This would prove more problematic than in the previous 
summer. Unlike September, the revolt spread throughout 
eastern Germany. Of the 25,000 men in Stennes's Group East, 
8,000-10,000 joined the rebellion. The Berlin Police estimated 
the breakdown as 1,500 in Berlin, 2,000 in Brandenburg, 
3,000 in Silesia (an area not under Stennes's jurisdiction at 
the start of the revolt), and 2,000 in Pomerania.52 
The motives of the mutineers were largely the same as in 
September. The party had allegedly forgotten the plight of 
the economically downtrodden SA and betrayed the storm 
troopers to gain the support of big business. Hitler had re-
moved Stennes because the SA leader had the courage to fight 
for his men against the party organization, run by "bourgeois 
liberals." The insurgents demanded that the legal course 
must be abandoned, because "the path to the people's com-
munity [Volksgemeinschaft] means struggle and not peace 
and order [Le., democracy]." 53 
The result of the revolt was a schism in the SA. After 
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surrendering party headquarters, Stennes formed the Na-
tionalsozialistische Kampfbewegung Deutschlands (National 
Socialist Movement for Germany's Struggle) or NSKD. He 
maintained earlier contacts with the KPD, which found the 
revolutionary zeal of the NSKD attractive and hoped to ab-
sorb the group, and eventually formed an alliance with Otto 
Strasser's Kampfgemeinschaft. This was a natural outcome 
of the similarities between the programs of the two groups. 
In May the NSKD had 6,000 members, 500 of them in Berlin. 
Throughout the rest of the year and into the next, it contin-
ued to lose members to both the KPD and NSDAP and gradu-
ally faded from the political scene.54 
Although the mutiny did not cause serious problems for 
the Nazis in the long run, it caused difficulties for Goebbels so 
severe that they affected his health. The SA in his Gau had 
rebelled twice within several months, raising serious doubts 
concerning his leadership. Several leading Nazis, most impor-
tantly Goering, accused Goebbels of incompetence. To make 
matters worse, Stennes claimed that Goebbels had partici-
pated in the planning of the revolt. Hence, the Berlin Police 
expected him to be replaced as soon as the crisis subsided.55 
Realizing that he faced a "great personal test," Goebbels 
remained close to the man upon whom all his political for-
tunes depended, Hitler. He did everything possible to assure 
the Fuehrer of his loyalty. Hitler, seeing that the brilliant pro-
pagandist was an invaluable asset, stood by Goebbels. On 3 
April, the Nazi leader published an open letter to the Berlin 
Gauleiter in the party newspaper. Hitler began by recounting 
the conditions under which Goebbels assumed the helm in 
the capital. The Gauleiter had built the movement in Berlin 
from the ground up. Hitler thanked him for his "unswerving 
loyalty to the movement and to me personally as Fuehrer."56 
Goebbels, however, did not go unpunished. Because of the 
role Der Angriffhad played in the rebellion, he temporarily lost 
managerial control of the paper. Hitler dispatched Amann, 
manager of the party publishing company, to Berlin to take 
the financial reins of the organ. Goebbels, however, main-
tained editorship of Der Angriff. While it soon became clear 
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that Amann did not control the daily operation of the news-
paper, he did force the Gauleiter temporarily to reduce its 
length from twelve to ten pages. Also, several staff members, 
most prominently Weissauer, were purged from the party. 
Goebbels successfully resisted efforts on the part of Amann 
and Hans Hinkel, Amann's assistant, to take over Der Angriff 
for the national organization. The proposal called for Hinkel 
to assume permanent managerial control of the paper while 
Goebbels kept the editorship. How the Gauleiter accom-
plished this is unclear, but, on 19 June, Amann returned to 
Munich and things returned to normal in the offices of Der 
Angriff·57 
Not only did Goebbels successfully resist efforts to seize 
control of his newspaper, but he also fought to maintain his 
regional leadership. As events progressed and Stennes made 
accusations concerning the Gauleiter's part in the uprising, 
an increasing number of Nazi leaders became convinced that 
he must be fired. Goebbels considered the possibilities of 
leaving the country for six months or serving some of the jail 
sentences he had accrued for his political activities and re-
turning when things quieted down. A meeting with his chief 
on 27 April changed the situation. Hitler told Goebbels that 
he trusted him and that "Berlin belongs to you and so should 
it remain!"58 
Goebbels did not limit his efforts to meetings with the 
Fuehrer. He cultivated good relations with the man who re-
placed Stennes as Osaf-ost, Paul Schulz. He also published 
articles in Der Angriff claiming that Stennes was a liar and 
police spy. Speeches to packed houses showed both the local 
party membership and the national leadership that he was 
indispensable to the movement. On 16 April 1931, Goebbels 
spoke to 4,000 SA men in the Sportpalast. As he recounted the 
tribulations the party had recently endured, many in the au-
dience wept. He later recorded in his diary that "no devil 
would ever take these young men away from me again." This 
was true; the 27 April meeting with Hitler had made it clear 
that he had weathered the storm.59 
The facts surrounding Goebbels's actions during this pe-
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riod indicate something about the character of the publisher 
of Der Angriff. His primary goal was power, and he always did 
what was necessary to obtain and keep it. Goebbels wooed 
Stennes in order to keep the SA leader contented, but when 
Stennes threatened his authority, he turned contritely to 
Hitler. He simply was not willing to risk his positions as 
Gauleiter and editor of Der Angriff to benefit his greatest po-
litical rival, Walther Stennes. 
Goebbels's part in the second SA mutiny also shows some-
thing about Nazi intra-party politics. Clearly, the NSDAP was 
not monolithic; at least two factions had developed. There 
were many within the party who wanted to abandon Hitler's 
call for a legal seizure of power. Others insisted upon the effi-
cacy of the Fuehrer's course. The unfortunate Gauleiter found 
himself in a difficult situation because people within both 
camps plotted against him. When the situation got out of con-
trol, he turned to the Fuehrer, who was, in the end, the ulti-
mate arbiter of power within the NSDAP. Having been granted 
Hitler's absolution, he could return to his post and serve his 
leader. The extent and limitations of Hitler's power are prob-
ably the most important lessons to be learned from Goeb-
bels's and Der Angriff's roles in the Stennes Revolt.60 
5 _____ _ 
Appeals to the Proletariat 
Berlin was a working-class city. Of its total population of 
about four million in 1922, around 956,000 (24 percent) were 
workers. There were around 25,000 businesses employing ten 
or more people, the German capital being a center of the met-
al, chemical, and clothing industries. Berlin was the most in-
dustrialized city on the European continent and the fourth 
most industrialized urban center in the world (trailing only 
London, New York, and Chicago).! 
Because of the working-class origins of so much of Ber-
lin's population, the two proletarian parties dominated poli-
tics in the city. During the period 1924-1933, the KPD and SPD 
together received anywhere from 41 to 57.6 percent of the 
vote in Reichstag elections. Support remained constant at 
over 54.3 percent after the 20 May 1928 Reichstag election. 
The most the Nazis ever polled was 28.6 percent in July 1932. 
Although these results belie Goebbels's claims to have "con-
quered" Berlin, they do mark a significant improvement over 
the 1.5 percent polled in May 1928.2 
The social and political composition of Berlin's popula-
tion presented serious difficulties to the editors of Der Angriff. 
Even after the party's supposed change of course in 1928-
away from appeals to the proletariat in favor of attracting 
peasant support-the paper continued its mission to Berlin's 
working classes. Goebbels and his editors simply had no 
choice. If they ceased to appeal to the proletariat, they would 
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be neglecting a significant group. This shows that the Nazi 
party had not given up completely on Germany's workers. 
Attempts to win working-class support also call into ques-
tion claims that National Socialism was ultimately an anti-
modernist movement. The proletariat, after all, is the most 
modern of social classes. Further, as was shown in chapter 
two, circumstantial evidence implies that a significant num-
ber of Der Angriff's readers were workers. Yet criticism of his-
torians who approach Nazism as an anti modernist movement 
can be countered by the fact that, as evidence culled from Der 
Angriff will show, the Nazis tried to attract the support of 
workers with appeals to tradition.3 
On the other hand, many of the propaganda techniques 
employed by Der Angriff, which were derivative of KPD and SPD 
methods, were modern in origin. Among these was the "prole-
tarian novel," which the working-class parties had been pub-
lishing for years. From the inception of the paper-they only 
became a regular feature after the Berlin organ became a 
daily-the staff of Der Angriff made occasional use of seri-
alized proletarian novels to emphasize Nazism's affinity for 
causes affecting Berlin's working classes. These stories graph-
ically portrayed life in the proletarian districts of the German 
capital and suggested a cure for the ills that plagued the city's 
streets. The serials often recounted the conversion of the main 
character to National Socialism, indicating the path the read-
er should take to secure Germany's redemption.4 
Among the serials to appear in the first year of Der An-
griff's publication was "Hans Sturm's [Storm's] Awakening" 
by Otto Baugert. It is the story of a mechanic who becomes a 
Nazi after attending a rally in Berlin. The first installment 
begins with the unmarried Sturm, having received his pay for 
the previous week's labor, wondering what he should do dur-
ing the upcoming weekend. He wanders the streets in search of 
entertainment. Baugert graphically depicts the dehumaniz-
ing milieu of the city. As Sturm travels through Berlin, he sees 
the light from the street lamps reflecting off the asphalt and 
hears the noise of the trollies, trucks and cars that drive by. He 
is clearly a man lost and unappreciated in all this activity.5 
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Suddenly, Sturm spots a "flaming red poster," reading 
"German Racial Comrades [Volksgenossen]! Men of the Fist 
and Brains!" It is a call to a political rally. At the bottom of the 
poster is a swastika. The young engineer has seen this symbol 
before. Although he has never attended an NSDAP rally, he 
knows, because of what his fellow workers have told him, that 
the Nazis are "bandits" and "killers of workers." In addition, 
they are reactionaries who want to return the Kaiser to power. 
In spite of these "prejudices," he is so bored that he decides to 
attend anyway.6 
Sturm arrives at the meeting place fifteen minutes before 
the rally is to begin. He is surprised to discover that the as-
sembly is to take place in a large hall that "seats a minimum 
of three thousand people." In spite of the size of the room 
there is no place to sit. Men are standing in the aisles, and 
several hundred are outside, hoping to gain admittance. Be-
cause of the crowd, the police close the doors at ten minutes 
to eight. "Things promise to become interesting." Looking 
about the room, he notices a flag. It is the "victorious and 
steady" swastika. "He feels: this symbol does not stand for 
mediocrity, weakness or idle talk; it demands fanatical sup-
port or fanatical hate!"7 
Sturm then begins to observe the people in attendance at 
the rally. All classes are represented: "shopkeepers, artisans, 
pensioners, bureaucrats, students, white collar workers, many 
women and girls, but above all, numberless workers." "Troops 
of brown-shirts" also populate the hall, providing security for 
the assembly. These storm troopers, determined countenances 
upon their faces, are mostly workers, like Sturm. "God knows, 
these men do not look like bandits!"8 
In stark contrast to the SA men is the band of "Commu-
nists and Red Front people" that sits in the middle of the 
crowd. A "Jewish-looking man," their leader, is making an 
anti-Nazi speech to his comrades and giving them schnapps. 
After several drinks, one of the Communists brags that "today 
we put an end to the Hitler trash!" Others yell "fascist dogs!" 
and "beat them all Up!"9 
The leader of the assembly tries to call the meeting to 
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order. The crowd begins to chant for order, and it appears 
that the meeting will degenerate into chaos. "The assembly 
leader stands as if carved from stone" and informs those pre-
sent that they are in a "National Socialist Assembly" and 
that order will be maintained. His "determined words" cause 
the hall to grow silent. The "opponents" of the Nazis "feel 
that the assembly is in strong hands." The evening can pro-
ceed as planned. lO 
The speaker approaches the podium. He is a small man; 
one could mistake him for a "youth." But "every movement 
and every word" makes it clear that Joseph Goebbels is "a 
man." The title of the speech is "Lenin or Hitler." The Com-
munists present, not liking the theme of the presentation, be-
gin to interrupt the speaker. Goebbels deals with them force-
fully, and they soon relent. "After five minutes all are dead 
quiet." 11 
Sturm has attended many political rallies. Berlin was, af-
ter all, the political center of Germany. But he has never seen 
anything comparable to this. Whereas the other assemblies 
were devoid of meaning, "here is determination and truth 
and here is the way!" Goebbels's speech was, in stark con-
trast to others he had heard, "powerfully clear." He is a man 
of action who will do what is necessary to redeem Germany. 
The speaker weeps as he recounts the shame his country has 
endured since the revolution. For the first time in his life, 
Sturm sees what the word Volk really means: every German 
is his "brother or sister." The speech exposes "a new world" 
to the mechanic.J2 
After Goebbels finishes, the discussion period begins. One 
of the Communists starts to spout the usual party line, mak-
ing use of the standard terminology: "class-conscious prole-
tariat" and "beat the fascists where you find them." Chaos 
results. The Communists begin to sing the "Internationale." 
In response, the leader of the SA guard blows his whistle. The 
situation deteriorates, and it soon becomes clear that a brawl 
is about to begin. Trying to preempt this possibility, the as-
sembly leader shouts: "If you wish to settle the ideological 
struggle with chair legs and steel rods, we will counter your 
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terror with even more brutal methods. Every attempt to 
break up the assembly will be beaten to the ground where it 
will suffocate in your blood." 13 
Sturm is impressed. Here are men who do not back down 
in the face of the enemy. They are willing to stand behind 
their ideas with their "blood and lives .... Here a new front 
presents itself, a resistance that is stronger than lies or gold." 
The fight begins. The Communists, singing the "Marseil-
laise," throw beer glasses and chair legs. "Tear down the 
flags!" someone with a knife in his hand cries. Because the 
Marxists have no respect for women, those present have to 
hide under tables to escape the indiscriminate Communist 
onslaught.14 
The SA suddenly mounts a counterattack, the brave storm 
troopers assaulting the Communists in their rear and on their 
flanks. They beat the Marxist rabble "to the floor." The fight 
lasts only about two minutes. The enemy is forced to retreat 
with "bloody hands .... The fists of Germany's workers have 
really done their work!" The SA leader, "a gaping wound on 
his forehead," stands on a table, shouting, "Long live Ger-
many!" The crowd responds with cheers and waving flags. 
"Three thousand arms are raised" in the Hitler salute. "Now 
Hans Sturm understands what the peculiar fascist salute rep-
resents: the noble consciousness of a great idea." 15 
This idea, for which "German workers ... have fought 
and bled," will save Germany. Sturm realizes that "the time 
[is] at hand" for him to "give ... [his] life to a heroic idea." 
So he "joins the National Socialist German Workers' Party," 
paying his membership fee with the money with that he had 
planned to spend celebrating the end of the work week. "'I 
thank you!' he says and shakes the speaker's hand. 'Now I 
know why I was put upon the earth: And thus Hans Sturm 
finds the way to his Volk and becomes a soldier for the Third 
Reich." 16 
One can see several themes designed to appeal to the prole-
tariat running throughout this story. The first of these, un-
doubtedly adopted from the propaganda techniques of the 
KPD, was the claim that the working man was unappreciated in 
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the Weimar Republic. Sturm worked hard all week but had 
nothing to show for it. He had no family, no security, no one 
who cared about him. All the mechanic had to do on a Friday 
night was visit one of Berlin's numerous taverns or houses of ill 
repute. He was a lonely man living in a dismal city. "Hans 
Sturm's Awakening" implies that only the NSDAP really cared 
about people like Sturm. The Nazi Weltanschauung would pro-
vide meaning in his life. 
Another major goal of this proletarian novel was to discre-
dit "Marxist" claims concerning the composition and goals of 
the NSDAP. His fellow workers, undoubtedly duped by Commu-
nist propaganda, had told Sturm that Nazis were "bandits" 
and "killers of workers." In sharp contrast to the KPD line, 
those present, although representative of all classes, were pri-
marily from the proletariat. Further driving this point home 
was Sturm's conclusion that the SA men at the assembly were 
brave, impressive looking, soldiers of the Weltanschauung of 
the future. "These men did not look like bandits!" Sturm con-
cluded. 
The Communists present, however, had little in common 
with the imposing figures the storm troopers presented. They 
were at the meeting, not to contribute anything positive to the 
evening's events but merely to cause trouble. As always, Der 
Angriff depicted Communist leaders as Jews. This was obvious 
from their appearance. One could always recognize these "ba-
cilli" within the Volksgemeinschaft. Claims that Jews domi-
nated the working-class parties were a consistent theme of 
Nazi appeals to workers. 
The way the story recounted events during the assembly 
also maximized the novella's appeal to the proletariat. The 
Nazis, especially the leaders present, behaved in an orderly 
and, at times, heroic fashion. The assembly leader stood in 
the face of the Communist hecklers "as if carved in stone." 
The speaker, although slight in stature, was equally impres-
sive, the logic of his arguments silencing even his most deter-
mined critics. 
The fight that ensued at the end of the speech also pre-
sented the NSDAP in a positive light. It is important to note 
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that it was the Communists who had started the brawl be-
cause they could not discredit Nazi ideology through peace-
ful argumentation. It was the Communists, not the SA men, 
who were the "bandits" and "murderers of workers." The 
storm troopers fought only in self defense, and they were 
willing to sacrifice their blood to defend their ideas. In addi-
tion, they fought in an orderly fashion, which was to be seen 
as indicative of working together for a common purpose. 
All of these facts convinced Sturm that the NSDAP was the 
political movement that really had the benefit of the workers 
in mind. Therefore, he joined the NSDAP, becoming a "fighter" 
for the cause that would save not just the proletariat but all of 
Germany. The editors of Der Angriflboped the readers of "Hans 
Sturms Erwachen" would arrive at the same conclusion. 
"Hans Sturm's Awakening" also makes clear some other 
aspects of Nazi propaganda. First, it was almost totally nega-
tive in character. Der Angriff made no effort to present con-
structive criticism of the Weimar government. It did not try 
to present alternatives to the government's policies. The pa-
per simply attacked everything connected with the status 
quo. In addition, Sturm's story illustrates the Nazi conten-
tion that all one had to do was accept the National Socialist 
Weltanschauung and his life would be changed completely. All 
troubles would end. This was an important component of 
Goebbels's propaganda technique: the NSDAP would solve all 
of Germany's problems if only given the chance. 
These same themes, as well as many others, can be found 
in the other types of copy printed in the pages of Der Angriff. 
Hans Schweitzer, for example, drew many of his cartoons with 
an appeal to Berlin's workers in mind. They always depicted 
workers in a positive light, emphasizing the benefits that the 
proletariat would receive from the coming Third Reich. Politi-
cal cartoons aimed at the proletariat fell into two large catego-
ries: those showing the advantages workers would have in the 
approaching National Socialist state (positive propaganda) 
and those attacking the working-class parties (negative propa-
ganda). Among those fitting into the former category was one 
that appeared in the 14 May 1928 edition of Der Angriff. It 
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"Comrade! For a better future." 
showed a storm trooper and a worker, hands joined, standing 
against a swastika in the background. The caption read, "Com-
rade! for a better future," the clear implication being that the 
NSDAP had the interests of the workers as its major goal. To fur-
ther this impression, Schweitzer gave the SA man and the 
worker similar appearances. Both were stern and muscular, 
possessing serious countenances. It is clear from the drawing 
that the storm trooper is a worker, knows what would be best 
for the proletariat and is determined to pursue it.17 
A drawing published in July 1928 graphically relates an-
other popular propaganda motif of the Nazis: the end of class 
conflict. The cartoon shows two men, the one on the left obvi-
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ously a white-collar worker and the other a laborer, the omni-
present hammer in his left hand. The white-collar worker is 
pointing toward the sun, clearly in reference to a brighter 
future. The two men have joined hands. In the background 
are symbols of the traditional social groups of Germany: a 
farm, a church, and a factory. The caption for the drawing 
reads: "Without free workers,-no free nation!" The clear im-
plication was that, if all classes were willing to work together 
under the banner of National Socialism, Germany would see 
a better future.'8 
In sharp contrast to the way Schweitzer depicted the 
Nazi Party was the way he characterized the SPD and KPD. 
The Socialists and Communists, through their promotion of 
class antagonism, were the real "murderers of workers." RFB 
and Reichsbanner men left their proletarian victims lying in 
pools of blood in the gutter. This was all done at the behest of 
the Jews, who dominated these parties. A few examples will 
help establish this point. 
In August 1928, Der Angrif{ published a cartoon that 
showed three RFB men dashing down the street. Wielding 
knives, they are fleeing two policemen approaching a body 
lying in the gutter. A short description to the left of the car-
toon makes it clear that the victim is a member of the Stahl-
helm, a right-wing paramilitary group that often allied itself 
with the Nazis. The caption underneath the cartoon says: "And 
it calls itself a Workers' Party!" The implication is, as always, 
quite clear. The three Communists, outnumbering their hap-
less victim, have seized an opportunity to do him in. The Com-
munists are, as always, characterized as cowards, willing to 
fight only when they have a numerical advantage or a route of 
escape. Further, it is they who are killing Berlin's proletariat, 
not the NSDAP. Clearly, the cartoonist hoped to relate, the KPD 
did not deserve the epithet "Workers' Party." 19 
That all this was ultimately the work of the Jews, who 
dominated the working-class parties, was intimated in nu-
merous cartoons. Among these is one that appeared in July 
1928. This cartoon shows two men, obvious caricatures of 
Jews, pointing accusing fingers at each other. The man on the 
98 Goebbels and Der Angri[[ 
!)it' b~utigtn fJlmmun;itij.f;tn 
'It.!bc-riiin~ iJ'..lb-elt tid) fe-it b~t Cl-nt· 
l:.iiunfi o:m ~l:;!3 in ~f!.rFcitntlcr 
iUdje gtl,olllt. ~e\Onbl:'lS 
tdJlii:tm geljt C5 in 5ertil',.>:lflllo 
p.eloof iJil, afm auc9 bit I{.lro;.;in} 
tt'itb nid)t ;mfdj.on1, ui.e tiinr.!t 
bie ... "'rITtllt'bung tine.; 6tJl]lr;dmtt'.i 
in !lDui~mnatf 3eigk lInb bas nenul flo') 'll!beile,lIulel! 
"And it calls itself a workers' party." 
DEa DENKE ARBEITER 
zu HiTLER 
''The thinking worker comes to Hitler." 
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left is identified as a Communist by the masthead of Rote 
Fahne appearing behind him. The masthead of Vorwaerts ap-
pearing in the background clearly identifies the man on the 
right as a Socialist. The two are screaming insults at each 
other, each accusing the other of being a "traitor to the work-
ers [Arbeiterverraeter]!!!" Between the two men stands a work-
er clearly indifferent to them. The caption reads: "The THINK-
ING Worker comes to HITLER." The inference here is that the 
two "proletarian" parties were too busy fighting each other 
to pursue the benefit of the workers, and if a worker took the 
time to think about it, he would come to this realization as 
well and turn to the NSDAP, the only truly working-class 
party.20 
A similar cartoon, appearing in November 1929 shows 
workers coming over to the Nazis from the KPD. A Jew, trying 
to impede the progress of the converts, is blocking their way, 
shouting, "Beat the fascists where you encounter them!" On 
his arm is printed "red lies." But the Jew cannot stop all of 
the workers who wish to join the NSDAP, and some manage to 
get through to the waiting Nazi. The man welcoming the 
workers to the Nazi movement is also a laborer as is shown 
by the hammer hanging from his belt. The caption above 
reads: "Red murder-slogan-last hopeless means of main-
taining members." "The upright workers open their eyes" is 
printed below. This cartoon is representative of Nazi claims 
that the only thing standing between the proletariat and the 
liberation of the toiling classes was the "Jewish dominated" 
parties, and realizing this was the first step in solving the 
problem.21 
Many of the articles in Der Angrif{ also castigated the pro-
letarian parties. The headline of the 14 May 1928 edition, for 
example, read: "Marxist Treason Time and Time Again." The 
accompanying article was an acidic critique of the SPD'S ac-
ceptance of the Dawes Plan, under which Germany agreed 
upon a schedule of payments for the reparations incurred as a 
result of its role in the First World War. The plan, Der Angrif{ 
insisted, made Germany a "colony" of "high-finance." It was 
the German Socialist Party that had agreed to these dishon-
orable demands. Indeed, it was representatives of the SPD 
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who had signed the "Versailles Peace-Diktat." By doing so 
"the German Social Democratic Party has accepted the guilt 
for the war in principle; the Social Democratic Party should 
be ashamed to have made such a declaration." Because of its 
acceptance of the War-Guilt Lie and the rest of the Treaty of 
Versailles, the SPD had left the German people in a condition 
of "destitution and need." Such conduct made it clear that 
the SPD was not the party of Germany's proletariat-which 
suffered because of reparations-but of British and French 
capitalists, who were the true beneficiaries of its policies.22 
An article appearing in July 1928 strove to drive home a 
similar point. The story revolves around the scholarly activ-
ities of a captain on the general staff, A. Heider. Heider, 
through the use of previously untapped sources, determined 
that the French commander, General Joffre, had planned to 
violate Switzerland's neutrality in the opening days of the 
war, hoping to outflank the Germans. Joffre, however, stopped 
the troops just short of the border. Germany's invasion of neu-
tral Belgium, on the other hand, was a response to this French 
plan, and hence, by the terms of the logic employed in Der 
Angriff, France's responsibility. The Marxist and bourgeois pa-
pers, the Nazi organ pointed out, had not picked up this story. 
This was further evidence that Germany's Marxists and demo-
crats had abandoned the nation's proletariat. After all, it was 
Germany's working people who had to pay the price incurred 
because of the "War-Guilt Lie."23 
The editors of Der Angriff sought not only to discredit SPD 
and KPD claims to be working-class parties; they tried also to 
establish that the Nazi Party was concerned with the well-
being of Germany's proletariat. A 16 April 1928 article, for 
example, chastised the Reichsbahn for laying off two thou-
sand workers. Der Angriff explained these layoffs, as it did 
every other negative development during this period, as a 
product of the poor economic conditions resulting from the 
Dawes Plan. The piece continued by stating that the layoffs 
could have been avoided if the government had raised ticket 
prices and freight rates. It was unwilling to do so, however, 
because an election was approaching, and democratic gov-
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ernments were inherently more interested in winning elec-
tions and maintaining the backing of capitalists than they 
were in doing what was best for the people. Once again, Ger-
many's government, dominated by the SPD, had sold out the 
workers at the behest of high finance. The article implied 
that this would not be the case under a National Socialist 
government.24 
Another article published in 1928 dealt with working con-
ditions among post office employees. Der Angrif{ claimed that 
the board of directors of the post office had unilaterally in-
creased hours of operation without consulting postal work-
ers. The board did this, the paper pointed out, in a so-called 
"workers' democracy." In addition, the routes of letter carri-
ers remained unchanged since the war, in spite of the fact 
that there were now many more addresses to which mail had 
to be delivered. To make matters worse, in order to increase 
operating hours, service had to be cut back and workers had 
to put in more hours without an appropriate increase in com-
pensation. Postal workers also had to buy new uniforms, 
which the paper saw as an unnecessary financial burden. 
This would serve to benefit the firms that sold postal uni-
forms, many of which were owned by Jews. The article con-
cluded with a call to the board of directors to rescind these 
measures for the benefit of the workers in order to avoid a 
"breakdown of the abandoned postal carriers." This article is 
significant because it shows that the editors of Der Angrif{ 
were, on occasion, willing to attack specific problems and of-
fer detailed solutions which would benefit Germany's prole-
tariat. For the most part, however, the paper was unwilling to 
make any concrete proposals and concentrated its efforts 
upon negative propaganda designed to discredit the Weimar 
Republic.25 
Appeals to the proletariat continued throughout the "years 
of struggle" as is evinced by the lead story of a special elec-
tion edition appearing in November 1932. The headline read: 
"Against Hugenberg-Capitalism; Against Pride of Place and 
Class Hate." The accompanying story denied charges made in 
the publications of the ultraconservative Scherl-Verlag that 
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Der Angrif{ was not a voelkisch publication. In response, 
Goebbels's daily charged that not only was the local Scherl-
Verlag publication, the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, run by Jews 
but it was not interested in the benefit of the Volk at all. The 
Nazis, on the other hand, were, according to Der Angrif{, inter-
ested in improving the lives of the German people. After all, 
the Berlin Nazi organ had continually opposed Germany's 
"policy of compliance" with the Treaty of Versailles. Because 
of the government's policies, the NSDAP had chosen to oppose 
the hated system at every turn. For this reason, the Nazi par-
ty had grown to a strength of 14 million and was on the verge 
of victory.26 
In response to these actions, the conservative press had 
written that: "Goebbels is the masculine Rosa Luxemburg. 
Both are undistinguished in form and Jewish in appearance. 
He sets in motion-as she did earlier-a great burning pas-
sion to hate and to lie." That the Scherl-Verlag was willing to 
make such outrageous statements was presented as evidence 
that it was the conservative press that lied. Indeed, the Scherl-
Verlag was without honor. It was, after all, the tool of "high 
finance" and others who supported submission in the face of 
the Versailles Treaty. The policies of Hugenberg and the con-
servatives had driven the proletariat into the arms of the 
Marxist parties. In contrast, Goebbels and the Berlin NSDAP 
had "made red Berlin German again," because they were will-
ing to pursue policies that benefited the workers, not the cap-
italists. As usual the nature of the Nazi Party's proletarian 
program was not explicitly spelled out. In general, Der Angrif{ 
chose to concentrate upon negative propaganda, attacking its 
enemies without offering any concrete alternativesP 
The most important occasion upon which Der Angrif{ 
took the side of Berlin's working class was during the Berlin 
Transportation (BVG) strike of November 1932. Although the 
strike lasted only a few days, the violent clashes between the 
police and strikers probably had an effect upon subsequent 
parliamentary elections, hurting those parties which sup-
ported the republic. The immediate catalyst for the outbreak 
of the strike was a salary reduction of two pfennigs per hour 
imposed upon BVG employees, but there were political mo-
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tivations for the work stoppage that went well beyond a pay 
dispute.28 
The BVG strike was part of a larger KPD strategy to dis-
credit the Socialist trade unions (German Trade Union Feder-
ation, or ADGB) among Germany's workers and win the prole-
tariat over to the KPD'S Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition 
(RGO). The Communist Party hoped to accomplish this by fo-
menting worker unrest wherever possible. They hoped this 
would lead to a strike that the ADGB would refuse to support. 
When the KPD, in contrast to the Socialists, stood behind the 
work stoppage, it could thereafter claim to be the only legit-
imate voice of Germany's working classes. In short, the pri-
mary motivation of the KPD leadership to strike was political, 
not material. From May to October 1932, the RGO led over eight 
hundred strikes throughout Germany.29 
From the point of view of the Communists, the BVG was 
an attractive target politically. Located in the German capi-
tal, it was highly visible. Further, it was the third-largest cor-
poration in Germany, employing over 23,000 workers. It was 
publicly owned, making it probable that the Socialist trade 
unions would not support a strike. Finally, the forced pay de-
crease came at a fortuitous time politically for the KPD, just 
before the 6 November 1932 elections. Discrediting the SPD 
could very well win proletarian votes for the Communists in 
the approaching contest. Also, a work stoppage aimed at such 
an important target could lead to a general strike, paving the 
way to revolution.3o 
The strike vote took place on 2 November 1932. Of the 
23,000 people employed by the BVG, 18,500 voted. Seventy-
eight percent (about 14,040) voted to stop work. In spite of the 
fact that a large majority favored walking out, the SPD re-
fused to sanction the strike. It insisted that a strike could only 
be called when a three-quarters majority of all BVG workers 
voted in favor of a walkout. Therefore, the Socialists claimed, 
a strike was only justified when 17,250 BVG employees voted 
in favor of a work stoppage. This refusal to support the action 
of the Berlin transport workers would cost the SPD dearly in 
the approaching election.31 
When twenty thousand of Berlin's transport workers went 
104 Goebbels and Der AngriJT 
on strike on the morning of 3 November, Goebbels and the 
Berlin NSDAP found themselves in a difficult situation. The 
Nazi trade union, the National Socialist Organization of Shop 
Stewards (NSBO), had made significant inroads into the BVG. 
To refuse to support the strike could destroy the work done 
with the transportation workers as well as other proletarian 
supporters of the NSDAP. To stand behind the transport work-
ers also presented hazards. For the NSDAP to ally itself with 
the KPD, a party that it insisted was a tool of the "internation-
al world Jewish conspiracy," could cause it to lose the sup-
port of many of its conservative backers. To Goebbels, how-
ever, it was clear that the Nazis had to support a strike, the 
goal of which was to secure the "most primitive rights of life 
[Lebensrechte]" for a significant portion of Berlin's prole-
tariat. Also, this action would help debunk claims that the 
NSDAP was just another "bourgeois" party unconcerned with 
the welfare of the people. On the other hand, Goebbels was 
sensitive to claims that the walkout was part of a "Bol-
shevik" plot. In the end, however, he was able to convince 
Hitler that supporting the transport workers was the lesser of 
two evils. Indeed, such a course could gain support for the 
NSDAP in the approaching election. This hope, however, would 
prove futile.32 
On the morning of 3 November 1932, Berliners awoke to a 
city without subway or train services. Although strikebreakers 
were willing to operate some of the street cars, this means of 
transportation proved hazardous since strikers threw large 
stones at the cars as they drove past. At first, about 3,600 
transport employees were willing to work. This violent cam-
paign against strikebreakers proved effective, however, and by 
5 November only 1,900 BVG workers showed up at their jobs.33 
The three major political parties in Berlin each took a dif-
ferent line on the strike. The SPD contended that the Com-
munists-whom it referred to as "Kozis"-were the mere 
lackeys of the Nazis. V01waerts insisted that the BVG strike was 
but a prelude to a putsch. The Nazis and the "Kozis," it held, 
were trying to overthrow violently the democratically elected 
government of Germany. Rote Fahne received a nine-day prohi-
bition on 4 November, limiting the KPD'S capability of presen-
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ting its account of the strike. An article appearing on 3 Novem-
ber, however, made it clear that the Communist Party was un-
willing to give its temporary ally, the NSDAP, any credit for the 
progress of the strike. Members of the NSBO, the article sug-
gested, were trying to break the strike. The Nazis had opposed 
the walkout, and the meager support they now gave was noth-
ing more than unadulterated opportunism. Indeed, in the 
past, Goebbels and the Nazis had opposed most strikes and 
would not have supported this one if they were not concerned 
with maintaining the votes of their working-class supporters 
in the upcoming election. Another article on the same page 
related the Communist view of the SPD'S role in the strike. The 
Socialists had, Rote Fahne maintained, betrayed the prole-
tariat and worked out a deal with Chancellor Papen under 
which they would form a coalition with Papen and the Nazis. 
The SPD'S primary goal was, as always, political power, not the 
benefit of the workers.34 
The Nazis, like the Communists, chastised the SPD for its 
attitude during the strike. In an article appearing on the first 
day of the walkout, Der Angrif{ insisted that the strike was 
necessary in the face of the Socialist Party's policies toward 
Germany's workers. After all, the SPD's "politics of corrup-
tion" were responsible for the current economic plight, which 
had caused the BVG to demand a reduction in pay from its 
employees. It was unconscionable, the paper insisted, to ask 
transport workers to take a pay cut at the same time that the 
BVG was increasing fares. In the eyes of Der Angrif{, this was 
just further proof that the system created by the Social Dem-
ocrats was corrupt and that, in spite of its protestations to 
the contrary, the SPD did not care about the proletariat. In 
short, the "reduction in wages" and the resulting strike were 
"the result" of "years of Social Democratic mismanagement 
of the economy." 35 
Violent clashes between strikers and the police provided 
an atmosphere in which a journal like Der Angrif{ flourished. 
The death of a forty-six-year-old storm trooper and customs 
employee, Kurt Reppich, in a clash with police on Martin-
Luther-Strasse in Schoeneberg provided the paper with an 
opportunity to incorporate the "death myth" into pro-strike 
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propaganda. During the very early hours of 4 November, 
Reppich's Sturm 13, as well as numerous other SA Sturme and 
ss men, were demonstrating on Wartzburgplatz in favor of 
the strike. At around 5:00 A.M. the police tried to break up the 
assembly. A violent confrontation soon developed in which 
the police made liberal use of their billy clubs. During the 
course of the brawl, Reppich was shot in the head. He died in 
St. Norbert's Hospital. Another storm trooper was shot in the 
upper arm.36 
Der Angrif{ grasped the opportunity to proclaim Reppich 
a martyr for the workers' cause. Reppich had gathered with 
other National Socialists-workers, white-collar employees, 
transportation employees, and bureaucrats-in order to dem-
onstrate his "solidarity with the BVG employees struggling 
against the oppressive pay reduction." He, like all the other 
Nazis, was "standing peacefully on the street." The police 
burst upon the scene suddenly, attacking the protestors with-
out provocation. In spite of the fact that the demonstrators 
had no weapons, the police made use of their pistols against 
the defenseless crowd. The wounded "lay in their blood." It 
was clear, in the opinion of Der Angrif{, that the "police 
had ... no grounds for shooting." In response to the actions 
of the officers the people of the neighborhood took to the 
streets, demanding justice and an end to the "murder" of 
innocent workers. Like all other Nazi martyrs, the death of 
Reppich was a call to action for anyone concerned with Ger-
many's welfare.37 
Another article explained the cause for which Reppich 
had given his life: the benefit of Berlin's working classes. 
Brave men, like Reppich, who were willing to stand up for 
what they knew was right, had shut down the BVG. Early on 
the morning of 3 November 1932, transport workers, accom-
panied by "workers, shop owners, white-collar workers, stu-
dents and the unemployed," had marched upon train sta-
tions, where the police confronted them. The workers were: 
"not thinking of storming, of attacking, of blasting or of de-
stroying. They demand their rightful pay and will not permit 
themselves to be oppressed into a condition of slave labor." 38 
The deeds of the strikers and their supporters were, ac-
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cording to Der Angriff, an excellent example of the Volksgemein-
schaft in action. People of all classes had worked together in 
order to benefit the German people. The BVG strike was not the 
product of class consciousness but of voelkisch consciousness. 
The German people should work together, not against each 
other. The strikers wanted to help create a "new state of na-
tional honor and social justice." "This is our [National Social-
ism's] final goal." The protests were unbelligerent, but the po-
lice employed by the system had broken the peace and beaten 
and shot SA men in the streets. The people had not tolerated 
this, and they had taken action. Further, Reppich's comrades, 
after dipping a Nazi flag in the dead storm trooper's blood, 
had carried it through the neighborhoods of Berlin, returning 
it to his Sturm's tavern. They were showing their appreciation 
for a fallen comrade, former front-line soldier, leader and fa-
ther. Reppich, the article makes clear, was but one of many 
"disciplined" storm troopers who had peacefully stood up to 
the police, only to have their lives taken from them. The death 
of this ordinary, yet heroic, man would inspire others to follow 
in his steps. National Socialism, therefore, could not be de-
feated. In the end, men such as Reppich, who were willing to 
die for the Volksgemeinschaft, would emerge victorious.39 
Although Der Angriff, as was typical of its approach to pro-
paganda, emphasized the violent aspects of the BVG strike, the 
paper addressed other issues as well. One of the major prob-
lems the strike caused for the Nazis stemmed from the fact 
that they had allied themselves with the Communist Party, 
Nazism's sworn enemy. On 5 November 1932, Der Angriffpub-
lished a speech given by Goebbels in which the Gauleiter dealt 
with this seeming inconsistency. The Nazis simply could not 
help it, Goebbels contended, if the KPD "thinks like us for 
once." This strike, the speaker claimed, had nothing to do with 
"class struggle" and everything to do with class cooperation. 
People of all strata supported the strike because it was just. 
National Socialism, as the vanguard of the new Germany, was 
obligated to endorse any strike that benefited the Reich. The 
BVG walkout clearly fell into this category. An article appear-
ing the previous day, "The NSDAP supports every justified 
strike," took the same line. It insisted that, contrary to what 
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the Communist press held, it was not unusual for the Nazis to 
support a work stoppage. The article even gave a list of sixteen 
strikes the NSDAP had supported in 1931 alone.4o 
Neither the Nazis nor the transport workers, however, 
were the primary beneficiaries of the strike. The KPD was. 
Reichstag elections took place in the midst of the conflagra-
tion. The Communist Party received 860,000 votes in Berlin, 
making it the largest political faction in the capital. The 
Nazis, losing around 36,000 votes in Berlin, suffered a major 
setback throughout Germany. The SPD lost over 75,000 votes 
in the German capital. The transport workers emerged from 
the conflict having done no better. Eleven thousand members 
of the Communist trade unions, having accomplished their 
primary goal, winning worker support away from the Social-
ists, returned to work on election day. Support for the strike 
quickly faded. The KPD, which had been the primary mover 
behind the 2-3 November walkout, had, in effect, also broken 
the strike.41 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn concern-
ing Der Angrif's appeals to the proletariat. These conclusions 
affect at least three important historiographic arguments. 
The first of these is concerned with the contention that, after 
the debacle of the May 1928 Reichstag elections, Nazi propa-
ganda shifted away from a concentration upon the prole-
tariat and toward an appeal to the peasantry. Many within 
the Nazi leadership thought this was the case, Otto Strasser 
being only the most obvious example. 
Evidence culled from Der Angrif{, however, indicates that 
the situation was much more complicated than most histo-
rians have claimed. It is clear that Der Angrif{ aimed its ap-
peal primarily at Berlin's workers throughout the "years of 
struggle." There was no dramatic change in its propaganda 
line after May 1928. This was the case primarily because Ber-
lin had a large proletarian population. Goebbels and his staff 
simply had no choice but to continue their appeal to the 
working classes. It can safely be concluded, therefore, that, 
while the national leadership may have changed its propa-
ganda strategy, local leaders had a great deal of latitude in 
determining propaganda tactics at the Gau level. This was 
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clearly the case when it came to the motifs employed by 
Goebbels and Der Angriff.42 
This claim affects another major dispute among histo-
rians: that concerning the character of Nazi intra-party poli-
tics. Was Hitler in complete control of the party, or was the 
NSDAP a chaotic organization, consisting of numerous fac-
tions, each trying to pursue its own agenda? The fact that 
Goebbels, and by extension probably other regional Nazi 
leaders, could adapt his propaganda to local conditions leads 
one to conclude that the NSDAP was not completely unified 
ideologically. Other Nazi newspapers, Julius Streicher's Der 
Stuermer for example, pursued a somewhat different propa-
ganda strategy from Der Angriff. Whereas the Berlin paper 
concentrated its efforts upon appeals to the proletariat, Der 
Stuermer's infamous pornographic anti-Semitism attracted 
the uneducated rural population. This leads one to conclude 
that those who view the Nazi Party as a "polycratic" organ-
ization-one representing numerous groups with varying in-
terests, each having a share of power within the party and 
later the Third Reich-are nearer the truth than the "Hitler 
centrists." 43 
Yet another major historiographic dispute concerns the 
alleged "antimodern" nature of National Socialism. His-
torians Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann have 
called this issue "among the most crucial problems confront-
ing modern historical research." On the surface, the fact that 
Der Angriff concentrated its appeals upon Berlin's workers 
discredits claims made by George Mosse and others that Na-
tional Socialism was primarily an anti modern phenomenon. 
On the other hand, the techniques employed by the paper to 
appeal to workers were clearly anti modernist. The Nazis, un-
like unquestionably modern parties such as the SPD and the 
KPD, did not try to appeal to the workers as a class. Der 
Angriff continually attacked such ideas as "class conscious-
ness" and "class conflict." The Berlin NSDAP approached the 
proletariat as an "estate." The working class was an integral 
part of society and, as such, was obligated to work together 
with other Germans for the benefit of the entire nation. The 
proletariat's primary concern was to be the interests of the 
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Volk, not of the workers. In short, Der Angriff's propaganda 
tried to help create the Volksgemeinschaft (people's commu-
nity), which played such an important role in Nazi ideology. 
Class conflict was counterproductive to achieving this goal. 
The paper therefore did all it could to discredit the Commu-
nist Party's attempts to promote class hatred.44 
The goal of creating a Volksgemeinschaft was clearly a re-
jection of the Enlightenment's call for racial and religious 
tolerance. It was a throwback to nineteenth-century romanti-
cism, to a mythical view of the Middle Ages. This new com-
munity the Nazis hoped to create would consist of all people 
of German blood working together for a common goal, the 
improvement of Germany. There would be no exploitation of 
the workers as was the case under capitalism, and the class 
conflict that Marxist ideology fostered would also be absent. 
All Germans would live together peacefully. In short, the 
Nazis hoped to create a nationalist and racist utopia. The 
propaganda presented in Der Angriff was a first tentative step 
in creating the conditions under which this paradise could be 
created. 
Other aspects of Der Angriff's appeal to the workers were 
clearly anti modern in nature. The anti-Semitism that perme-
ated the paper's copy was also the product of a premodern 
bias. As Burleigh and Wippermann have argued, nineteenth-
and twentieth-centry anti-Semitism were, to a large extent, 
reactions against industrialzation and the alienation it pro-
duced, especially among the middle classes. Since Jewish 
emancipation occurred within the same time frame as indus-
trialzation and the growth of capitalism, the Jews were often 
linked with these developments, especially with their negative 
aspects. Further, the emphasis upon heroic death in Der An-
griff was also the result of a premodern world view. Therefore, 
it is clear that, while appeals to the proletariat were clearly 
a realistic concession to the twentieth century, the ways in 
which Der Angriff attempted to attract working-class support 
were the products of an anti modern Weltanschauung.45 
6 _____ _ 
The "System" 
According to Der Angriff, the Weimar system was responsible 
for all of Germany's ills. Because of the "un-German" democ-
racy created by the Social Democrats-who had stabbed the 
gallant German Army in the back during the closing days of 
the war-the nation had suffered the humiliation of the Ver-
sailles "Diktat" and the resulting collapse of the its economy. 
Because it was created by "traitors" who had abandoned 
the brave men dying at the front in favor of a "Marxist" revo-
lution, Der Angrif{ held that the republic was illegitimate 
from its inception. Not only had the "November Criminals" 
turned their backs on Germany in the closing days of the war, 
but they had also signed the hated Versailles Treaty, which 
had enslaved Germany to the erstwhile Entente powers. To 
make matters worse, the republic had compounded its sin by 
agreeing to the hated Dawes and Young Plans, under which 
the Weimar government recognized the legitimacy of repara-
tions. Because the traitors had made these agreements, the 
German economy was in a state of chaos, and unemployment 
was widespread. The actions of the November Criminals, the 
founders of the hated republic, were the cause of all this 
suffering .1 
Indeed, self-interest was, in the eyes of Goebbels's paper, 
the most conspicuous characteristic of Weimar Germany's 
leadership. According to Der Angriff, corruption was rampant 
within the system. In an article entitled "Parliamentarianism 
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is Corruption," Der Angriffbemoaned the fact that the Reich-
stag had increased its expense allowances at a time when 
many Germans were unemployed and in need. The paper 
cited this as a typical example of the callous disregard the 
Reichstag exhibited when it was to the advantage of its mem-
bers. In yet another piece, the paper interpreted the govern-
ment's "shameless" tax policies as further evidence that the 
system sought its own advantage to the detriment of the Volk. 
Taxes on working and farming families were raised in order 
to pay the fourteen billion marks per year in reparations in-
curred because of the Dawes Plan. While the burden upon the 
common people increased, the leaders of the "Daweskolonie" 
had decreased taxes upon the wealthy. This was further evi-
dence that the system considered the leaders of finance ~api­
tal the most important people in Germany. After all, only the 
wealthy could provide the monetary backing that was the life-
blood of Germany's political parties. Further, many Reichstag 
members, being wealthy themselves, benefited from these 
policies. In short, the system was concerned only with its 
own interests and cared little about the common people.2 
Der Angriffhad a simple explanation for the corruption of 
the system. Jews dominated it. The logic employed by Goeb-
bels and his underlings was simple. The Jews dominated the 
"Marxist" parties, and the SPD dominated the system. There-
fore, the Jews controlled the system that enslaved Germany. 
Ultimately the Jews were responsible for all of Germany's 
ills. Not only did the paper's copy make this contention clear 
but so did its political cartoons. Schweitzer always portrayed 
the leaders of the Weimar Republic as Jewish caricatures. 
This alleged connection between the Jews and the system 
was the subject of some of Der Angriff's most virulent anti-
Semitic propaganda.3 
Bernhard Weiss, the vice president of the Berlin Police 
Force, and also a Jew and member of the Democratic Party, 
provided a particularly attractive target for Der Angriff's at-
tacks upon the system. Weiss, who was trained as a lawyer 
and soon became a judge, earned an Iron Cross First Class 
during the war. Following the war, he joined the Berlin Police 
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Force, his talent enabling him quiCkly to rise to the leader-
ship of the criminal police. Weiss became the number two 
man in the police department in 1927, shortly after Goebbels 
became Gauleiter. Soon Weiss was known in right-wing cir-
cles by the abusive name "Isidor." Use of Weiss's nickname 
became so widespread that many people were unaware that 
it was not his real name. Goebbels and the staff of Der Angrif{ 
played a vital role in bringing this about. An ongoing battle 
between Weiss and Goebbels, fought in the courts and on the 
pages of the Gau's newspaper, characterized Berlin politics 
for the next three years.4 
An article published in Der Angrif{ in October 1927 ex-
plained why the Nazis had chosen the apellation Isidor for 
Weiss. The custom of dubbing one's enemies with derisive 
names based upon their physiognomy was, according to the 
author of the piece, a tradition that went back to the Roman 
Empire ("Nomen est omen"). It was only natural, therefore, 
that Weiss be called Isidor. The Greek word dor meant gift, 
and lsi was short for the goddess Isis. Isidor meant "gift of 
Isis." Isis was a major Egyptian deity; hence Isidor also meant 
"gift of Egypt." Egypt was, according to Der Angriff, the source 
of much of the world's evil: the gypsies and "above all the 
Jews." The Bible also held that the Jews had come out of Egypt. 
Since Weiss was a Jew, this transparent pseudointellectual ar-
gument concluded, it was only natural that he be dubbed Isi-
dor, "gift from Egypt." The name, according to the newspaper, 
was not so much an insult as an accurate description of who 
Weiss was. This argument would often surface as a defense in 
libel suits brought by the police vice president against Der 
Angrif{.5 
Although the conflict between Weiss and Goebbels began 
with Nazi placards and speeches, it intensified after the po-
lice banned the party in May 1927. The 8-9 May 1927 issue of 
the Voelkischer Beobachter published a vicious polemic aimed 
at discrediting the police vice president. The lead story, "Vio-
lations of the Constitution by the Jewish-Marxist Berlin Po-
lice," charged that the prohibition issued against the Berlin 
NSDAP was a violation of the right to free speech guaranteed 
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"This is what he [Bernhard Weiss] looks like!" 
by the Weimar constitution. A large picture of Weiss ap-
peared under the headline. Above the picture was the caption 
"This is what he looks like! [So sieht er aus!]," the Nazis con-
tending that Weiss's appearance made it evident that he was 
Jewish. The police vice president refused to take this insult 
lying down and took Goebbels to court for defamation of 
character, thus beginning a series of legal battles between 
Weiss and the NSDAP that would continue over the next three 
years.6 
The "System" 115 
"Who votes list 'six' (Democrats)? Only people with the 
appropriate noses." 
Weiss's "Jewish" countenance remained a major theme in the 
political cartoons in Der Angriff. Drawings of Weiss always 
contained the prominent hooked nose that was so prevalent 
in anti-Semitic caricatures. A cartoon appearing during the 
May 1928 Reichstag election, for example, showed the police 
vice president standing in line, waiting to cast his vote. On 
his ballot appears the numeral six, the number of the list of 
the Democrats. Weiss's nose is also shown as containing the 
outline of a six. The clear implication of this cartoon was that 
those who voted for the Democrats were also supporting 
Weiss and the rest of the Jews who dominated the system. 
Another caricature depicted Weiss's face on a donkey, imply-
ing that he was an ass (Ese!).? 
Isidor, as a tool of the system, was allegedly a callous in-
dividual who did not care about the welfare of the German 
people. The actions of the Berlin police after the 1927 party 
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Bernhard Weiss as "The New Nero." 
congress in Nuremberg served as proof that the police force, 
dominated by men like Weiss, was a brutal puppet of the sys-
tem. When the Nazis returning from Nuremberg arrived at the 
train station, the Berlin police were there to greet them. They 
arrested some 500 Nazis for violating the prohibition on the 
NSDAP. As a result, they all missed a day of work, 74 of them 
losing their jobs. The actions of the police had, in the eyes of 
Der Angrif{, "made 74 workers breadless." This was, in the end, 
a victory for the Nazis, since the "hunger pains should help" 
remind these workers who was responsible for their plight. A 
caricature of Weiss appearing in December 1927 dubbed him 
"The New Nero." The cartoon showed Weiss dressed in a toga, 
policemen standing behind him in the uniforms of Roman cen-
turions. Standing before Weiss was an SA man tied to a post 
with the word Verbot upon it. The implication of this cartoon 
was clear. National Socialism was a new movement, perse-
cuted by authorities who wanted to suppress the truth. In this 
it was much like first-century Christianity.8 
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A piece from September 1927 provides an excellent exam-
ple of the paper's contention that the Berlin Police Depart-
ment was a vicious, heartless organization. Der Angriff re-
ported that, while on her way home from a Nazi meeting with 
her husband, a woman identified only as Mrs. Dornbusch was 
assaulted by the police after someone nearby shouted, "Deut-
schland erwache!" Not only was Mrs. Dornbusch beaten by the 
officers, she was also arrested. Things only got worse for the 
poor woman. A "fat ... [police] commissar named Hoehne" 
decided that, since Frau Dornbusch was in jail, there was no 
one to take care of her six-year-old child. Hoehne wanted to 
take the child to the orphanage. Not only had the police forbid-
den Dornbusch from exercising her right to demonstrate for 
the NSDAP, but it also tried to "rob her child" from her. Clearly, 
the system had gone too far in this instance.9 
On another occasion, Der Angriff claimed, the police had 
been warned two hours in advance about a planned Commu-
nist attack upon storm troopers in the Goerlitzer train sta-
tion but had done nothing to prevent it. This was typical, the 
article went on to say, of the way that the system yielded in 
the face of the red terror. The RFB waged" open civil war" on 
the streets of Berlin, not only against the Nazis but also the 
people of Berlin and the policemen themselves. Yet the police 
were concerned primarily with crushing the Nazi Party, the 
only true representatives of the Volk.1° 
But such actions on the part of the police were, in the 
eyes of Der Angriff, typical. The police had, the paper con-
tended, consistently assaulted people participating in peace-
ful demonstrations. One Nazi, the butcher Herbert Guenz, for 
example, was assaulted by five men (allegedly Jewish friends 
of the police) as the police looked on. When he began to fight 
back, the policemen responded by beating Guenz with their 
billy clubs. This was in sharp contrast to official policy, 
which stated that the police were obligated to protect those 
participating in a peaceful assembly. This hypocrisy, how-
ever, was indicative of the injustice inherent in the system. 
Another major theme of Der Angriff's attacks upon the Berlin 
police was alleged corruption. A story appearing in Decem-
118 Goebbels and Der Angriff 
ber 1927 charged that the police held parties with official 
money. Also, the wife of the police president received the use 
of a horse at taxpayers' expense. The police force, like all oth-
er parts of the Weimar system, was ridden with corruption.!! 
Der Angrif{ often singled out Weiss as a specific target for 
similar attacks, particularly in political cartoons. These car-
toons depicted Weiss as single-minded and ruthless in his 
persecution of Berlin's Nazis. A December 1927 cartoon, for 
example, was entitled "Isidor, if he would have celebrated 
Christmas." The cartoon shows Weiss, callous as ever, hang-
ing dead SA men upon his Christmas tree. At the top of the 
tree is a Star of David. The gramophone is playing "Daughter 
of Zion be Joyful." At the right is a dog with a policeman's 
head, clearly implying that policemen are mere lackeys of 
Weiss, the persecutor of the NSDAP. Another cartoon showed 
Weiss astride a rocking horse, calling the dogs of the Socialist 
Party to the hunt. The intended victim of the chase was the 
NSDAP, represented by a majestic elk. The title of the cartoon 
was "The 'hunt' begins." Yet another caricature of Weiss de-
picted him as a boxer. Before him was a punching bag with 
the word Constitution upon it. The caption read: "The daily 
morning training of a well-known political knock-out artist." 
The implication of this cartoon was clear: Weiss's support for 
the Weimar constitution was not only one of convenience, it 
was also inconsistent. While standing steadfast behind it, the 
police vice president was more than willing to batter the con-
stitution when it suited himP 
In general, Der Angrif{'s depiction of the Berlin Police 
Force was designed to enhance the image of the NSDAP as a 
persecuted movement. The Nazis were trying to overthrow 
the evil system, which was merely a tool the Jews used to 
keep Germany subjugated. In the face of the Nazis' unrelent-
ing onslaught, the system had turned its police upon the 
peaceful Nazi Party. Weimar authorities could not keep the 
NSDAP under control by the nonviolent means consistent with 
the Weimar constitution. Like every other wing of the system, 
the Jews dominated the police force. Further, the police force 
was the backbone of the system, because without its violent 
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Bernhard Weiss batters the constitution. 
actions against the German people, the Volk would rise up and 
overthrow the republic, thereby redeeming Germany. It was 
the fist of the system. Bernhard Weiss served as an excellent 
symbol for the system because he was a leader of the Berlin 
Police Force and was Jewish. Also, he fought the Nazis at every 
turn, determined not to let SA thugs have free rein in his city. 
While Weiss's actions helped to make the streets of Berlin safer, 
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they also had the unfortunate result of feeding into Der An-
griff's propaganda. Prohibitions and violent clashes between 
the Nazis and the police only served to enhance the image of 
the party among opponents of the Weimar Republic. Because 
the system hated by so many was determined to crush the 
NSDAP, the Nazis became heroes in the minds of many people. 
Thus a major goal of Goebbels's propaganda was attained. 
The victims of Der Angriff's hyperbole, however, were not 
without recourse. From the outset, the paper faced numerous 
legal challenges in the form of libel suits. After the enactment 
of the changes in the Reich Press Law in 1930, bans upon Der 
Angriff's publication became a frequent alternative to libel 
actions. 
During the first three years of the paper's publication, 
however, libel suits were the only option open to victims of Der 
Angriff's enmity who did not wish to let Goebbels's insults pass 
unopposed. Weiss, the public figure most often attacked on the 
pages of the paper, was among the most frequent plaintiffs in 
these cases. He accused Der Angriff of libel at least three times 
during the first six months of the paper's publication. These 
and subsequent suits brought against Goebbels and other 
leaders ofthe paper's editorial staff had mixed success. While 
Goebbels, Duerr, or Lippert often received fines and prison 
terms as a result of these suits, Goebbels used his immunity as 
a member of the Reichstag to avoid serving jail terms. Further, 
these attacks upon Der Angriff served as ammunition for the 
paper's propaganda against the system.B 
One of the first cases Weiss brought against Der Angriff 
involved a series of articles published in the paper during the 
last three months of 1927, as well as two political cartoons. 
The articles appeared under the rubric, "Danger! Rubber 
Clubs." They were vicious personal attacks, chastising "Isi-
dor" for cowardice, insisting that he was using the power of 
the Berlin Police Force to attack the fledgling NSDAP, thereby 
pursuing the goals of the Jewish-dominated system. "You 
should be ashamed of yourself, Isidor," the paper concluded. 
One of the offensive cartoons was the one depicting Weiss's 
face on the body of a donkey. The other related Der Angriff's 
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'''Bernhard': 'Prohibited?-How come?-Has he attacked a Jew?'" 
position on Weiss's recent prohibition of the Communist Red 
Front Fighters' League. The cartoon showed an SA man talk-
ing to the police vice president and pointing at two RFB men. 
The caption read: "'Bernhard:' 'Prohibited?-How come-
Has he assaulted a Jew?'" The implication was that Weiss 
did not care for the storm troopers assaulted by the RFB, only 
for his fellow Jews,14 
The indictment in this case named Dagobert Duerr, the 
author of the articles, as the primary defendant with Goeb-
bels, publisher of the paper and Schulze, Der Angriff's printer, 
named as co-defendants. While the court acquitted Schulze, 
holding that he was not responsible for the newspaper's con-
tents, it handed down guilty verdicts against Duerr and Goeb-
bels. The court ruled that the use of the name Isidor to identify 
Weiss was libel, because it presented Weiss in a "hateful, un-
worthy manner" and strove "to make him [appear] comical." 
One of the articles also referred to Weiss as a "butcher of work-
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ers [Arbeiterschlaechter] , which contains a stark impression of 
misconduct." "They [the attacks] are therefore libelous." The 
court also judged the caricature of Weiss being addressed by 
the storm trooper libelous because it accused him of showing 
"favoritism to a political party." The court ruled that, since 
Weiss had always acted in accordance with the orders of his 
superiors, he had never shown partiality to any political fac-
tion. Both Goebbels and Duerr received two months in jail for 
the cartoons and an additional three weeks for the articles. 
Because Goebbels was a member of the Reichstag, he did not 
serve a single day of his sentence. IS 
Goebbels and Der Angriff responded to these court cases in 
a number of ways. Since these strategies were not mutually 
exclusive, they were often carried out in conjunction with one 
another. First, the defendants would plead ignorance. Since 
few of the articles in the newspaper had bylines, the accused 
would simply claim that, although he was editor of the part of 
the paper in which the offending article appeared, he had not 
written it. Further, because of the time his job entailed at the 
understaffed paper, he had not even read the article before it 
appeared; nor did he know who had written it. Second, Goeb-
bels and his cohorts often employed a stalling technique. Their 
lawyers would repeatedly ask for continuances and the ac-
cused would often fail to appear for his court date. Another al-
ternative, at first only open to Goebbels but later to other 
members of Der Angriff's staff, was to make use of the immu-
nity from prosecution accorded a member of the Reichstag. 
Even when the court managed to have this privilege revoked, it 
failed to make its sting felt. The Reichstag, which was willing 
to remove Goebbels's immunity from prosecution, refused to 
take away the Gauleiter's exemption from serving time in jail. 
The final tactic was to mount a counterattack on the pages of 
Der Angriff.16 
The editors of the newspaper sought to use these cases for 
propaganda purposes. Often the paper derided the decisions 
of the courts, exhibiting its contempt for the machinations of 
the system. Der Angriff's response to the outcome of the case 
Weiss brought against the paper because of the "Danger! Rub-
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ber Clubs" articles and the two political cartoons is a good 
example in this regard. The author of the article" J ail for Dr. 
Goebbels: Does the Court Take Bernhard Weiss for a Donkey?" 
insisted that the name Isidor was not meant as a personal at-
tack against the police vice president. Rather, it is symbolic of 
"the spirit of the rubber club democracy" Weiss represented. 
That Weiss "recognized" his own face in that of the donkey, the 
piece went on to argue, only indicated that he had a rather low 
opinion of his own looks. Surely, two months for "making 
[Weiss] look comical" was excessive, the article contended. In 
the end, however, the "most pitiful" aspect of the case was the 
fact that the court held that Weiss "looked like a donkey." 17 
Another response Der Angrif{ exhibited against judgments 
of the Weimar courts was to accuse the system of hypocrisy. 
Although the court acquitted Goebbels of a charge of libeling 
Reich President von Hindenburg, the staff of the paper was 
not satisfied. The purpose of the case-and in this the Nazis' 
enemies failed-was to silence the major critic of the system. 
In short, the suit was a violation of Goebbels's right to free 
speech. The paper did not point out the hypocrisy of this posi-
tion or the fact that the concept of freedom of speech was 
totally foreign to the Nazi world view. The NSDAP was the 
beneficiary of the rules of the very system it chastised so fre-
quently and promised to eliminate when it came to power. IS 
After President Hindenburg issued the "Presidential De-
cree Concerning Defense Against Political Excesses" in 1930 it 
became possible for Weimar authorities to prohibit periodi-
cals that printed libelous attacks upon government officials. 
Under the law, newspapers could not be banned because of 
"their tendency as such," but only because of specific abuses. 
That is, a paper had actually to print a libelous article aimed at 
either a public official or the republican government before it 
could be banned. It could not be prohibited simply because of 
its political affiliation.'9 
A series of laws passed in 1931 established more specifi-
cally what constituted legal grounds for a prohibition. Peri-
odicals could be banned for any combination of four reasons: 
(1) undermining the constitution, (2) attacking the "organs" 
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of the government, (3) insulting a religious group, or (4) hav-
ing "endangered public security or order." Under this law, 
dailies could be banned for as long as eight weeks (later re-
duced to four weeks) and all other periodicals for as much as 
six months. At first the Reich chancellor was responsible for 
issuing the bans, but later the power fell upon the minister of 
the interior.2o 
Weimar authorities made liberal use of this law. Journalist 
Wolfgang Bretholz held that "prohibitions upon newspapers 
were issued an average of twice per day" throughout the Reich. 
He provided more specific statistics for Prussia. In April 1931, 
ten prohibitions were issued; in May, eleven; and in June 1931, 
seventeen. These numbers include newspapers of all political 
persuasions. Between November 1930 and August 1932, Der 
Angriff was prohibited thirteen times. The bans, lasting from 
one to four weeks, totaled nineteen weeks.21 
The final prohibition issued against Der Angriff, occur-
ring in August 1932, serves as an excellent example of the 
grounds that constituted justification for a ban upon a news-
paper. The warrant announcing the prohibition listed several 
articles published in the paper as grounds for legal action. 
The first piece listed was the lead article for the 23 August 
edition of the paper, "The Incomprehensible has Happened!" 
The article dealt with the conviction of five storm troopers 
for murdering a Pole in the Pomeranian town of Beuthen. The 
paper insisted that "if one hair on the heads of the convicted 
is harmed, not only will Germany be in jeopardy, but every-
thing will simply be smashed to ruins." Weimar authorities 
held this statement to be a call for the violent overthrow of 
the republic. The following day, after the court handed down 
a death sentence, Der Angriff stated that "we find it a shame 
that five German freedom fighters will be murdered because 
of one Polish insurgent." The interior ministry ruled that the 
contention that "execution of a legal judgment of a German 
court" would constitute murder was an attack upon the Min-
istry of Justice, an organ of the state and, therefore, justifica-
tion for a prohibition. Yet another article insisted that the 
court's decision had been based upon political considerations 
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that had little to do with justice. Because this was untrue, the 
article was considered libelous and hence cited as further 
grounds for a prohibition. The ban lasted one week. The 
matter-of-fact manner in which Goebbels mentioned the pro-
hibition in his diaries is indicative of the fact that, by this 
time, the Gauleiter had had extensive contact with the courts 
and took dealings with them in stride.22 
The effectiveness of such bans is difficult to determine 
with certainty, but some conclusions can be safely drawn. On 
the negative side, the editors of Der Angriff saw any prohibi-
tion imposed by the system as a badge of honor. On the day in 
which a ban went into effect, the paper would publish a spe-
cial one-page edition announcing the actions of the Interior 
Ministry. "Der Angriff verboten!" the headline would read. Be-
neath the headline would appear an excerpt from the police 
warrant ordering the ban. Not only did this provide an oppor-
tunity to show to Der Angriff's readers that the paper was be-
ing punished for attacking the system, it also permitted the 
editors to reprint the most vicious portions of the libelous 
copy. In short, prohibitions were counterproductive to the ex-
tent that they, like libel cases brought before the courts, pro-
vided more material for Gau Berlin's propaganda machine.23 
Prohibitions and libel suits, however, apparently proved 
effective on other levels. First and foremost, prohibitions de-
nied the editors of Der Angriff the opportunity to reach tens of 
thousands of readers every day. Bans were a serious blow to the 
Gau's propaganda apparatus. In addition, the paper was in al-
most constant financial difficulty, and a prohibition imposed 
additional monetary hardships. If no papers were printed, 
none were sold, and no money was collected from newsstand 
sales. Employees, however, still had to be paid, news-gathering 
activities had to continue, and the materials necessary to pub-
lish future editions had to be bought. By 1932, Der Angriffhad a 
circulation of over one hundred thousand; hence the money 
lost during a week-long ban would have been significant. Also, 
tens of thousands of marks in fines were accrued as a result of 
legal actions. Although Goebbels could afford to ignore prison 
sentences, the Gau simply could not afford to pay these fines. 
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At one time Hinkel noted that, because of bans imposed by the 
interior ministry, Der Angriff was in dire straits, having enough 
paper for only two days and no one willing to extend the news-
paper credit. The effectiveness of the legal actions brought 
against the Berlin organ is evinced by the reduction in the num-
ber of attacks against Weiss published in Der Angriff through-
out 1930. By the end of the year, the hooked-nose caricatures of 
the vice president of the Berlin Police Force had disappeared 
entirely. This was likely the result of Weiss's continuous stream 
of libel cases brought against the paper. These cost Der Angriff 
money not only in the form of fines but also in costly legal fees. 
In 1930Der Angriffsimplycapitulatedin its war with the police 
vice president. The system won this battle.24 
Der Angriff's battles with the system and what the paper 
viewed as its primary symbol, Bernhard Weiss, show much 
about the propaganda techniques of Gau Berlin. In the eyes 
of the Nazi newspaper, the system was corrupt, uncaring, and 
dominated by Jews. Perhaps the most important conclusion 
to be drawn is that at the heart of Der Angriff was a virulent 
anti-Semitism. The system was responsible for all of Ger-
many's ills, and the Jews dominated it. In short, Der Angriff 
held the Jews responsible for all the ills plaguing Germany: 
inflation, unemployment, poverty, military weakness, the 
Versailles Treaty and reparations, as well as Marxism and 
class conflict. Indeed, it is possible to say that anti-Semitism 
was the central theme around which the staff of Der Angriff 
structured all of its propaganda. 
This fact helps further to support the contention that the 
National Socialist Weltanschauung was the result of a radical 
rejection of modernity. Ultimately, anti-Semitism was not so 
much the rejection of a people as it was the hatred of a way of 
life. As historian Peter Pulzer has pointed out, as central Eu-
rope became increasingly industrialized and overpopulated, 
anti-Jewish views became more prevalent. Since Germany's 
Jewish population was concentrated in the country's urban 
centers (Jews were not permitted to own land), it became 
popular to link the Jews with all of the perceived ills inherent 
in urban life: industry, overcrowding, the abuses of finance 
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capital, and the dehumanization of Germany's common peo-
ple. All of these things were common themes in Der Angriff's 
propaganda, and all revolved around an anti-Semitic motif. 
If it can be said that ultimately all of the paper's propaganda 
was anti-Semitic in its origins, it follows that National So-
cialism was, in the end, an antimodernist movement. This is 
true in spite of the fact that the Nazis did not hesitate to 
make use of such modern propaganda tools as newspapers.25 
The Berlin NSDAP'S only goal was political power, as can 
be seen in the hypocritical methods Der Angriff used to battle 
the system. The Nazis were totally without scruples in this 
regard. When it suited them to do so, Goebbels and his un-
derlings continually made use of a system they held was the 
creation of the much-hated Jews. Ironically, if not for the pro-
tection afforded by that system they could not have battled it 
as effectively as they did. The constitution of the Weimar Re-
public contained the seeds of its own destruction. On the oth-
er hand, if the Weimar Republic had not guaranteed freedom 
of speech, it could hardly have considered itself a republic. 
Conclusion 
On 30 January 1933 Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Ger-
many, beginning a new era in European history. During the 
next twelve years, the Nazi regime affected the lives of mil-
lions. The changes brought by the Nazi "seizure of power" 
also had an effect upon Der Angriff. The paper was no longer a 
major concern to Goebbels, who became chief of the Third 
Reich's immense propaganda machine. It eventually fell out 
of his orbit, becoming the official organ of the German Labor 
Front. Although Der Angriff continued to be published until 
April 1945, it did not playa major role in Hitler's Germany. 
But Der Angriff played an important part in the rise of Na-
tional Socialism in Berlin. The paper was born in a period of 
extreme hardship for the Berlin NSDAP and helped maintain 
the existence of Nazism in the face a police prohibition. Many 
of the future leaders of Berlin's NSDAP got their start working 
for Der Angriff. For the first year of its existence the paper was 
the only legal means by which Goebbels could propagate Nazi 
ideas. For this reason, he paid special attention to the contents 
of the paper, always striving to create the atmosphere of a 
street battle or a barroom brawl. He knew that this type of 
nihilistic hooliganism appealed to his constituents. The Gau-
leiter was as successful as could have been expected given the 
limited resources with which he was working. Indeed, it is 
possible that, if Goebbels had not created a newspaper in the 
summer of 1927, the Berlin NSDAP may have perished. 
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Der Angriff continued to provide a vehicle for Nazi propa-
ganda throughout the Kampfzeit. On its pages, Goebbels and 
his underlings could present their world view to the paper's 
readers. At first these were few in number. Later, as electoral 
successes mounted, circulation increased to over one hun-
dred thousand daily, making Der Angriff a force to be reck-
oned with. It became an important actor in Berlin's political 
life, a serious rival to the other political newspapers pub-
lished in the German capital. 
The paper's propaganda methods were largely negative 
in character. The writers, editors, and cartoonists simply at-
tacked the Weimar Republic and everything connected with 
it, offering no alternative program of their own. At the same 
time, the paper emphasized the Nazi contention that, once 
the NSDAP came to power, all of Germany's problems would 
be solved. These motifs had an important effect. For example, 
many Berliners thought that Bernhard Weiss's real name was 
Isidor. Further, Der Angriff helped make Horst Wessel a na-
tional hero. It played an important role in intra-party dis-
putes such as the Goebbels-Strasser feud and the Stennes re-
volt and helped to create the Hitler Myth, which would play 
such a prominent role in the Third Reich. 
At the core of this propaganda was a virulent anti-Semi-
tism. The paper was consistent with the party line in blaming 
all of Germany's ills upon the Jews. The Jews stood behind the 
Weimar Republic, which the Nazis held responsible for every-
thing bad in Germany. Der Angriff's anti-Semitic propaganda 
was unique in that it tried to appeal to Germany's proletariat. 
Previously, hatred of Jews was, for the most part, the domin-
ion of peasant politics. It had made little headway within 
working-class movements. Even after the electoral debacle of 
May 1928, Der Angriff continued to concentrate its efforts upon 
the proletariat. Circumstantial evidence indicates that many, 
if not most, of the paper's readers were from a working-class 
background. 
Der Angriff's constant attacks upon the Weimar system 
did much to discredit further the republic in the eyes of the 
German right wing. The economic debacle beginning in 1929 
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helped to increase the appeal of a newspaper that strove to 
assail the status quo at every turn. This served to make the 
Nazis more attractive to many German voters disillusioned 
with their lot under the republic. Der Angriffhelped create a 
political atmosphere in which the NSDAP could flourish. 
These conclusions have an impact upon larger issues. First, 
they help to explain why the Nazis ultimately succeeded. The 
staff of Der Angrif{ was adept at benefiting from the suffering 
of the German people. The paper, for the most part, accu-
rately portrayed the daily misery experienced by millions of 
Germans. The organ helped the Nazis to appear sympathetic. 
Further, it told the German people that they were not to 
blame for their anguish. It was outsiders, the Jews, who were 
responsible. Finally, Der Angriff offered a simple solution to 
Germany's problems: give the NSDAP power. Its leaders knew 
that the only way to improve things was to eliminate the 
Jews from positions of authority. In this regard, the paper 
helped prepare the way for the persecution and eventual 
murder of millions of Europe's Jews and other "subhumans." 
If anti-Semitism were at the center of every aspect of Nazi 
ideology, it is clear that National Socialism was an anti-
modernist movement. It was not the last gasp of monopoly 
capitalism as Marxist historians claim. It was organized rac-
ism. Nazism was a reaction to industrialization, urbaniza-
tion, and the alienation felt by the common man in the mod-
ern world. Only by accepting this fact can scholars b~gin to 
understand the seemingly inexplicable phenomenon that was 
the Third Reich. 
If one accepts the view that National Socialism was ulti-
mately an antimodern phenomenon, this calls into question 
efforts to link it too closely with Marxism-Leninism. Whereas 
Nazism rejected industrialization and the proletarianization 
of much of the German population, Marxism-Leninism ac-
cepted these changes, hoping to end the "exploitation" inher-
ent in industrial capitalism and replace it with a "humanist" 
alternative. In short, while it is clear that Hitler's Germany 
and Stalin's Soviet Union were both responsible for the deaths 
of millions, the motives of each regime were quite different. 
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This is a fact that historians, like Ernst Nolte, who try to 
equate the two movements ignore. National Socialism was 
unique.' 
Evidence culled from Der Angriff makes it clear that, in 
contrast to what other historians have said, the NSDAP did not 
give up on appeals to the proletariat after May 1928. This indi-
cates that, in spite of all its bizarre and repugnant elements, 
Nazi ideology had a pragmatic side. The Nazis wanted politi-
cal power. If Goebbels were to succeed in Berlin, he had to 
concentrate his propaganda upon the city's large working-
class population. He adapted his propaganda to local condi-
tions. Further, if the Nazis really wanted to create a mythical 
Volksgemeinschaft, they would need the support of Germany's 
proletariat. In this respect, Goebbels was looking ahead to the 
years after Hitler came to power. The Gauleiter clearly be-
lieved that the Third Reich was approaching. He, with the aid 
of his newspaper, was able to convince tens of thousands of 
Berliners of this as well. This was perhaps the most important 
contribution that Der Angriff made to the rise of National So-
cialism in Berlin. 
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Berliner Tageblatt, 10 July 1931, in Repositorium 90, Aktum 2412, 
Geheimes Staatsarchiv, 352. 
21. See Bretholz, "Zeitungsverbote;" "Der Angriff," in the NSDAP 
Hauptarchiv, Reel 47, Folder 968,2. 
22. Verbat issued against Der Angrif{by the Polizeipraesident, 24 
August 1932, Repositorium 431, Kanzlei Rosenberg, Aktum 2533, 
Bundesarchiv, 250-54. For more information about the Beuthen case 
and the NSDAP'S reaction to it, see Goebbels, Tagebuecher, vol. 2, 
22-23 August 1932, 229-30. For Goebbels's brief mention of the pro-
hibition, see his Tagebuecher, vol. 2, 25 August 1932, 230. Goebbels 
states that an "Attack against Herr von Papen" was the reason for the 
ban. The documentary evidence, however, shows that the grounds 
consisted of much more than an attack upon the Chancellor. 
23. See for example, the single-page edition of Der Angrif{ ap-
pearing on 11 November 1930. 
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24. "Wir brauchen 1 000 RM," in the Hans Hinkel Collection, 
Hoover Institution Archives. 
25. On the anti modern nature of anti-Semitism see Peter G.J. 
Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, 
(New York: Wiley, 1964), 66, 240-41, 310-11; Fritz Stern, The Politics 
of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 62-63. 
Conclusion 
1. On this debate see Richard J. Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: 
West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past 
(New York: Pantheon, 1989), and Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable 
Past: History Holocaust, and German Identity (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1988). For a collection of some the most important 
texts to emerge during the dispute, known as the "Historikerstreit," 
see "H istorikerstreit:" Die Dokumentation der Krontroverse um die E in-
zigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen ludenvernichtung (Munich: 
Piper, 1987). 
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